I’ll grant that the objectification of people is wrong from a consequentialist perspective, barring any redeeming factors. I’ll also point out that any action (like supporting a given field of study) that has negative consequences which exceed the positive consequences is immoral from a consequentialist perspective. I’ll refrain from making any claims about whether supporting any specific field is a net negative.
No, I think that actions are ‘justified’ when the expected consequences are in accordance with the values of the actor. Actions are only ‘moral’ in my view when they are made with the mutual consent of all participating actors. A decision such as destroying one’s own private property and making oneself sad as a result are moral but unjustified in my view; from a consequentialist view, that would be immoral.
Unjustified actions are not always immoral, but do indicate suboptimal decision making and poor mental hygiene. Being able to recognize those decisions in oneself and others is important.
I rage against the sexism that results when the possible fact “There is a difference between male and female brain chemistry with this result” becomes “This is proof that one sex is [universally|locally] inferior”. Not because I have a moral obligation to prevent as much harm or create as much good as possible, but because I have a philosophical need for people, who are metaphysically equal, to be treated as metaphysically equal.
Actions are only ‘moral’ in my view when they are made with the mutual consent of all participating actors.
Is that a mere simplification of your deontology? Because if it’s the totality thereof, I find it very easy to construct counterexamples where it’d be really eccentric to proclaim them immoral… e.g. you see a two-year old child lean dangerously over an open window and you pull him back, lest it falls—even though it doesn’t consent and might even cry in protest.
Or you are a doctor and perform an operation to save the life of an unconscious patient that was in a car accident. You don’t have their consent because they’re unconscious and can’t provide it—does it mean the action of saving their life isn’t moral?
In the first counter-examples you make the assumption that people who are young are persons, in the sense that they are worth moral consideration. Some would maintain that children are not people, and thus any action regarding them cannot be considered moral/immoral. In other words, their consent does not matter as they are not ‘actors’. In that way Decius’ claim that all actors must consent would still be true, as you are the only actor in that scenario. I’d be curious to read about any justification you would cite for the treatment of children as moral actors.
However, that said, I find your second example to be more convincing, but I’d be interested to know how the nature of the unconsciousness might affect your view. Would someone in a vegetative state also be considered as a moral actor in your view (and thus should be saved)?
I think IAWYC, but I’d steel-man Decius and assume that young children unconscious people, etc. wouldn’t count as “actors” and thus such actions wouldn’t be more immoral than, say, replace a broken string in a guitar without its consensus.
Well, if that was the position, then it wouldn’t be any more immoral not to help an unconscious person than to not help a broken swing. That seems fairly problematic, so I doubt that’s a successful solution.
Why is it problematic to say that the existence of unconscious people does not obligate me to provide medical care any more than the existence of a broken string obligates me to provide repair services?
A doctor (profession) is under contract to be available and to provide emergency medical services; failing to perform that (social) contract without the consent of the other parties (all of society, in some cases), is impermissible. A doctor who has agreed to provide care in a given situation is obligated to, just as a repairman who has agreed to perform repairs in a given situation is obligated to do so.
Most people feel no obligation to help someone who is in need of help. For example, there is a shortage of living kidney donors everywhere.
The only thing that creates an obligation in me is my decision to accept an obligation; the only way I can obligate others is for them to accept the obligation.
It’s not the totality thereof- contract theory is also included with the concept “It is possible to consent to actions in the future in a manner which may not be unilaterally revoked.”
I can’t explain why the social contract or geographical government has jurisdiction over a new actor who does not choose to accept it.
Not because I have a moral obligation to prevent as much harm or create as much good as possible, but because I have a philosophical need for people, who are metaphysically equal, to be treated as metaphysically equal.
What kinds of experiences would you expect in a world where (some?) people are metaphysically equal that you wouldn’t expect in a world where people are not metaphysically equal?
If my premise that people are metaphysically equal is wrong, then something which is not part of this universe has privileged access over something else which is not part of this universe.
I would, for example, expect the same entity to make decisions for two physical bodies, or for psychic phenomena to exist and not have a physical basis, or for consciousness to persist after death differentially depending on the conscious entity; in general, things would have to be able happen without a physical basis and differentially based on the metaphysical person.
