Other peoples’ beliefs are evidence. Many people believe in God. No one believes that disc golf causes eternal torture. The two hypotheses should not be assigned equal probability.
that’s only because of how many people have believed in religion in the past
So you do not believe that others’ beliefs are evidence?
So you do not believe that others’ beliefs are evidence?
It’s sometimes (or even very often) evidence, but not when (1) there’s not even a shred of evidence elsewhere, and (2) there’s a convincing, systematic explanation for how a particular cluster of epistemic vulnerabilities in human brain hardware led to its widespread adoption.
In other words, a large portion of society believing something is evidence only if the memetic market test for the adoption of the idea at hand is intact. But our hardware and factory settings are so ridiculously mal-adapted to the epistemic environment of the modern world that this market test is extremely often utterly broken and useless.
If you want to make use of the societal thoughts on an issue, you must first appraise the health of the market test for the adoption of the ideas. Is it likely that competition in this area of the memetic environment will lead to ever more sound beliefs, or is there a wrench in the system that is bound to lead to a systematic spiral to ever more ridiculous or counterproductive dogmas?
Our hardware is just so riddled with epistemic problems that it would be a huge mistake to consider societal conclusions at face value. If the market test for meme propagation were intact, and the trial-and-error system for weeding out less useful beliefs in favor of more useful ones ran smoothly, large-scale acceptance of a position would of course be plenty of evidence—no further questions asked.
But we live in a different world—one where this trial-and-error system is in utter disrepair in an absolutely staggering number of cases. In such a world, one must always start with the question, “Is the memetic market test intact in this case, or must I go this epistemic journey myself?”
Of course the market test is better or worse from one place to the next, and I hang out here because the Less Wrong community certainly has one of the best belief propagation systems out there. If everybody on here seems to believe something with a lot of conviction, that to me is strong evidence.
In case the point was lost in the length, I should state it concisely. Whether the beliefs of others are evidence is a contextual question. It depends what the market test is, specifically for the propagation of the belief under scrutiny. If there’s reason to believe that the market test is corrupted because of a particular hardware or software vulnerability, then there’s reason to dismiss the widespread acceptance, and declare it no evidence at all.
If you accept all that, this of course brings us to the all-important question of why I think the memetic market test for the propagation of religion is broken enough to explain such widespread adoption despite how epistemically insane I consider it, but I don’t think I need to (try to) answer that. You’ve probably heard it all before on here, in writing on memetics, from Dawkins, etc.
I more or less accept your reasoning as far as it goes, but:
our hardware and factory settings are so ridiculously mal-adapted to the epistemic environment of the modern world that this market test is extremely often utterly broken and useless.
If this is true, then why have so much confidence in your own personal appraisal of who to trust and who to write off as deluded? It is of course true that nearly everyone believes what they do for non-truth-tracking reasons, but “nearly everyone” isn’t everyone, and there are many people, both theist and atheist, who believe what they do even despite strong memetic pressures to the contrary. Take me, for example; my theism doesn’t win me any points with anyone, at least not as many points as it loses. And there are many theists like me. Knowing what you know about how easily humans fall into delusion, how can you be so confident that it’s the other side that is deluded, and not your own? To return to the point, can you really be confident enough to disregard Pascal’s wager? If so, how did so many at-least-nominally-truth-seeking people, from Plato to Pascal to Kant to me, end up disagreeing with you? How did we fall into such an obvious error?
Based on the comments of yours I’ve read, I think the only way you can call yourself a theist is by redefining most theistic terminology. Tell me if I’m wrong, but I don’t think you agree with the object-level claims made by an average theist, as that theist would understand them. I’m not sure what you should call yourself...
As far as I know, I have the same conception of God as Thomas Aquinas did, and Thomism is the predominant philosophy of the Catholic church, which is the largest sect of Christianity, which is the most popular religion in the world.
A year or two ago my ideas were still pretty fuzzy, so that might have tripped you up. I change my mind pretty often.
Can you reliably communicate a good approximation of what you believe to another without reference to decision theory?
If yes, I’ll accept your hypothesis that I’ve been reading the wrong comments of yours.
If no, I really doubt that Aquinas would recognize what you believe as what he believed.
(And I don’t know what the situation is among the average Catholic, but IMX the average protestant doesn’t even know who Aquinas is, so my point may still hold anyway....)
Can you reliably communicate a good approximation of what you believe to another without reference to decision theory?
I think so. There is a supremely powerful person, Who is the Form of the Good, Who is perfectly simple… yeah, pretty sure I can do it using accepted theological terminology.
Does it matter what the average theist believes? If Aquinas doesn’t believe in the same God that a typical Baptist churchgoer does, I don’t think that means that Aquinas isn’t a theist. If the average biology students don’t have the same definition of “gene” as the best biologists do… (This is like some really weird variation on No True Scotsman.)
