Ah. It seems we have been talking about somewhat different things.
You are talking about the worth of a human being. I’m talking about my personal perception of the value of a human being under the assumption that other people can and usually do have different perceptions of the same value.
I try not to pass judgement of the worth of humans, but I am quite content with assigning my personal values to people based, in part, on “their proximity and/or relation to myself”.
I’m not entirely sure what a “personal perception of the value of a human being” is, as distinct from the value or worth of a human being. Surely the latter is what the former is about?
Granted, I guess you could simply be talking about their instrumental value to yourself (e.g. “they make me happy”), but I don’t think that’s really the main thrust of what “caring” is.
I’m not entirely sure what a “personal perception of the value of a human being” is, as distinct from the value or worth of a human being.
The “worth a human being” implies that there is one, correct, “objective” value for that human being. We may not be able to observe it directly so we just estimate it, with some unavoidable noise and errors, but theoretically the estimates will converge to the “true” value. The worth of a human being is a function with one argument: that human being.
The “personal perception of the value of a human being” implies that there are multiple, different, “subjective” values for the same human being. There is no single underlying value to which the estimates converge. The personal perception of a value is a function with two arguments: who is evaluated and who does the evaluation.
So, either there is such a thing as the “objective” value and hence, implicitly, you should seek to approach that value, or there is not.
I don’t see any reason to believe in an objective worth of this kind, but I don’t really think it matters that much. If these is no single underlying value, then the act of assigning your own personal values to people is still the same thing as “passing judgement on the worth of humans”, because it’s the only thing those words could refer to; you can’t avoid the issue simply by calling it a subjective matter.
In my view, regardless of whether the value in question is “subjective” or “objective”, I don’t think it should be determined by the mere circumstance of whether I happened to meet that person or not.
So, for example, you believe that to a mother the value of her own child should be similar to that of a random person anywhere on Earth—right? It’s a “mere circumstance” that this particular human happens to be her child.
Probably not just any random person, because one can reasonably argue that children should be valued more highly than adults.
However, I do think that the mother should hold other peoples’ children as being of equal value to her own. That doesn’t mean valuing her own children less, it means valuing everyone else’s more.
Sure, it’s not very realistic to expect this of people, but that doesn’t mean they shouldn’t try.
one can reasonably argue that children should be valued more highly than adults.
One can reasonably argue the other way too. New children are easier to make than new adults.
However, I do think that the mother should hold other peoples’ children as being of equal value to her own. That doesn’t mean valuing her own children less, it means valuing everyone else’s more.
Since she has finite resources, is there a practical difference?
It seems to me extreme altruism is so easily abused that it will inevitably wipe itself out in the evolution of moral systems.
One can reasonably argue the other way too. New children are easier to make than new adults.
True. However, regardless of the relative value of children and adults, it is clear that one ought to devote significantly more time and effort to children than to adults, because they are incapable of supporting themselves and are necessarily in need of help from the rest of society.
Since she has finite resources, is there a practical difference?
Earlier I specifically drew a distinction between devoting time and effort and valuation; you don’t have to value your own children more to devote yourself to them and not to other peoples’ children.
That said, there are some practical differences. First of all, it may be better not to have children if you could do more to help other peoples’ children. Secondly, if you do have children and still have spare resources over and above what it takes to properly care for them, then you should consider where those spare resources could be spent most effectively.
It seems to me extreme altruism is so easily abused that it will inevitably wipe itself out in the evolution of moral systems.
If an extreme altruist recognises that taking such an extreme position would lead overall to less altruism in the future, and thus worse overall consequences, surely the right thing to do is stand up to that abuse. Besides, what exactly do you mean by “extreme altruism”?
If an extreme altruist recognises that taking such an extreme position would lead overall to less altruism in the future, and thus worse overall consequences, surely the right thing to do is stand up to that abuse.
A good point. By abuse I wouldn’t necessarily mean anything blatant though, just that selfish people are happy to receive resources from selfless people.
Besides, what exactly do you mean by “extreme altruism”?
Valuing people equally by default when their instrumental value isn’t considered. I hope I didn’t misunderstand you. That’s about as extreme it gets but I suppose you could get even more extreme by valuing other people more highly than yourself.
A good point. By abuse I wouldn’t necessarily mean anything blatant though, just that selfish people are happy to receive resources from selfless people.
Sure, and there isn’t really anything wrong with that as long as the person receiving the resources really needs them.
