First, I don’t think you did anything particularly irrational. Religions’ descriptions of God or gods are pretty specific. If you don’t see sufficient evidence for the existence of this very specific entity, then it makes sense not to be a believer. You’re not a religious believer for perfectly rational reasons. Choosing to call yourself “atheist” instead of “agnostic” is a matter of choosing what to emphasize. “Atheist” makes the point that believing in God is unjustified; “Agnostic” makes the point that God is possible. Both can be true, and it’s your own choice what label you prefer.
As for why atheists call themselves rational—some of it may be pride, but some of it is justified. “Converts” to atheism, in particular, often deliberately decided to discard things they believed that made no sense. They not only developed doubts about theology, but they decided to take their own doubts seriously, to believe their own brains. It’s a rare case when people have to make a pure choice between thought and non-thought.
I remember asking myself, “Yes, this is what my brain says, this is what the evidence says, this is what my conscience says—but who am I to believe my own thoughts?” When you say, “Yes, dammit, I believe my own thoughts, I’ll bet on thought, I’ll bet on my own capacity to reason, because it’s all I’ve got,” it’s a determination that sticks with you, and follows you into other topics.
Which is about as crazy as believing that God is likely. The not-0%-impossible point applies to God in about the same sense as to Santa Claus. If you want to specifically make the point that Santa Claus is possible, something is still seriously wrong with you, even if you stopped making the mistake of believing that Santa Claus is most certainly real.
As SarahC intimated above, it’s very unlikely that a specific deity exists. But when you suggest that the probability of God is so unlikely as to make one crazy to entertain the possibility, I wonder what your definition of ‘God’ is.
Over the course of writing and revising this comment, I’m recalling that the context of God here on LessWrong is almost always that of an anthropomorphic, personal, intervening, laying-out-rules-you-better-not-break god. But consider how flexible the meaning can be from one context to another. In which case, could Perplexed comment on what sort of God he is choosing not believe in without sufficient evidence? With all this discussion of what atheism means, it might also be helpful to pin down if we mean different things by ‘God’.
In which case, could Perplexed comment on what sort of God is not believed in without sufficient evidence?
The question is “What sort of God do I disbelieve in?” with it understood that I have already admitted that my disbelief is not based on sufficient evidence.
My answer is that I do not believe in any being with supernatural powers, including beings who control computers in which I am being simulated. Such powers would be supernatural from my viewpoint, if not from their own. I don’t believe such entities exist. That is reasonable. I believe that such entities do not exist. That is less reasonable. I plead guilty to this departure from ideal rationality.
I don’t believe such entities exist. That is reasonable. I believe that such entities do not exist. That is less reasonable. I plead guilty to this departure from ideal rationality.
If you know that a certain belief is unreasonable, and in what direction it is unreasonable, how do you still believe it? (I mean that both in the sense of “Why would you?” and of “How can you?”.) Is that not an instance of belief in self-deception?
I don’t think so. And neither should you unless you think that God exists. That posting by Eliezer is about Tarski’s litany—which I think I can recite without hypocrisy.
If God exists, I desire to believe “God exists”
If God doesn’t exist, I desire to believe “God doesn’t exist”.
Since I believe that God does not exist, therefore I believe I have believed what I want to believe. It sounds far more disreputable than it really is.
To be honest, I have already discussed the issue of how much my decision (to believe that God does not exist) departs from Bayesian rationality and whether that departure from rationality matters. I would prefer not to discuss it further, unless it is to discuss it with a theist. That might lead to a more interesting discussion.
I would prefer not to discuss it further, unless it is to discuss it with a theist. That might lead to a more interesting discussion.
Because the theist has a good definition (or at least they think so) of what God is. If I remember right then the debate you had here revolved around semantics. You’ve to ask if to believe that a specific being, with certain characteristics and qualities, does exist departs from Bayesian rationality. But simply asking if believing that God does exist departs from Bayesian rationality on LW is like asking color-blind aliens if believing that the color red does exist departs from reality. They could probably offer a lot of answers, but without asking the right (specific) question you’d gain nothing.
Request: Please explain. What (which?) is the crime? Why is “social pressure” the appropriate sentence? And what does the linked post have to do with either one?
Comment: There are several people here with the annoying habit of writing critical responses that are so terse and cryptic as to be useless to the recipient. You are one person who often does this; wedrifid is another. EY sometimes does it too.
If your goal in making these comments is to other-optimize, or to uphold LW standards, then you should understand that cryptic criticism does not accomplish those goals. If you are merely signaling your own cleverness, well …, ok, but if it were me, I would seek to appear clever to multitudes.
I think it is problematic that there is no immediate observable difference in behavior between the beliefs. I guess this is asking—how does Perplexed know he has the stronger belief?
[nevermind this second paragraph, omitted, the lines between actions, beliefs, and choices seem so murky to me, I don’t think there’s any point in pursuing them]
I think it is problematic that there is no immediate observable difference in behavior between the beliefs. I guess this is asking—how does Perplexed know he has the stronger belief?
I suppose I could respond “If there is no difference in what behavior would be rational for me to exhibit, what makes you think that one belief is stronger than the other?”.
There is one hypothetical behavior difference, though. A more cautious atheist, confronted with a hypothetical Judgment Day, will simply say “Well, what do you know? God exists after all!” He will then do his Bayesian updating and proceed about his business. Whereas I, having been too impulsive in my youth, will wander around muttering to myself, “I notice that I am confused”.