I think so. There is a supremely powerful person, Who is the Form of the Good, Who is perfectly simple… yeah, pretty sure I can do it using accepted theological terminology.
But I don’t think those words coming from you are generated by the same thought process that most theists use to make similar statements. You use the same words, but you mean something different. At least, that is my impression.
Does it matter what the average theist believes?
No. But at some point it becomes helpful to try and make sure everyone means similar things when using the same word. If that’s not possible then maybe it’s a good time to taboo the word. I’m thinking that “theist” usually refers to a particular cluster of beliefs that are sorta similar to yours but different enough that I’m not sure if calling yourself a theist clarifies or obscures your actual beliefs. I’m leaning towards “obscures”...
You use the same words, but you mean something different. At least, that is my impression.
My impression differs… like, there’s only so many different things “supremely powerful person” and “Form of the Good” can mean, ya know? The meanings of those words all seem pretty straightforward.
mmm.… I was about to agree with you, but after some thought, no, I think those words are incredibly vague. I can see adherents of most any religion agreeing with them. And the various religions typically think that they disagree with each other. I still maintain that by the time you define your beliefs at the same specificity as a typical human religion does, most Christians will not count you among their number.
I’m not saying that they’re right and you’re wrong (I’ll bet on you if those are my options) just that you aren’t really saying the same thing.
Does it matter what the average theist believes? If Aquinas doesn’t believe in the same God that a typical Baptist churchgoer does, I don’t think that means that Aquinas isn’t a theist.
It matters if you’re arguing from a majoritarian “orthodoxy as democracy spread over time” perspective. If the vast majority of theists throughout history didn’t actually believe in the God of Aquinas, but rather in the God of the old testament (or whatever), then you can’t cite their belief as evidence supporting Aquinas’ (or your) God.
We seem to be getting into some potentially very important territory, and I would certainly like to continue this discussion, but I’m running out of time for now and may be busy for up to 24 hours.
Before I go though, I should say at least one thing. It’s certainly not an obvious error, and I could well be the one who’s wrong. The discussions about rationality on Less Wrong are extremely useful for a basic reason: it’s an extremely difficult and intricate epistemic journey to compensate for our mal-adapted hardware and software, and LW does it better than any other place at the moment (as far as I can see).
So yeah, your questions are certainly important, and they perhaps get to the essence of the issue. I look forward to trying to answer those questions, and seeing where it leads us in the discussion (assuming you think this is useful too). Feel free to write anything else in the meantime, or not.
So you do not believe that others’ beliefs are evidence?
A belief can be evidence for its stipulated meaning (this holds often), but could also be counterevidence, or irrelevant. What is a belief evidence for? Not at all automatically its stipulated meaning.
Yes, that’s the response I was fishing for, so I could spring my trap. But the bait wasn’t meant for you, so now I have to make pointless commentary. Alas.
Other peoples’ beliefs are evidence. Many people believe in God. No one believes that disc golf causes eternal torture. The two hypotheses should not be assigned equal probability.
So you do not believe that others’ beliefs are evidence?
It’s sometimes (or even very often) evidence, but not when (1) there’s not even a shred of evidence elsewhere, and (2) there’s a convincing, systematic explanation for how a particular cluster of epistemic vulnerabilities in human brain hardware led to its widespread adoption.
In other words, a large portion of society believing something is evidence only if the memetic market test for the adoption of the idea at hand is intact. But our hardware and factory settings are so ridiculously mal-adapted to the epistemic environment of the modern world that this market test is extremely often utterly broken and useless.
If you want to make use of the societal thoughts on an issue, you must first appraise the health of the market test for the adoption of the ideas. Is it likely that competition in this area of the memetic environment will lead to ever more sound beliefs, or is there a wrench in the system that is bound to lead to a systematic spiral to ever more ridiculous or counterproductive dogmas?
Our hardware is just so riddled with epistemic problems that it would be a huge mistake to consider societal conclusions at face value. If the market test for meme propagation were intact, and the trial-and-error system for weeding out less useful beliefs in favor of more useful ones ran smoothly, large-scale acceptance of a position would of course be plenty of evidence—no further questions asked.
But we live in a different world—one where this trial-and-error system is in utter disrepair in an absolutely staggering number of cases. In such a world, one must always start with the question, “Is the memetic market test intact in this case, or must I go this epistemic journey myself?”
Of course the market test is better or worse from one place to the next, and I hang out here because the Less Wrong community certainly has one of the best belief propagation systems out there. If everybody on here seems to believe something with a lot of conviction, that to me is strong evidence.
In case the point was lost in the length, I should state it concisely. Whether the beliefs of others are evidence is a contextual question. It depends what the market test is, specifically for the propagation of the belief under scrutiny. If there’s reason to believe that the market test is corrupted because of a particular hardware or software vulnerability, then there’s reason to dismiss the widespread acceptance, and declare it no evidence at all.
