“Overpopulated” seems to already reply to the reversal test (i.e. yes, the population should be reduced). The reversal test might apply to a different claim that the current population is all right and shouldn’t be increased further.
In the grandparent comment, the reversal test might apply to lifespan (the relation of lifespan to population is not completely straightforward if we control other parameters such as birth rate).
I should have elaborated more. The reversal test I was thinking of was “if the problem is overpopulation and death’s a good solution to it, should we be killing people?”
Except that most people have a deontological objection to actually killing people, so even if lucidian didn’t think we should be killing people, it wouldn’t necessarily imply contradictory beliefs (or rather, the contradiction comes from contradictions in deontology, not anything related to cryonics).
It is fair to observe that when somebody claims that their utility function says one thing but their deontology prevents them from following up, that is at least suspicious for one or the other being not-fully-motivating, not-fully-thought-out, etc.
I agree, but deontology is well-known to be a problematic but widely-held philosophy, which should explain away the observed inconsistency (e.g. desires could be consistent but deontology prevents the desires from being acted upon). I think that the proposed alternate test of asking about slowing down longevity research should reveal whether there is a further inconsistency within the desires themselves.
(e.g. desires could be consistent but deontology prevents the desires from being acted upon)
The question is why the deontological concerns are motivating. If they are motivating though a desire to fulfill deontological concern, then they belong in the utility function. And if not through desire, then how? An endorsed deontological principle might say ‘X!’ or ‘Don’t X’, but why obey it? Deontological principles aren’t obviously intrinsically motivating (in the way anything desired is).
Right. I was thinking of “death” as having status quo (“natural”) death as the intended interpretation, which seems to exclude this possibility as stated, but allows a version where we prevent future attacks of status quo death by e.g. stopping all medical research (not just anti-aging research).
In this instance, I don’t think the reversal test will establish much. I imagine that most who hold a belief similar to lucidian believe that there is a population homeostasis, or at least upper bound, which is determined by Earth’s resources’ ability to accommodate human existence.
If this homeostasis or upper bound is exceeded, either Earth’s resources’ ability to accommodate human existence must be improved, or humans must be killed. I imagine those I previously identified would favor the former.
The former could be achieved by ceasing pollution, disbanding mass cattle and feces pits, and investing in research investigating ways to remove airbourne methane as well reducing existing environmental damage. This route may prove more laborious than genocide or random en masse killings, but preferable nonetheless.
The standard reply to this is a reversal test. What’s your reply to that?
“Overpopulated” seems to already reply to the reversal test (i.e. yes, the population should be reduced). The reversal test might apply to a different claim that the current population is all right and shouldn’t be increased further.
In the grandparent comment, the reversal test might apply to lifespan (the relation of lifespan to population is not completely straightforward if we control other parameters such as birth rate).
I should have elaborated more. The reversal test I was thinking of was “if the problem is overpopulation and death’s a good solution to it, should we be killing people?”
Except that most people have a deontological objection to actually killing people, so even if lucidian didn’t think we should be killing people, it wouldn’t necessarily imply contradictory beliefs (or rather, the contradiction comes from contradictions in deontology, not anything related to cryonics).
It is fair to observe that when somebody claims that their utility function says one thing but their deontology prevents them from following up, that is at least suspicious for one or the other being not-fully-motivating, not-fully-thought-out, etc.
I agree, but deontology is well-known to be a problematic but widely-held philosophy, which should explain away the observed inconsistency (e.g. desires could be consistent but deontology prevents the desires from being acted upon). I think that the proposed alternate test of asking about slowing down longevity research should reveal whether there is a further inconsistency within the desires themselves.
The question is why the deontological concerns are motivating. If they are motivating though a desire to fulfill deontological concern, then they belong in the utility function. And if not through desire, then how? An endorsed deontological principle might say ‘X!’ or ‘Don’t X’, but why obey it? Deontological principles aren’t obviously intrinsically motivating (in the way anything desired is).
Following deontological concerns can be instrumentally useful for biased finite agents: http://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/Ethical_injunction
Right. I was thinking of “death” as having status quo (“natural”) death as the intended interpretation, which seems to exclude this possibility as stated, but allows a version where we prevent future attacks of status quo death by e.g. stopping all medical research (not just anti-aging research).
In this instance, I don’t think the reversal test will establish much. I imagine that most who hold a belief similar to lucidian believe that there is a population homeostasis, or at least upper bound, which is determined by Earth’s resources’ ability to accommodate human existence.
If this homeostasis or upper bound is exceeded, either Earth’s resources’ ability to accommodate human existence must be improved, or humans must be killed. I imagine those I previously identified would favor the former.
The former could be achieved by ceasing pollution, disbanding mass cattle and feces pits, and investing in research investigating ways to remove airbourne methane as well reducing existing environmental damage. This route may prove more laborious than genocide or random en masse killings, but preferable nonetheless.