Since I posit that the metaphysical person exists only as a moral abstraction (and can thus be defined to be equal), such evidence that ‘personhood’ is an actual concrete thing, and that some ‘personhoods’ were inherently superior in an objectively measurable way would falsify my moral beliefs. I also suspect that it would be problematic for all moral systems.
Are you saying people are metaphysically equal by definition? If not, I’m not sure what you mean, since I find your comment somewhat difficult to follow.
A decision such as destroying one’s own private property and making oneself sad as a result are moral but unjustified in my view; from a consequentialist view, that would be immoral.
This confuses me: I self-identify as a consequentialist myself, but I wouldn’t call an action which harms you but no-one else “immoral” (but I’d call it stupid).
I’m not at all sure what it means for an act to be immoral, under a consequentialist moral frame, if not that it leads to the loss of value. Can you expand on this?
But deliberately harming oneself does lead to a loss of value (at least as much as if you did that). So, why do I think that harming you is not-evil if you do it yourself but not if I do it? I’m confused...
You said that if I perform an action that harms me, that’s not immoral. We agree that if I perform an action that harms me, that leads to a loss of value. So it follows that whatever it means for an act to be immoral, by your reasoning, it is not simply that it leads to a loss of value. Also, you’ve identified your moral reasoning as consequentialist.
So I’m asking: under your consequentialist moral frame, what does it mean for an act to be immoral, since you don’t think it’s that it leads to a loss of value?
It’s been suggested elsewhere that the key here is foreknowledge… that an immoral act is one that has negative expected value for the actor. I would agree that this is consistent with a (rule-)consequentialist moral frame, and that you might mean “I wouldn’t call an action which harms you but no-one else ‘immoral’ (assuming you don’t expect it to cause harm).” I would agree with that statement (though I would find it odd) but I doubt that’s actually what you meant.
Many consequentialist systems consider the morality or immorality of an action to be a function of the consequences expected by the agent at the time when it makes the decision. For any act, there is a possible universe where that act results in harmful consequences relative to the alternatives. What matters is how harmful it typically is, when executed by an agent in the same epistemic state.
I would guess that among humans we consider self-harming behaviour a sign of mental incompetence, since people don’t usually desire their own suffering. Hence someone who takes “stupid” actions is probably believing that the actions lead to excellent consequences, in which case you can prevent such behaviour through psychological treatment rather than punishment.
Well, OK, but if “better addressed through psychological treatment than punishment” is equivalent to “not immoral”, then it seems that by that reasoning my harming others isn’t immoral either, as long as I’m incompetent enough to expect an increase in value from my actions.
I guess so. But harming anyone at all can still be considered bad. “Immoral” simply has a connotation (or maybe even an additional denotation?) of “blameful” that means it can basically only be applied to competent agents.
I’ll grant that the objectification of people is wrong from a consequentialist perspective, barring any redeeming factors.
Isn’t consequentialism intrinsically objectifying? It doesn’t treat people as right holders but as means to the end of achieving desirable world states.
It can also treat people as the ends, instead of the means, of desirable world states.
I intuit that there is also something along the lines of ‘equal objectification’; if everyone, including oneself, is objectified equally, is that really objectification? I don’t know and must consider that.
It can also treat people as the ends, instead of the means, of desirable world states.
In practice at best it treats people as some combination of tools and victory points.
I intuit that there is also something along the lines of ‘equal objectification’; if everyone, including oneself, is objectified equally, is that really objectification? I don’t know and must consider that.
but because I have a philosophical need for people, who are metaphysically equal, to be treated as metaphysically equal.
I invite you to consider the possibility that what people are, and how people should be treated as, may possibly be two different things. If they’re not “metaphysically equal”, perhaps it’s still best that they be treated as such.
If things are different in a significant way, it is appropriate that they are treated as different.
It is a premise of mine that people are metaphysically equal; to delve further into that we need to discuss what ‘people’ means. I doubt that you will find such a discussion rewarding.
Equal, in every sense that cannot be falsified by the observation of privilege or inequality which exists only in the embodied world.
Basically, it’s a way of creating a metaphysical entity “person”, which is defined to be that which exercises control over the physical embodiment of that person. By making the moral agent an abstract rather than a concrete, the inequalities which exist in the concrete world do not falsify the claim to general equality.
For example, people do not lose or gain rights as their fortunes change.
