From what I see, your questions completely ignore the crucial problem of weirdness signaling. Your question (1) should also assume that these hospitals are perceived by the general population, as well as the overwhelming majority of scientists and intellectuals, as a weird crazy cult that gives off a distinctly odd, creepy, and immoral vibe—and by accepting the treatment, you also subscribe to a lifelong affiliation with this cult, with all its negative consequences for your relations with people. (Hopefully unnecessary disclaimer for careless readers: I am not arguing that this perception is accurate, but merely that it is an accurate description of the views presently held by people.)
As for question (3), the trouble with such arguments is that they work the other way around too. If you claim that the future “me” 20 years from now doesn’t have any more special claim to my identity than whatever comes out of cryonics in more distant future, this can be used to argue that I should start identifying with the latter—but it can also be used to argue that I should stop identifying with the former, and simply stop caring about what happens to “me” 20 years, or one year, or a day, or even a minute from now. To which I can respond that yes, there is no rational reason to care about the fate of the future “me,” but I just happen to be a sort of creature that gets upset when the future “me” is threatened and constantly gets overcome with an irresistible urge to work against such threats at the present moment—but this urge doesn’t extend to the post-cryonics “me,” so I’m rationally indifferent in that case.
If you believe that this conclusion is false, how exactly would you counter it? (This objection obviously has implications for your question (6) too.)
(7) If you have a fatal disease that can only be cured by wearing a bracelet or necklace under your clothing, and anyone who receives an honest explanation of what the item is will think you’re weird, do you wear the bracelet or necklace?
Answering yes to (7) means that you shouldn’t refrain from cryonics for fear of being thought weird.
Is it really so easy to hide it from all the relevant people, including close friends and relatives, let alone significant others (who, according to what I’ve read about the topic, usually are the most powerful obstacle)?
Also, I’m not very knowledgeable about this sort of thing, but it seems to me like doing it completely in secret could endanger the success of the procedure after your death. Imagine if a bereaved family and/or spouse suddenly find out that their beloved deceased has requested this terrible and obscene thing instead of a proper funeral, which not only shocks them, but also raises the frightening possibility that once the word spreads, they’ll also be tainted with this awful association in people’s minds. I wouldn’t be surprised if they fight tooth and nail to prevent the cryonics people from taking possession of the body, though I don’t know what realistic chances of success they might have (which probably depends on the local laws).
(I wonder if some people around here actually know of real-life stories of this kind and how they tend to play out? I’m sure at least some have happened in practice.)
I’ve heard of stories like that, except replace ‘cryonics’ with ‘organ donation’ and ‘this terrible and obscene thing’ refers to destroying the sanctity of a dead body rather than preserving the entire body cryonically. In Australia at least, the family’s wishes win out over those of the deceased.
I think to be honest here you need to point out the very small chance the bracelet has of working.
I think it could be aptly compared to those ‘magnetic bracelets’ newagey types sometimes wear which are a fast track to me not talking to them anymore.
(8) Suppose you are told that your fatal disease can only be cured by wearing a necklace. You ask how many people have been cured and receive the answer “None”. You ask how the necklace works, and are told that it might be nano-technology, or it might be scanning and uploading. “We don’t know yet, but that there is reason to be confident that it will work.” Do you wear the necklace?
Answering yes to (8) means that you shouldn’t refrain from cryonics because you fear signaling that you are prone to being victimized by quacks.
You’re confusing different questions. Each question should isolate a single potential motivation and show that it is not, of itself, sufficient reason to refuse. If you fear signaling, don’t tell people about the necklace. If you fear quacks, don’t make the question be about a necklace or about signaling.
There was some irony, but skepticism is a real reason why some people refrain. The necklace is simply part of the scenario, I see no particular reason to remove it from the story except risk of confusion. So, instead of a necklace, make it a “magic decoder ring”, or, if we need to maintain privacy, a “harmonic suppository”.
