Not because I have a moral obligation to prevent as much harm or create as much good as possible, but because I have a philosophical need for people, who are metaphysically equal, to be treated as metaphysically equal.
What kinds of experiences would you expect in a world where (some?) people are metaphysically equal that you wouldn’t expect in a world where people are not metaphysically equal?
If my premise that people are metaphysically equal is wrong, then something which is not part of this universe has privileged access over something else which is not part of this universe.
I would, for example, expect the same entity to make decisions for two physical bodies, or for psychic phenomena to exist and not have a physical basis, or for consciousness to persist after death differentially depending on the conscious entity; in general, things would have to be able happen without a physical basis and differentially based on the metaphysical person.
Since I posit that the metaphysical person exists only as a moral abstraction (and can thus be defined to be equal), such evidence that ‘personhood’ is an actual concrete thing, and that some ‘personhoods’ were inherently superior in an objectively measurable way would falsify my moral beliefs. I also suspect that it would be problematic for all moral systems.
Are you saying people are metaphysically equal by definition? If not, I’m not sure what you mean, since I find your comment somewhat difficult to follow.
What kinds of experiences would you expect in a world where (some?) people are metaphysically equal that you wouldn’t expect in a world where people are not metaphysically equal?
If my premise that people are metaphysically equal is wrong, then something which is not part of this universe has privileged access over something else which is not part of this universe.
I would, for example, expect the same entity to make decisions for two physical bodies, or for psychic phenomena to exist and not have a physical basis, or for consciousness to persist after death differentially depending on the conscious entity; in general, things would have to be able happen without a physical basis and differentially based on the metaphysical person.
Since I posit that the metaphysical person exists only as a moral abstraction (and can thus be defined to be equal), such evidence that ‘personhood’ is an actual concrete thing, and that some ‘personhoods’ were inherently superior in an objectively measurable way would falsify my moral beliefs. I also suspect that it would be problematic for all moral systems.
Are you saying people are metaphysically equal by definition? If not, I’m not sure what you mean, since I find your comment somewhat difficult to follow.