What is the metaphysical entity “rock”, and how do the actions of physical geology reflect them? When a person consents to a transaction in the world, their body is what makes the decision and indicates to other people’s bodies that consent is present.
If a rock consents to an action which involves a geologic object, how would it indicate that to other physical objects?
I’ll grant that the objectification of people is wrong from a consequentialist perspective, barring any redeeming factors. I’ll also point out that any action (like supporting a given field of study) that has negative consequences which exceed the positive consequences is immoral from a consequentialist perspective. I’ll refrain from making any claims about whether supporting any specific field is a net negative.
No, I think that actions are ‘justified’ when the expected consequences are in accordance with the values of the actor. Actions are only ‘moral’ in my view when they are made with the mutual consent of all participating actors. A decision such as destroying one’s own private property and making oneself sad as a result are moral but unjustified in my view; from a consequentialist view, that would be immoral.
Unjustified actions are not always immoral, but do indicate suboptimal decision making and poor mental hygiene. Being able to recognize those decisions in oneself and others is important.
I rage against the sexism that results when the possible fact “There is a difference between male and female brain chemistry with this result” becomes “This is proof that one sex is [universally|locally] inferior”. Not because I have a moral obligation to prevent as much harm or create as much good as possible, but because I have a philosophical need for people, who are metaphysically equal, to be treated as metaphysically equal.
Is that a mere simplification of your deontology? Because if it’s the totality thereof, I find it very easy to construct counterexamples where it’d be really eccentric to proclaim them immoral… e.g. you see a two-year old child lean dangerously over an open window and you pull him back, lest it falls—even though it doesn’t consent and might even cry in protest.
Or you are a doctor and perform an operation to save the life of an unconscious patient that was in a car accident. You don’t have their consent because they’re unconscious and can’t provide it—does it mean the action of saving their life isn’t moral?
In the first counter-examples you make the assumption that people who are young are persons, in the sense that they are worth moral consideration. Some would maintain that children are not people, and thus any action regarding them cannot be considered moral/immoral. In other words, their consent does not matter as they are not ‘actors’. In that way Decius’ claim that all actors must consent would still be true, as you are the only actor in that scenario. I’d be curious to read about any justification you would cite for the treatment of children as moral actors.
However, that said, I find your second example to be more convincing, but I’d be interested to know how the nature of the unconsciousness might affect your view. Would someone in a vegetative state also be considered as a moral actor in your view (and thus should be saved)?
I think IAWYC, but I’d steel-man Decius and assume that young children unconscious people, etc. wouldn’t count as “actors” and thus such actions wouldn’t be more immoral than, say, replace a broken string in a guitar without its consensus.
Well, if that was the position, then it wouldn’t be any more immoral not to help an unconscious person than to not help a broken swing. That seems fairly problematic, so I doubt that’s a successful solution.
Why is it problematic to say that the existence of unconscious people does not obligate me to provide medical care any more than the existence of a broken string obligates me to provide repair services?
A doctor (profession) is under contract to be available and to provide emergency medical services; failing to perform that (social) contract without the consent of the other parties (all of society, in some cases), is impermissible. A doctor who has agreed to provide care in a given situation is obligated to, just as a repairman who has agreed to perform repairs in a given situation is obligated to do so.
It is not logically problematic, but it I still something with which (I think) most people would (say they) disagree.
Most people feel no obligation to help someone who is in need of help. For example, there is a shortage of living kidney donors everywhere.
The only thing that creates an obligation in me is my decision to accept an obligation; the only way I can obligate others is for them to accept the obligation.
It’s not the totality thereof- contract theory is also included with the concept “It is possible to consent to actions in the future in a manner which may not be unilaterally revoked.”
I can’t explain why the social contract or geographical government has jurisdiction over a new actor who does not choose to accept it.
What kinds of experiences would you expect in a world where (some?) people are metaphysically equal that you wouldn’t expect in a world where people are not metaphysically equal?
If my premise that people are metaphysically equal is wrong, then something which is not part of this universe has privileged access over something else which is not part of this universe.
I would, for example, expect the same entity to make decisions for two physical bodies, or for psychic phenomena to exist and not have a physical basis, or for consciousness to persist after death differentially depending on the conscious entity; in general, things would have to be able happen without a physical basis and differentially based on the metaphysical person.
