But deliberately harming oneself does lead to a loss of value (at least as much as if you did that). So, why do I think that harming you is not-evil if you do it yourself but not if I do it? I’m confused...
You said that if I perform an action that harms me, that’s not immoral. We agree that if I perform an action that harms me, that leads to a loss of value. So it follows that whatever it means for an act to be immoral, by your reasoning, it is not simply that it leads to a loss of value. Also, you’ve identified your moral reasoning as consequentialist.
So I’m asking: under your consequentialist moral frame, what does it mean for an act to be immoral, since you don’t think it’s that it leads to a loss of value?
It’s been suggested elsewhere that the key here is foreknowledge… that an immoral act is one that has negative expected value for the actor. I would agree that this is consistent with a (rule-)consequentialist moral frame, and that you might mean “I wouldn’t call an action which harms you but no-one else ‘immoral’ (assuming you don’t expect it to cause harm).” I would agree with that statement (though I would find it odd) but I doubt that’s actually what you meant.
But deliberately harming oneself does lead to a loss of value (at least as much as if you did that). So, why do I think that harming you is not-evil if you do it yourself but not if I do it? I’m confused...
I’m not sure what’s confusing.
You said that if I perform an action that harms me, that’s not immoral.
We agree that if I perform an action that harms me, that leads to a loss of value.
So it follows that whatever it means for an act to be immoral, by your reasoning, it is not simply that it leads to a loss of value.
Also, you’ve identified your moral reasoning as consequentialist.
So I’m asking: under your consequentialist moral frame, what does it mean for an act to be immoral, since you don’t think it’s that it leads to a loss of value?
It’s been suggested elsewhere that the key here is foreknowledge… that an immoral act is one that has negative expected value for the actor. I would agree that this is consistent with a (rule-)consequentialist moral frame, and that you might mean “I wouldn’t call an action which harms you but no-one else ‘immoral’ (assuming you don’t expect it to cause harm).” I would agree with that statement (though I would find it odd) but I doubt that’s actually what you meant.