Valuing people equally by default when their instrumental value isn’t considered. I hope I didn’t misunderstand you. That’s about as extreme it gets but I suppose you could get even more extreme by valuing other people more highly than yourself.
The term “altruism” is often used to refer to the latter, so the clarification is necessary; I definitely don’t agree with that extreme.
In any case, it may not be reasonable to expect people (or yourself) to hold to that valuation, or to act in complete recognition of what that valuation implies even if they do, but it seems like the right standard to aim for. If you are likely biased against valuing distant strangers as much as you ought to, then it makes sense to correct for it.
Ah. It seems we have been talking about somewhat different things.
You are talking about the worth of a human being. I’m talking about my personal perception of the value of a human being under the assumption that other people can and usually do have different perceptions of the same value.
I try not to pass judgement of the worth of humans, but I am quite content with assigning my personal values to people based, in part, on “their proximity and/or relation to myself”.
I’m not entirely sure what a “personal perception of the value of a human being” is, as distinct from the value or worth of a human being. Surely the latter is what the former is about?
Granted, I guess you could simply be talking about their instrumental value to yourself (e.g. “they make me happy”), but I don’t think that’s really the main thrust of what “caring” is.
The “worth a human being” implies that there is one, correct, “objective” value for that human being. We may not be able to observe it directly so we just estimate it, with some unavoidable noise and errors, but theoretically the estimates will converge to the “true” value. The worth of a human being is a function with one argument: that human being.
The “personal perception of the value of a human being” implies that there are multiple, different, “subjective” values for the same human being. There is no single underlying value to which the estimates converge. The personal perception of a value is a function with two arguments: who is evaluated and who does the evaluation.
So, either there is such a thing as the “objective” value and hence, implicitly, you should seek to approach that value, or there is not.
I don’t see any reason to believe in an objective worth of this kind, but I don’t really think it matters that much. If these is no single underlying value, then the act of assigning your own personal values to people is still the same thing as “passing judgement on the worth of humans”, because it’s the only thing those words could refer to; you can’t avoid the issue simply by calling it a subjective matter.
In my view, regardless of whether the value in question is “subjective” or “objective”, I don’t think it should be determined by the mere circumstance of whether I happened to meet that person or not.
So, for example, you believe that to a mother the value of her own child should be similar to that of a random person anywhere on Earth—right? It’s a “mere circumstance” that this particular human happens to be her child.
Probably not just any random person, because one can reasonably argue that children should be valued more highly than adults.
However, I do think that the mother should hold other peoples’ children as being of equal value to her own. That doesn’t mean valuing her own children less, it means valuing everyone else’s more.
Sure, it’s not very realistic to expect this of people, but that doesn’t mean they shouldn’t try.
One can reasonably argue the other way too. New children are easier to make than new adults.
Since she has finite resources, is there a practical difference?
It seems to me extreme altruism is so easily abused that it will inevitably wipe itself out in the evolution of moral systems.
True. However, regardless of the relative value of children and adults, it is clear that one ought to devote significantly more time and effort to children than to adults, because they are incapable of supporting themselves and are necessarily in need of help from the rest of society.
Earlier I specifically drew a distinction between devoting time and effort and valuation; you don’t have to value your own children more to devote yourself to them and not to other peoples’ children.
That said, there are some practical differences. First of all, it may be better not to have children if you could do more to help other peoples’ children. Secondly, if you do have children and still have spare resources over and above what it takes to properly care for them, then you should consider where those spare resources could be spent most effectively.
If an extreme altruist recognises that taking such an extreme position would lead overall to less altruism in the future, and thus worse overall consequences, surely the right thing to do is stand up to that abuse. Besides, what exactly do you mean by “extreme altruism”?
A good point. By abuse I wouldn’t necessarily mean anything blatant though, just that selfish people are happy to receive resources from selfless people.
Valuing people equally by default when their instrumental value isn’t considered. I hope I didn’t misunderstand you. That’s about as extreme it gets but I suppose you could get even more extreme by valuing other people more highly than yourself.
Sure, and there isn’t really anything wrong with that as long as the person receiving the resources really needs them.
The term “altruism” is often used to refer to the latter, so the clarification is necessary; I definitely don’t agree with that extreme.
In any case, it may not be reasonable to expect people (or yourself) to hold to that valuation, or to act in complete recognition of what that valuation implies even if they do, but it seems like the right standard to aim for. If you are likely biased against valuing distant strangers as much as you ought to, then it makes sense to correct for it.