Since I posit that the metaphysical person exists only as a moral abstraction (and can thus be defined to be equal), such evidence that ‘personhood’ is an actual concrete thing, and that some ‘personhoods’ were inherently superior in an objectively measurable way would falsify my moral beliefs. I also suspect that it would be problematic for all moral systems.
Are you saying people are metaphysically equal by definition? If not, I’m not sure what you mean, since I find your comment somewhat difficult to follow.
This confuses me: I self-identify as a consequentialist myself, but I wouldn’t call an action which harms you but no-one else “immoral” (but I’d call it stupid).
I’m not at all sure what it means for an act to be immoral, under a consequentialist moral frame, if not that it leads to the loss of value. Can you expand on this?
But deliberately harming oneself does lead to a loss of value (at least as much as if you did that). So, why do I think that harming you is not-evil if you do it yourself but not if I do it? I’m confused...
I’m not sure what’s confusing.
You said that if I perform an action that harms me, that’s not immoral.
We agree that if I perform an action that harms me, that leads to a loss of value.
So it follows that whatever it means for an act to be immoral, by your reasoning, it is not simply that it leads to a loss of value.
Also, you’ve identified your moral reasoning as consequentialist.
So I’m asking: under your consequentialist moral frame, what does it mean for an act to be immoral, since you don’t think it’s that it leads to a loss of value?
It’s been suggested elsewhere that the key here is foreknowledge… that an immoral act is one that has negative expected value for the actor. I would agree that this is consistent with a (rule-)consequentialist moral frame, and that you might mean “I wouldn’t call an action which harms you but no-one else ‘immoral’ (assuming you don’t expect it to cause harm).” I would agree with that statement (though I would find it odd) but I doubt that’s actually what you meant.
Many consequentialist systems consider the morality or immorality of an action to be a function of the consequences expected by the agent at the time when it makes the decision. For any act, there is a possible universe where that act results in harmful consequences relative to the alternatives. What matters is how harmful it typically is, when executed by an agent in the same epistemic state.
I would guess that among humans we consider self-harming behaviour a sign of mental incompetence, since people don’t usually desire their own suffering. Hence someone who takes “stupid” actions is probably believing that the actions lead to excellent consequences, in which case you can prevent such behaviour through psychological treatment rather than punishment.
Or something like that.
Well, OK, but if “better addressed through psychological treatment than punishment” is equivalent to “not immoral”, then it seems that by that reasoning my harming others isn’t immoral either, as long as I’m incompetent enough to expect an increase in value from my actions.
I guess so. But harming anyone at all can still be considered bad. “Immoral” simply has a connotation (or maybe even an additional denotation?) of “blameful” that means it can basically only be applied to competent agents.
Isn’t consequentialism intrinsically objectifying? It doesn’t treat people as right holders but as means to the end of achieving desirable world states.
It can also treat people as the ends, instead of the means, of desirable world states.
I intuit that there is also something along the lines of ‘equal objectification’; if everyone, including oneself, is objectified equally, is that really objectification? I don’t know and must consider that.
In practice at best it treats people as some combination of tools and victory points.
Taboo ‘objectification’.
I invite you to consider the possibility that what people are, and how people should be treated as, may possibly be two different things. If they’re not “metaphysically equal”, perhaps it’s still best that they be treated as such.
If things are different in a significant way, it is appropriate that they are treated as different.
It is a premise of mine that people are metaphysically equal; to delve further into that we need to discuss what ‘people’ means. I doubt that you will find such a discussion rewarding.
I’d like to know what you mean by ‘metaphysically equal’?
Equal, in every sense that cannot be falsified by the observation of privilege or inequality which exists only in the embodied world.
Basically, it’s a way of creating a metaphysical entity “person”, which is defined to be that which exercises control over the physical embodiment of that person. By making the moral agent an abstract rather than a concrete, the inequalities which exist in the concrete world do not falsify the claim to general equality.
For example, people do not lose or gain rights as their fortunes change.
By that definition aren’t people ‘metaphysically equal’ to rocks?
What is the metaphysical entity “rock”, and how do the actions of physical geology reflect them? When a person consents to a transaction in the world, their body is what makes the decision and indicates to other people’s bodies that consent is present.
If a rock consents to an action which involves a geologic object, how would it indicate that to other physical objects?