There’s a certain type of leader, over-represented among strongmen, that will push as far as they think they can and stop when they can’t any more. They don’t care about diplomacy or treaties, they care about what they can get away with. I think Putin is one of those—weak in most meaningful ways, but strong in will and very willing to exploit our weakness in same. The way to stop someone like that is with strength. Russia simply can’t throw down, so if we tell them that they’d have to do so to get anywhere, they’d back off.
Of course, we need to be sure we don’t push too far—they can still destroy the world, after all—but Putin is sane, and doesn’t have any desire to do anything nearly so dramatic.
I think Putin is one of those—weak in most meaningful ways, but strong in will and very willing to exploit our weakness in same.
Putting gains inner politcs strength from the conflict.
The way to stop someone like that is with strength.
That assumes that you can simply change from being weak to being strong.
In poker you can do this as bluffing. In Chess you can’t. You actually have to calculate your moves.
Holding joint military exercises isn’t strength if you aren’t willing to use the military to fight.
Bailing out European countries is expensive enough. There not really the money to additionally prop up Ukraine.
Putting gains inner politcs strength from the conflict.
Only as long as he’s winning.
That assumes that you can simply change from being weak to being strong.
NATO is, far and away, the strongest military alliance that has ever existed. They have the ability to be strong. When the missing element is willpower, “Man up, already!” is perfectly viable strategic advice.
That’s probably why ISIS is still alive despite years of US troops in Iraq.
The US crushed ISIS(then called AQI) back during the Bush years—it took a while, and a change of strategy, but they were completely demolished. When the troops left, ISIS came back.
How would you imagine a scenario in which Putin overtly losing in Ukraine? How would it look like?
At this point, a complete loss is impossible. We can’t push him out of Crimea in any plausible way. Support for the Ukrainian military to keep the eastern bits of the country from being overrun could work. But the real move here is stationing a bunch of military hardware in the Baltics, adding whatever is left of Ukraine to NATO, seeing if we can carve Belarus out of his sphere of influence, re-starting ballistic missile defense programs and deploying them in real quantity, and getting the Europeans to start fracking already so they’re not so dependent on Putin’s goodwill.
Yes. Ukraine is not an isolated data point. There is a recent history of Russia attacking its different neighbors, which would make me bet that the future will be similar.
It’s not merely “What to do about Crimea?” but also “Who is next (and what to do about them while we can, while the Russian army is not there yet)?”. If my country had borders with Russia, I would consider fortifying those borders a #1 national priority. I would probably destroy as much roads and railways across the border as would be economically possible. But that’s only passive defense.
I would probably destroy as much roads and railways across the border as would be economically possible.
I don’t think this helps all that much (tanks can travel over rough terrain) and has high economic costs. Better to mine the infrastructure, and detonate the mines when a train carrying enemy soldiers passes over it.
Modern tanks are pretty capable cross-country, but they have a long supply tail. An Abrams tank (which, to be fair, is more of a gas-guzzler than average owing to its high weight and its cool-but-questionably-practical turbine engine) gets about half a mile to the gallon and has a nominal range of a bit under 300 miles, which overstates its operational range because warfare tends to involve a lot of waiting and a lot of local maneuvering.
Strategically, you can only move armor as fast as the trucks or railroad cars carrying fuel, food, and ammunition, and that means that roads, rails, and bridges remain important. (A bit less so if you’re somewhere like Iraq, though, where you’ve got lots of open, hard-surfaced desert to work with.)
Well, destruction of infrastructure is certainly some help, but I imagine that the supply train would be reasonably adapted to rough terrain as well. Even if you can slow the Russians down, this only really helps if reinforcements are on the way, which depends on whether NATO is willing to get involved.
Destroying bridges is certainly really useful though.
If my country had borders with Russia, I would consider fortifying those borders a #1 national priority. I would probably destroy as much roads and railways across the border as would be economically possible.
That seems… excessive (and pretty useless). Do you actually believe that, say, Finland should do this now?
This is the situation where it could be useful to have a prediction market for “which country will be next invaded by Russia?”. I don’t have high confidence for my predictions here.
My guess is merely: within 10 years, Russia will invade another country, one they share a border with. But I’m not sure which one.
Finland seems like an interesting target: it is a EU member, but not a NATO member. NATO has weapons, EU has rationalizations why not doing anything is the wisest policy ever.
On the other hand, there are former Soviet Union countries where Russia can use the excuse “they belonged to us historically anyway, and there is our minority we have to protect”. I don’t know how important each of these factors is for Russia when deciding its next target.
NATO has far higher military expenditure than Russia. I think if nukes were out of the picture then retaking the Crimea would be a possibility. But this is unlikely because the main objective has to be preventing nuclear war, and the more we escalate, the more likely it is that nukes will be used by accident if nothing else. For this reason its probably a good idea not to add the Ukraine to NATO—its simply not worth the risk to get involved.
Ballistic missile defence stops mutually assured destruction, and so gives ones enemies an incentive to strike first before the defence can be completed. I’m not saying Putin would launch a first strike, but it still seems needlessly antagonising even if its technologically feasible.
Finally, couldn’t we do without fracking by using nuclear power?
1) Adding Ukraine to NATO is iffy—their politics are so conflicted that it’d be tough to guarantee they join, or that they stay, and we don’t want them thinking we’re as bad as the Russians. But an offer should be made. And yes, nukes are the reason we can’t squish Russia like a bug(well, that and morality).
2) Doesn’t need to be deployed tomorrow, or deployed publicly. Step up R+D, at a minimum, though.
