One interesting datum about willpower (which I’ve observed repeatedly in many people and contexts; not sure if it’s officially documented anywhere) is that it’s much easier to take a fully scripted action than to take an action that requires creatively filling in details.
For example, suppose several people are out trying to do “rejection therapy” (a perhaps-dubious game in which folks make requests of strangers that are likely to be rejected, e.g. “Can I listen to the walkman you’re listening to for a moment?” or “Can we trade socks?”). Many many people who set out to ask a stranger such a question will… “decide” not to, once the stranger is actually near them. However, people who have written down exactly which words they plan to stay in what order to exactly which stranger, with no room for ambiguity, are (anecdotally but repeatedly) more likely to actually say the words. (Or to do many other difficult habits, I think.)
(I originally noticed this pattern in undergrad, when there was a study group I wanted to leave, but whose keeper I felt flinchy about disappointing by leaving. I planned to leave the group and then … didn’t. And the next week, planned again to leave the group and then didn’t. And the third week, came in with a fully written exact sentence, said my scripted sentence, and left.)
Further examples:
It’s often easier to do (the dishes, or exercise, or other ‘difficult’ tasks) if there’s a set time for it.
Creativity-requiring tasks are often harder to attempt than more structured/directions-following-y tasks (e.g. writing poetry, especially if you’re “actually trying” at it; or attempting alignment research in a more “what actually makes sense here?” way and a less “let me make deductions from this framework other people are using” way; or just writing a blog post vs critiquing one).
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I’ve previously taken the above observations as evidence for the “subparts of my mind with differing predictions” view — if there are different bits of my (mind/brain) that are involved in e.g. assembling the sentence, vs saying the sentence, then if I need to figure out what words to say I’ll need whatever’s involved in calling the “assemble sentences” bit to also be on board, which is to say that more of me will need to be on board.
I guess you could also try this from the “Bayesian evidence” standpoint. But I’m curious how you’d do it in detail. Like, would you say the prior against “moving muscles” extends also for “assembling sentences”?
I suppose that any moment when you have to choose “A or B” is actually a moment when your choices are “A or B or give up”. So the more such moments, the greater the chance of giving up.
Which seems like the reason behind one-click shopping (each click is a moment of choice “click or give up”).
To handle this, it would probably work to extend the “motionless” prior to a more abstract “status quo” prior. It’s not necessarily related to physical movement (it could even be the opposite if it were a sports group instead of a study group in your example) but rather an aversion to expending effort or experiencing potential undesired consequences. The prior says, “Things are fine. It’s not worth going out of the way to change that.”
With this extended version, creativity-requiring tasks are analogous to physically-demanding tasks. With pre-scripted tasks, it’s not as demanding in the moment.
One interesting datum about willpower (which I’ve observed repeatedly in many people and contexts; not sure if it’s officially documented anywhere) is that it’s much easier to take a fully scripted action than to take an action that requires creatively filling in details.
For example, suppose several people are out trying to do “rejection therapy” (a perhaps-dubious game in which folks make requests of strangers that are likely to be rejected, e.g. “Can I listen to the walkman you’re listening to for a moment?” or “Can we trade socks?”). Many many people who set out to ask a stranger such a question will… “decide” not to, once the stranger is actually near them. However, people who have written down exactly which words they plan to stay in what order to exactly which stranger, with no room for ambiguity, are (anecdotally but repeatedly) more likely to actually say the words. (Or to do many other difficult habits, I think.)
(I originally noticed this pattern in undergrad, when there was a study group I wanted to leave, but whose keeper I felt flinchy about disappointing by leaving. I planned to leave the group and then … didn’t. And the next week, planned again to leave the group and then didn’t. And the third week, came in with a fully written exact sentence, said my scripted sentence, and left.)
Further examples:
It’s often easier to do (the dishes, or exercise, or other ‘difficult’ tasks) if there’s a set time for it.
Creativity-requiring tasks are often harder to attempt than more structured/directions-following-y tasks (e.g. writing poetry, especially if you’re “actually trying” at it; or attempting alignment research in a more “what actually makes sense here?” way and a less “let me make deductions from this framework other people are using” way; or just writing a blog post vs critiquing one).
— I’ve previously taken the above observations as evidence for the “subparts of my mind with differing predictions” view — if there are different bits of my (mind/brain) that are involved in e.g. assembling the sentence, vs saying the sentence, then if I need to figure out what words to say I’ll need whatever’s involved in calling the “assemble sentences” bit to also be on board, which is to say that more of me will need to be on board.
I guess you could also try this from the “Bayesian evidence” standpoint. But I’m curious how you’d do it in detail. Like, would you say the prior against “moving muscles” extends also for “assembling sentences”?
I suppose that any moment when you have to choose “A or B” is actually a moment when your choices are “A or B or give up”. So the more such moments, the greater the chance of giving up.
Which seems like the reason behind one-click shopping (each click is a moment of choice “click or give up”).
To handle this, it would probably work to extend the “motionless” prior to a more abstract “status quo” prior. It’s not necessarily related to physical movement (it could even be the opposite if it were a sports group instead of a study group in your example) but rather an aversion to expending effort or experiencing potential undesired consequences. The prior says, “Things are fine. It’s not worth going out of the way to change that.”
With this extended version, creativity-requiring tasks are analogous to physically-demanding tasks. With pre-scripted tasks, it’s not as demanding in the moment.