EY is right, though that if this one is meant seriously, the final sentence should read:
Answering yes to (8) means that you shouldn’t refrain from cryonics because you dislike being victimized by quacks.
I thought Eliezer was taking your comment a bit seriously—but on rereading his comment, I now think it makes sense to ask for your objections to be split up.
There’s a problem, though—his “don’t tell people about the necklace” sounds as though it would help to defeat its ostensible purpose. It is intended to send a message to those close to the near-death-experience. It is tricky to send that kind of message to one group, while not sending it to everyone else as well.
You mean like the warning sign of a pacemaker, or one off all the other helpful, but odd medical tools? There are many things that treat a person in need but look odd. Problem being that those get applied to sick people.
You are right about the weirdness signal, my questions don’t get at this.
As for (3) wouldn’t a yes response imply that you do care about the past and future versions of yourself?
When you write “but I just happen to be a sort of creature that gets upset when the future ‘me’ is threatened and constantly gets overcome with an irresistible urge to work against such threats at the present moment—but this urge doesn’t extend to the post-cryonics “me,” so I’m rationally indifferent in that case.” you seem to be saying your utility function is such that you don’t care about the post-cryonics you and since one can’t claim a utility function is irrational (excluding stuff like Intransitive preferences) this objection to cryonics isn’t irrational.
Perhaps the best way to formulate my argument would be as follows. When someone appears to care about his “normal” future self a few years from now, but not about his future self that might come out of a cryonics revival, you can argue that this is an arbitrary and whimsical preference, since the former “self” doesn’t have any significantly better claim to his identity than the latter. Now let’s set aside any possible counter-arguments to that claim, and for the sake of the argument accept that this is indeed so. I see three possible consequences of accepting it:
Starting to care about one’s post-cryonics future self, and (assuming one’s other concerns are satisfied) signing up for cryonics; this is presumably the intended goal of your argument.
Ceasing to care even about one’s “normal” future selves, and rejecting the very concept of personal identity and continuity. (Presumably leading to either complete resignation or to crazy impulsive behavior.)
Keeping one’s existing preferences and behaviors with the justification that, arbitrary and whimsical as they are, they are not more so than any other options, so you might as well not bother changing them.
Now, the question is: can you argue that (1) is more correct or rational than (2) or (3) in some meaningful way?
(Also, if someone is interested in discussions of this sort, I forgot to mention that I raised similar arguments in another recent thread.)
I can imagine somebody who picks (2) here, but still ends up acting more or less normally. You can take the attitude that the future person commonly identified with you is nobody special but be an altruist who cares about everybody, including that person. And as that person is (at least in the near future, and even in the far future when it comes to long-term decisions like education and life insurance) most susceptible to your (current) influence, you’ll pay still pay more attention to them. In the extreme case, the altruistic disciple of Adam Smith believes that everybody will be best off if each person cares only about the good of the future person commonly identified with them, because of the laws of economics rather than the laws of morality.
But as you say, this runs into (6). I think that with a pefectly altruistic attitude, you’d only fight to survive because you’re worried that this is a homicidal maniac who’s likely to terrorise others, or because you have some responsibilities to others that you can best fulfill. And that doesn’t extend to cryonics. So to take care of extreme altruists, rewrite (6) to specify that you know that your death will lead your attacker to reform and make restitution by living an altruistic life in your stead (but die of overexertion if you fight back).
Bottom line: if one takes consequence (2) of answering No to question (3), question (3) should still be considered solved (not an objection), but (6) still remains to be dealt with.
From what I see, your questions completely ignore the crucial problem of weirdness signaling. Your question (1) should also assume that these hospitals are perceived by the general population, as well as the overwhelming majority of scientists and intellectuals, as a weird crazy cult that gives off a distinctly odd, creepy, and immoral vibe—and by accepting the treatment, you also subscribe to a lifelong affiliation with this cult, with all its negative consequences for your relations with people. (Hopefully unnecessary disclaimer for careless readers: I am not arguing that this perception is accurate, but merely that it is an accurate description of the views presently held by people.)