That is a difference in behavior, hypothetically at least. Now, if only I knew that this is the way I would hypothetically behave, then I could answer your original question.
First, I don’t think you did anything particularly irrational. Religions’ descriptions of God or gods are pretty specific. If you don’t see sufficient evidence for the existence of this very specific entity, then it makes sense not to be a believer. You’re not a religious believer for perfectly rational reasons. Choosing to call yourself “atheist” instead of “agnostic” is a matter of choosing what to emphasize. “Atheist” makes the point that believing in God is unjustified; “Agnostic” makes the point that God is possible. Both can be true, and it’s your own choice what label you prefer.
As for why atheists call themselves rational—some of it may be pride, but some of it is justified. “Converts” to atheism, in particular, often deliberately decided to discard things they believed that made no sense. They not only developed doubts about theology, but they decided to take their own doubts seriously, to believe their own brains. It’s a rare case when people have to make a pure choice between thought and non-thought.
I remember asking myself, “Yes, this is what my brain says, this is what the evidence says, this is what my conscience says—but who am I to believe my own thoughts?” When you say, “Yes, dammit, I believe my own thoughts, I’ll bet on thought, I’ll bet on my own capacity to reason, because it’s all I’ve got,” it’s a determination that sticks with you, and follows you into other topics.
Which is about as crazy as believing that God is likely. The not-0%-impossible point applies to God in about the same sense as to Santa Claus. If you want to specifically make the point that Santa Claus is possible, something is still seriously wrong with you, even if you stopped making the mistake of believing that Santa Claus is most certainly real.
As SarahC intimated above, it’s very unlikely that a specific deity exists. But when you suggest that the probability of God is so unlikely as to make one crazy to entertain the possibility, I wonder what your definition of ‘God’ is.
Over the course of writing and revising this comment, I’m recalling that the context of God here on LessWrong is almost always that of an anthropomorphic, personal, intervening, laying-out-rules-you-better-not-break god. But consider how flexible the meaning can be from one context to another. In which case, could Perplexed comment on what sort of God he is choosing not believe in without sufficient evidence? With all this discussion of what atheism means, it might also be helpful to pin down if we mean different things by ‘God’.
The question is “What sort of God do I disbelieve in?” with it understood that I have already admitted that my disbelief is not based on sufficient evidence.
My answer is that I do not believe in any being with supernatural powers, including beings who control computers in which I am being simulated. Such powers would be supernatural from my viewpoint, if not from their own. I don’t believe such entities exist. That is reasonable. I believe that such entities do not exist. That is less reasonable. I plead guilty to this departure from ideal rationality.
Incidentally, a philosophy blog that I sometimes read is currently half-seriously asking the “What is a god, anyways?” question.
If you know that a certain belief is unreasonable, and in what direction it is unreasonable, how do you still believe it? (I mean that both in the sense of “Why would you?” and of “How can you?”.) Is that not an instance of belief in self-deception?
I don’t think so. And neither should you unless you think that God exists. That posting by Eliezer is about Tarski’s litany—which I think I can recite without hypocrisy.
Since I believe that God does not exist, therefore I believe I have believed what I want to believe. It sounds far more disreputable than it really is.
To be honest, I have already discussed the issue of how much my decision (to believe that God does not exist) departs from Bayesian rationality and whether that departure from rationality matters. I would prefer not to discuss it further, unless it is to discuss it with a theist. That might lead to a more interesting discussion.
Because the theist has a good definition (or at least they think so) of what God is. If I remember right then the debate you had here revolved around semantics. You’ve to ask if to believe that a specific being, with certain characteristics and qualities, does exist departs from Bayesian rationality. But simply asking if believing that God does exist departs from Bayesian rationality on LW is like asking color-blind aliens if believing that the color red does exist departs from reality. They could probably offer a lot of answers, but without asking the right (specific) question you’d gain nothing.
Shame on you!
(A bit of social pressure is in order.)
Request: Please explain. What (which?) is the crime? Why is “social pressure” the appropriate sentence? And what does the linked post have to do with either one?
Comment: There are several people here with the annoying habit of writing critical responses that are so terse and cryptic as to be useless to the recipient. You are one person who often does this; wedrifid is another. EY sometimes does it too.
If your goal in making these comments is to other-optimize, or to uphold LW standards, then you should understand that cryptic criticism does not accomplish those goals. If you are merely signaling your own cleverness, well …, ok, but if it were me, I would seek to appear clever to multitudes.
I think it is problematic that there is no immediate observable difference in behavior between the beliefs. I guess this is asking—how does Perplexed know he has the stronger belief?
[nevermind this second paragraph, omitted, the lines between actions, beliefs, and choices seem so murky to me, I don’t think there’s any point in pursuing them]
I suppose I could respond “If there is no difference in what behavior would be rational for me to exhibit, what makes you think that one belief is stronger than the other?”.
There is one hypothetical behavior difference, though. A more cautious atheist, confronted with a hypothetical Judgment Day, will simply say “Well, what do you know? God exists after all!” He will then do his Bayesian updating and proceed about his business. Whereas I, having been too impulsive in my youth, will wander around muttering to myself, “I notice that I am confused”.
That is a difference in behavior, hypothetically at least. Now, if only I knew that this is the way I would hypothetically behave, then I could answer your original question.
What’s the difference between the two (why should there be one), in more of your own words?