Who’s this “we” that you say can and needs to do better? Does it include Putin and/or Russian elites? I do agree that the rhetoric of “war on everything” is harmful, but it’s intentional harm, which actual people are using to get attention and funding. And actual wars are ALSO intentional. Real people are making decisions that they believe are correct (or at least best for them in the situation they find themselves).
Some things cannot cooperatively be solved, as many participants aren’t cooperating. All of this is the sum of individual human actions. SOMEONE believes they’ll benefit (or at least think they’ll benefit, even if they’re wrong) for every single thing you mention.
Read and re-read Discordianism’s A Sermon on Ethics and Love—https://principiadiscordia.com/book/45.php . It’s all well and good to talk about equilibria and mechanisms, but underneath it all is individual people, and they violently disagree on valuation of different world-states. I prefer mistake theory as a baseline for things that surprise me, but conflict is real and pervasive, and ignoring it means your map is consistently wrong.
More seriously, “we” refers to the general “west” (US + Europe, mostly) that has reacted to the war. My thinking is about what happens after the armed conflict ends—the nature of traditional warfare means that when a war is over, it’s over.
Economic sanctions, social and cultural blacklisting, and so on are (as you say) the actions of individuals.
When the armed conflict ends, how are those actions coordinated, and what happens if they aren’t? Does society (international organizations) suddenly let Russian chess players compete again? Does culture (Reddit, Twitter, etc.) go back to whatever it was doing before? Do companies (McDonald’s, Visa/Mastercard, etc.) suddenly all resume service in Russia?
Are these things that coordinate themselves, or will the lack of coordination leave us with a half-hearted punishment scheme that fails to achieve anything?
To be clear: I completely agree that there is real, violent conflict in valuation of world-states here, and that Putin & co. are not cooperating. They are not included in the aforementioned “we”. I’m questioning what constitutes victory for either side in this conflict, and who can credibly declare it.
I don’t see these as questions with clear answers.
I think a lot will depend on HOW it ends and the framing that takes hold in the public consciousness.
There will be quite a bit of coordination in that governments will modify or relax the official sanctions. And a lot of the same coordination among individual actors we saw in imposing the limits, in media and corporate behavior.
But I think it’s a feature, not a bug, that we can’t tell Putin what the actual tests are that would let the sanctions go away completely. If it were planned and coordinated, Russia would do the minimum to get the sanctions lifted. To the extent that it’s cultural and diffuse, they have to figure out what apologies, reparations, and changes in behavior will be sufficient to get McDonalds to re-open, and how that differs from getting re-admitted to sporting events.
I think you’re right that there’s no clear victory possible—this war and the sanctions have done incredible damage, both directly in Ukraine, and indirectly in disruption of trade and markets. That damage can never be undone—it’s a permanent loss in value. The wind-down of conflict will be as complex as the ramp-up was, and will be a new equilibrium for how willing people are to trade with Russia, based on their perceived willingness to do similar crimes in the future.
Agreed—how the conflict ends is super important. I was mostly thinking about it ending in Ukraine’s (relative) favor, whatever that looks like, but were Russia/Putin to “win” (not just propaganda win, but actually win), considerations would be markedly different.
I didn’t think of the decentralized nature of the punishments on Russia as a feature instead of a bug—it’s a good frame I’ll have to mull over.
I will say that if there was some clear condition for all the sanctions and such to end (withdraw from Ukraine entirely tomorrow, or something else I haven’t thought of), would that change Putin’s calculus or Russian opinion? I don’t know.
Is the lack of knowledge of the actual tests and its effect on Putin’s decisions worth the possible additional damage done during a complex wind-down (as opposed to a single, organized wind-down)?
Who’s this “we” that you say can and needs to do better? Does it include Putin and/or Russian elites? I do agree that the rhetoric of “war on everything” is harmful, but it’s intentional harm, which actual people are using to get attention and funding. And actual wars are ALSO intentional. Real people are making decisions that they believe are correct (or at least best for them in the situation they find themselves).
Some things cannot cooperatively be solved, as many participants aren’t cooperating. All of this is the sum of individual human actions. SOMEONE believes they’ll benefit (or at least think they’ll benefit, even if they’re wrong) for every single thing you mention.
Read and re-read Discordianism’s A Sermon on Ethics and Love—https://principiadiscordia.com/book/45.php . It’s all well and good to talk about equilibria and mechanisms, but underneath it all is individual people, and they violently disagree on valuation of different world-states. I prefer mistake theory as a baseline for things that surprise me, but conflict is real and pervasive, and ignoring it means your map is consistently wrong.
We = me and the mouse in my pocket :)
More seriously, “we” refers to the general “west” (US + Europe, mostly) that has reacted to the war. My thinking is about what happens after the armed conflict ends—the nature of traditional warfare means that when a war is over, it’s over.
Economic sanctions, social and cultural blacklisting, and so on are (as you say) the actions of individuals.
When the armed conflict ends, how are those actions coordinated, and what happens if they aren’t? Does society (international organizations) suddenly let Russian chess players compete again? Does culture (Reddit, Twitter, etc.) go back to whatever it was doing before? Do companies (McDonald’s, Visa/Mastercard, etc.) suddenly all resume service in Russia?
Are these things that coordinate themselves, or will the lack of coordination leave us with a half-hearted punishment scheme that fails to achieve anything?
To be clear: I completely agree that there is real, violent conflict in valuation of world-states here, and that Putin & co. are not cooperating. They are not included in the aforementioned “we”. I’m questioning what constitutes victory for either side in this conflict, and who can credibly declare it.
I don’t see these as questions with clear answers.
I think a lot will depend on HOW it ends and the framing that takes hold in the public consciousness.
There will be quite a bit of coordination in that governments will modify or relax the official sanctions. And a lot of the same coordination among individual actors we saw in imposing the limits, in media and corporate behavior.
But I think it’s a feature, not a bug, that we can’t tell Putin what the actual tests are that would let the sanctions go away completely. If it were planned and coordinated, Russia would do the minimum to get the sanctions lifted. To the extent that it’s cultural and diffuse, they have to figure out what apologies, reparations, and changes in behavior will be sufficient to get McDonalds to re-open, and how that differs from getting re-admitted to sporting events.
I think you’re right that there’s no clear victory possible—this war and the sanctions have done incredible damage, both directly in Ukraine, and indirectly in disruption of trade and markets. That damage can never be undone—it’s a permanent loss in value. The wind-down of conflict will be as complex as the ramp-up was, and will be a new equilibrium for how willing people are to trade with Russia, based on their perceived willingness to do similar crimes in the future.
Agreed—how the conflict ends is super important. I was mostly thinking about it ending in Ukraine’s (relative) favor, whatever that looks like, but were Russia/Putin to “win” (not just propaganda win, but actually win), considerations would be markedly different.
I didn’t think of the decentralized nature of the punishments on Russia as a feature instead of a bug—it’s a good frame I’ll have to mull over.
I will say that if there was some clear condition for all the sanctions and such to end (withdraw from Ukraine entirely tomorrow, or something else I haven’t thought of), would that change Putin’s calculus or Russian opinion? I don’t know.
Is the lack of knowledge of the actual tests and its effect on Putin’s decisions worth the possible additional damage done during a complex wind-down (as opposed to a single, organized wind-down)?
No idea.