If you accept all that, this of course brings us to the all-important question of why I think the memetic market test for the propagation of religion is broken enough to explain such widespread adoption despite how epistemically insane I consider it, but I don’t think I need to (try to) answer that. You’ve probably heard it all before on here, in writing on memetics, from Dawkins, etc.
I more or less accept your reasoning as far as it goes, but:
If this is true, then why have so much confidence in your own personal appraisal of who to trust and who to write off as deluded? It is of course true that nearly everyone believes what they do for non-truth-tracking reasons, but “nearly everyone” isn’t everyone, and there are many people, both theist and atheist, who believe what they do even despite strong memetic pressures to the contrary. Take me, for example; my theism doesn’t win me any points with anyone, at least not as many points as it loses. And there are many theists like me. Knowing what you know about how easily humans fall into delusion, how can you be so confident that it’s the other side that is deluded, and not your own? To return to the point, can you really be confident enough to disregard Pascal’s wager? If so, how did so many at-least-nominally-truth-seeking people, from Plato to Pascal to Kant to me, end up disagreeing with you? How did we fall into such an obvious error?
Based on the comments of yours I’ve read, I think the only way you can call yourself a theist is by redefining most theistic terminology. Tell me if I’m wrong, but I don’t think you agree with the object-level claims made by an average theist, as that theist would understand them. I’m not sure what you should call yourself...
Newsomelike.
As far as I know, I have the same conception of God as Thomas Aquinas did, and Thomism is the predominant philosophy of the Catholic church, which is the largest sect of Christianity, which is the most popular religion in the world.
A year or two ago my ideas were still pretty fuzzy, so that might have tripped you up. I change my mind pretty often.
Can you reliably communicate a good approximation of what you believe to another without reference to decision theory?
If yes, I’ll accept your hypothesis that I’ve been reading the wrong comments of yours.
If no, I really doubt that Aquinas would recognize what you believe as what he believed.
(And I don’t know what the situation is among the average Catholic, but IMX the average protestant doesn’t even know who Aquinas is, so my point may still hold anyway....)
I think so. There is a supremely powerful person, Who is the Form of the Good, Who is perfectly simple… yeah, pretty sure I can do it using accepted theological terminology.
Does it matter what the average theist believes? If Aquinas doesn’t believe in the same God that a typical Baptist churchgoer does, I don’t think that means that Aquinas isn’t a theist. If the average biology students don’t have the same definition of “gene” as the best biologists do… (This is like some really weird variation on No True Scotsman.)
But I don’t think those words coming from you are generated by the same thought process that most theists use to make similar statements. You use the same words, but you mean something different. At least, that is my impression.
No. But at some point it becomes helpful to try and make sure everyone means similar things when using the same word. If that’s not possible then maybe it’s a good time to taboo the word. I’m thinking that “theist” usually refers to a particular cluster of beliefs that are sorta similar to yours but different enough that I’m not sure if calling yourself a theist clarifies or obscures your actual beliefs. I’m leaning towards “obscures”...
My impression differs… like, there’s only so many different things “supremely powerful person” and “Form of the Good” can mean, ya know? The meanings of those words all seem pretty straightforward.
mmm.… I was about to agree with you, but after some thought, no, I think those words are incredibly vague. I can see adherents of most any religion agreeing with them. And the various religions typically think that they disagree with each other. I still maintain that by the time you define your beliefs at the same specificity as a typical human religion does, most Christians will not count you among their number.
I’m not saying that they’re right and you’re wrong (I’ll bet on you if those are my options) just that you aren’t really saying the same thing.
It matters if you’re arguing from a majoritarian “orthodoxy as democracy spread over time” perspective. If the vast majority of theists throughout history didn’t actually believe in the God of Aquinas, but rather in the God of the old testament (or whatever), then you can’t cite their belief as evidence supporting Aquinas’ (or your) God.
Or am I misunderstanding your argument?
We seem to be getting into some potentially very important territory, and I would certainly like to continue this discussion, but I’m running out of time for now and may be busy for up to 24 hours.
Before I go though, I should say at least one thing. It’s certainly not an obvious error, and I could well be the one who’s wrong. The discussions about rationality on Less Wrong are extremely useful for a basic reason: it’s an extremely difficult and intricate epistemic journey to compensate for our mal-adapted hardware and software, and LW does it better than any other place at the moment (as far as I can see).
So yeah, your questions are certainly important, and they perhaps get to the essence of the issue. I look forward to trying to answer those questions, and seeing where it leads us in the discussion (assuming you think this is useful too). Feel free to write anything else in the meantime, or not.
A belief can be evidence for its stipulated meaning (this holds often), but could also be counterevidence, or irrelevant. What is a belief evidence for? Not at all automatically its stipulated meaning.
Yes, that’s the response I was fishing for, so I could spring my trap. But the bait wasn’t meant for you, so now I have to make pointless commentary. Alas.
Would it be possible for you to go ahead and spring your trap anyway? I’m very curious what you had in mind.