Metaculus has very strong calibration scores (apparently better than prediction markets). I am inclined to take these numbers as the best guess we currently have of the situation.
Come to think of it, I don’t think most compute-based AI timelines models (e.g. EPOCH’s) incorporate geopolitical factors such as a possible Taiwan crisis. I’m not even sure whether they should. So keep this in mind while consuming timelines forecasts I guess?
Also: anybody have any recommendations for pundits/analysis sources to follow on the Taiwan situation? (there’s Sentinel but I’d like something more in-depth and specifically Taiwan-related)
Phillip Tetlock pretty convingingly showed that most geopolitics experts are no such thing.
The inherent irreducible uncertainty is just quite high.
On Taiwan specifically you should know that the number of Westerners that can read Chinese at a high enough level that they can actually co. Chinese is incredibly difficult. Most China experts you see on the news will struggle with reading the newspaper unassisted (learning Chinese is that hard. I know this is surprising; I was very surprised when I realized this during an attempt to learn chinese).
I did my best on writing down some of the key military facts on the Taiwan situation that can be reasonably inferred recently. You can find it in my recent shortforms.
Even when confining too concrete questions like how many missiles, how much shipbuilding capacity, how well would an amphibious landing go, how would US allies be able to assist, how vulnerable/obsolete are aircraft carriers etc the net aggregated uncertainty on the balance of power is still quite large.
The CSIS wargamed a 2026 Chinese invasion of Taiwan, and found outcomes ranging from mixed to unfavorable for China (CSIS report). If you trust both them and Metaculus, then you ought to update downwards on your estimate of the PRC’s strategic ability. Personally, I think Metaculus overestimates the likelihood of an invasion, and is about right about blockades.
Why would they? It’s not like the Chinese are going to believe them. And if their target audience is US policymakers, then wouldn’t their incentive rather be to play up the impact of marginal US defense investment in the area?
If you trust both them and Metaculus, then you ought to update downwards on your estimate of the PRC’s strategic ability.
I note that the PRC doesn’t have a single “strategic ability” in terms of war. They can be better or worse at choosing which wars to fight, and this seems likely to have little influence on how good they are at winning such wars or scaling weaponry.
Eg in the US often “which war” is much more political than “exactly what strategy should we use to win this war” is much more political than “how much fuel should our jets be able to carry”, since more people can talk & speculate about the higher level questions. China’s politics are much more closed than the US’s, but you can bet similar dynamics are at play.
I should have been more clear. With “strategic ability”, I was thinking about the kind of capabilities that let a government recognize which wars have good prospects, and to not initiate unfavorable wars despite ideological commitments.
How to prepare for the coming Taiwan Crisis? Should one short TSMC? Dig a nuclear cellar?
Metaculus gives a 25% of a fullscale invasion of Taiwan within 10 years and a 50% chance of a blockade. It gives a 65% chance that if China invades Taiwan before 2035 the US will respond with military force.
Metaculus has very strong calibration scores (apparently better than prediction markets). I am inclined to take these numbers as the best guess we currently have of the situation.
Is there any way to act on this information?
Come to think of it, I don’t think most compute-based AI timelines models (e.g. EPOCH’s) incorporate geopolitical factors such as a possible Taiwan crisis. I’m not even sure whether they should. So keep this in mind while consuming timelines forecasts I guess?
Also: anybody have any recommendations for pundits/analysis sources to follow on the Taiwan situation? (there’s Sentinel but I’d like something more in-depth and specifically Taiwan-related)
I don’t have any. I’m also wary of soothsayers.
Phillip Tetlock pretty convingingly showed that most geopolitics experts are no such thing. The inherent irreducible uncertainty is just quite high.
On Taiwan specifically you should know that the number of Westerners that can read Chinese at a high enough level that they can actually co. Chinese is incredibly difficult. Most China experts you see on the news will struggle with reading the newspaper unassisted (learning Chinese is that hard. I know this is surprising; I was very surprised when I realized this during an attempt to learn chinese).
I did my best on writing down some of the key military facts on the Taiwan situation that can be reasonably inferred recently. You can find it in my recent shortforms.
Even when confining too concrete questions like how many missiles, how much shipbuilding capacity, how well would an amphibious landing go, how would US allies be able to assist, how vulnerable/obsolete are aircraft carriers etc the net aggregated uncertainty on the balance of power is still quite large.
The CSIS wargamed a 2026 Chinese invasion of Taiwan, and found outcomes ranging from mixed to unfavorable for China (CSIS report). If you trust both them and Metaculus, then you ought to update downwards on your estimate of the PRC’s strategic ability. Personally, I think Metaculus overestimates the likelihood of an invasion, and is about right about blockades.
Why would you trust CSIS here? A US think tank like that is going to seek to publically say that invading Taiwan is bad for the Chinese.
Why would they? It’s not like the Chinese are going to believe them. And if their target audience is US policymakers, then wouldn’t their incentive rather be to play up the impact of marginal US defense investment in the area?
I note that the PRC doesn’t have a single “strategic ability” in terms of war. They can be better or worse at choosing which wars to fight, and this seems likely to have little influence on how good they are at winning such wars or scaling weaponry.
Eg in the US often “which war” is much more political than “exactly what strategy should we use to win this war” is much more political than “how much fuel should our jets be able to carry”, since more people can talk & speculate about the higher level questions. China’s politics are much more closed than the US’s, but you can bet similar dynamics are at play.
I should have been more clear. With “strategic ability”, I was thinking about the kind of capabilities that let a government recognize which wars have good prospects, and to not initiate unfavorable wars despite ideological commitments.