As for question (3), the trouble with such arguments is that they work the other way around too. If you claim that the future “me” 20 years from now doesn’t have any more special claim to my identity than whatever comes out of cryonics in more distant future, this can be used to argue that I should start identifying with the latter—but it can also be used to argue that I should stop identifying with the former, and simply stop caring about what happens to “me” 20 years, or one year, or a day, or even a minute from now. To which I can respond that yes, there is no rational reason to care about the fate of the future “me,” but I just happen to be a sort of creature that gets upset when the future “me” is threatened and constantly gets overcome with an irresistible urge to work against such threats at the present moment—but this urge doesn’t extend to the post-cryonics “me,” so I’m rationally indifferent in that case.
If you believe that this conclusion is false, how exactly would you counter it? (This objection obviously has implications for your question (6) too.)
(7) If you have a fatal disease that can only be cured by wearing a bracelet or necklace under your clothing, and anyone who receives an honest explanation of what the item is will think you’re weird, do you wear the bracelet or necklace?
Answering yes to (7) means that you shouldn’t refrain from cryonics for fear of being thought weird.
Heh—that actually doubles as an explanation to people who ask:
“I’m wearing this necklace because I have a fatal disease that can only be cured by wearing it, and even then it only has a small chance of working.”
--Oh no! I’m so sorry! What’s the disease?
“Mortality.”
The main weirdness problem with cryonics is not that people examine cryonics and then discard it because they don’t want to look weird.
The problem is that people will not consider or honestly discuss at all something that looks weird.
Is it really so easy to hide it from all the relevant people, including close friends and relatives, let alone significant others (who, according to what I’ve read about the topic, usually are the most powerful obstacle)?
Also, I’m not very knowledgeable about this sort of thing, but it seems to me like doing it completely in secret could endanger the success of the procedure after your death. Imagine if a bereaved family and/or spouse suddenly find out that their beloved deceased has requested this terrible and obscene thing instead of a proper funeral, which not only shocks them, but also raises the frightening possibility that once the word spreads, they’ll also be tainted with this awful association in people’s minds. I wouldn’t be surprised if they fight tooth and nail to prevent the cryonics people from taking possession of the body, though I don’t know what realistic chances of success they might have (which probably depends on the local laws).
(I wonder if some people around here actually know of real-life stories of this kind and how they tend to play out? I’m sure at least some have happened in practice.)
I’ve heard of stories like that, except replace ‘cryonics’ with ‘organ donation’ and ‘this terrible and obscene thing’ refers to destroying the sanctity of a dead body rather than preserving the entire body cryonically. In Australia at least, the family’s wishes win out over those of the deceased.
I think to be honest here you need to point out the very small chance the bracelet has of working.
I think it could be aptly compared to those ‘magnetic bracelets’ newagey types sometimes wear which are a fast track to me not talking to them anymore.
If you replace the necklace with “losing all your hair”, haven’t you described chemotherapy?
(For extra fuel: losing your hair is far from the most unpleasant symptom of chemotherapy.)
Actually, I suspect that most people would answer no to this, at least in practice.
(8) Suppose you are told that your fatal disease can only be cured by wearing a necklace. You ask how many people have been cured and receive the answer “None”. You ask how the necklace works, and are told that it might be nano-technology, or it might be scanning and uploading. “We don’t know yet, but that there is reason to be confident that it will work.” Do you wear the necklace?
Answering yes to (8) means that you shouldn’t refrain from cryonics because you fear signaling that you are prone to being victimized by quacks.
You’re confusing different questions. Each question should isolate a single potential motivation and show that it is not, of itself, sufficient reason to refuse. If you fear signaling, don’t tell people about the necklace. If you fear quacks, don’t make the question be about a necklace or about signaling.
I think that was intended more as irony.
There was some irony, but skepticism is a real reason why some people refrain. The necklace is simply part of the scenario, I see no particular reason to remove it from the story except risk of confusion. So, instead of a necklace, make it a “magic decoder ring”, or, if we need to maintain privacy, a “harmonic suppository”.
EY is right, though that if this one is meant seriously, the final sentence should read: Answering yes to (8) means that you shouldn’t refrain from cryonics because you dislike being victimized by quacks.
Necklace seems OK to me—the Alcor Emergency ID Tags includes a necklace and bracelet.
I thought Eliezer was taking your comment a bit seriously—but on rereading his comment, I now think it makes sense to ask for your objections to be split up.
There’s a problem, though—his “don’t tell people about the necklace” sounds as though it would help to defeat its ostensible purpose. It is intended to send a message to those close to the near-death-experience. It is tricky to send that kind of message to one group, while not sending it to everyone else as well.
You mean like the warning sign of a pacemaker, or one off all the other helpful, but odd medical tools? There are many things that treat a person in need but look odd. Problem being that those get applied to sick people.
Most people don’t need to know about your affiliation.
You are right about the weirdness signal, my questions don’t get at this.
As for (3) wouldn’t a yes response imply that you do care about the past and future versions of yourself?
When you write “but I just happen to be a sort of creature that gets upset when the future ‘me’ is threatened and constantly gets overcome with an irresistible urge to work against such threats at the present moment—but this urge doesn’t extend to the post-cryonics “me,” so I’m rationally indifferent in that case.” you seem to be saying your utility function is such that you don’t care about the post-cryonics you and since one can’t claim a utility function is irrational (excluding stuff like Intransitive preferences) this objection to cryonics isn’t irrational.
Perhaps the best way to formulate my argument would be as follows. When someone appears to care about his “normal” future self a few years from now, but not about his future self that might come out of a cryonics revival, you can argue that this is an arbitrary and whimsical preference, since the former “self” doesn’t have any significantly better claim to his identity than the latter. Now let’s set aside any possible counter-arguments to that claim, and for the sake of the argument accept that this is indeed so. I see three possible consequences of accepting it:
Starting to care about one’s post-cryonics future self, and (assuming one’s other concerns are satisfied) signing up for cryonics; this is presumably the intended goal of your argument.
Ceasing to care even about one’s “normal” future selves, and rejecting the very concept of personal identity and continuity. (Presumably leading to either complete resignation or to crazy impulsive behavior.)
Keeping one’s existing preferences and behaviors with the justification that, arbitrary and whimsical as they are, they are not more so than any other options, so you might as well not bother changing them.
Now, the question is: can you argue that (1) is more correct or rational than (2) or (3) in some meaningful way?
(Also, if someone is interested in discussions of this sort, I forgot to mention that I raised similar arguments in another recent thread.)
I can imagine somebody who picks (2) here, but still ends up acting more or less normally. You can take the attitude that the future person commonly identified with you is nobody special but be an altruist who cares about everybody, including that person. And as that person is (at least in the near future, and even in the far future when it comes to long-term decisions like education and life insurance) most susceptible to your (current) influence, you’ll pay still pay more attention to them. In the extreme case, the altruistic disciple of Adam Smith believes that everybody will be best off if each person cares only about the good of the future person commonly identified with them, because of the laws of economics rather than the laws of morality.
But as you say, this runs into (6). I think that with a pefectly altruistic attitude, you’d only fight to survive because you’re worried that this is a homicidal maniac who’s likely to terrorise others, or because you have some responsibilities to others that you can best fulfill. And that doesn’t extend to cryonics. So to take care of extreme altruists, rewrite (6) to specify that you know that your death will lead your attacker to reform and make restitution by living an altruistic life in your stead (but die of overexertion if you fight back).
Bottom line: if one takes consequence (2) of answering No to question (3), question (3) should still be considered solved (not an objection), but (6) still remains to be dealt with.