3) Longer lead time, higher capital costs, and electricity-fuelled transport is still in its infancy(other than trains, but not even Europe runs on trains alone). Also, Europe(bar France) is about as anti-nuclear as they are anti-fracking, so I don’t see any obvious gains in political viability here.
1) Why should we let the Ukraine join NATO? It escalates us towards a war against Russia, and really if we wanted the Ukraine to join then the offer would have been made before the war started.
2) I’d guess that something with the complexity of a ballistic missile shield probably can’t be kept secret. For instance, if you were going the ‘star wars’ route and sticking weapons in space, then the Russians are going to wonder what all these new satellites being launched are for. I suppose you could disguise them as spy satellites, but its still a clue that something’s going on.
3) Isn’t Russia exporting gas rather than oil? In which case it is being used for heating and power rather than transport.
1) Before the war started, Ukraine was run by a corrupt Russian toady. Russia’s in the process of carving off all the regions of Ukraine that voted for said toady, so it’s unlikely another would win. Also, it’s become clear that conciliation isn’t working, so deference to not aggravating the Russians matters a lot less than it used to. That makes them a lot more appealing.
2) Depends on the shield. The GWB-era defence system is land-based, for example.
Some “land wars in Asia” are successful. For example, Germany successfully conquered Russia in 1917. Even more relevantly, Poland ejected the Russians from large parts of the Ukraine in 1921. I think the saying gets its popularity from a very superficial reading of history. Yes, Napoleon and Hitler famously came a cropper, but there have been plenty of successes.
For example, Germany successfully conquered Russia in 1917
You must be using a pretty strange definition of the word “successfully”.
there have been plenty of successes
Certainly Russian armies have been defeated and Russia lost chunks of territory on occasion. But the last guy who, I’d say, successfully invaded Russia went by the name of Genghis Khan.
You must be using a pretty strange definition of the word “successfully”.
I think I’m using the standard one. Germany invaded Russia, forced it to renounce huge amounts of territory, and knocked it out of WW1. Incidentally, it was that invasion which led to the formation of Finland, the Baltic States, Ukraine and Belarus which persist (some with interruptions) to this day. Looks like a pretty resounding victory to most. And Germany did all that while fighting on two fronts! Now, Germany later lost on the Western front, but the moral there isn’t “Don’t start a land war in Asia,” it’s “Don’t fight serious enemies on two fronts at once.”
Certainly Russian armies have been defeated and Russia lost chunks of territory on occasion.
Great, so you agree with skeptical_lurker that, nukes aside, NATO retaking the Crimea from Russia is a possibility. (Frankly I’d say it would be a certainty).
I think Russia’s conventional army today would fold in a matter of weeks. Yes I know who else said that.
It would be bloody though, on both sides.
Lenin’s peace with Germany in WW1 isn’t even applicable to the saying about land wars in Asia, as only the European part of Russia was a part of the theatre. The historically relevant bit of Russia is in Europe both culturally and geographically. Maybe the saying should be “don’t get involved in land wars with Russia.” China was partitioned just fine back in the day. Commodore Perry got what he wanted from Japan just by showing up in a fancy ship, right? The East India Company did ok for a while, etc.
You’re right that the WW1 invasion was entirely in the European part of Russia… but then, so were the Napoleonic and WW2 invasions. And the Crimea too, the point in question.
And you are of course quite right that lots of people have successfully invaded Asia by land, from Alexander onwards. I think the saying is nonsense, relying entirely on a highly selective reading of history.
I feel like Princess Bride was probably repeating Baby Boomer wisdom from the anti-Vietnam protests. A quick Googling attributes the quote to Douglas MacArthur, of all people(who fought no less than three of them, which makes me wonder...)
I like how you ignore Russia’s, um, internal problems at the time :-/ Not to mention that what you are showing is that Russia lost WW1, not that Germany successfully conquered it.
so you agree with skeptical_lurker that, nukes aside, NATO retaking the Crimea from Russia is a possibility
No, I do not, not in the real world. If you want to do simulated war-games which abstract from most everything except for numbers and hardware, maybe, but I don’t see how that’s relevant to anything.
I like how you ignore Russia’s, um, internal problems at the time :-/
But those internal problems were largely caused by the hardships and stresses of losing the war. Similarly, the proximate cause of the German surrender in WW1 was “internal problems” in Germany (the revolutions in Kiel and Bavaria, etc) but those are inseparable from the fact that the hardships of the war and the psychological sense that Germany was losing put an intolerable strain on German morale. Loss of morale leading to institutional overthrow is often the mechanism by which countries collapse when at war.
Russia faced Germany and its allies, fought until the country collapsed, and then surrendered and gave up a massive chunk of land to secure an ignominious and punitive peace.
Germany faced France and its allies, fought until the country collapsed, and then surrendered and gave up a massive chunk of land to secure an ignominious and punitive peace.
US does. European military isn’t particularly large or capable.
http://www.globalfirepower.com/ says that the UK, France and Germany are the 5th-7th most powerful countries respectively. UK tanks are probably the most powerful in the world, based on the idea that whoever shoots first wins (at least when you’re firing depleted uranium rounds that can punch straight through a tank), and the UK holds the record for longest distance tank-on-tank kill.
The US alone has over 8x the defence budget. The UK, France and Germany together have almost twice the defence budget.
Sigh. Do the words “land war in Asia” ring any bells?
Yes… this is because Asia is very big, and armies can freeze on the way to Moscow. But the Crimea isn’t that big.
No one froze in Iraq or Afghanistan where the world’s #1 superpower with the defence budget that’s a large multiple of the entire GDP of those countries used the most sophisticated military hardware to achieve… what?
Well, the US conquered these countries, killed a lot of Taliban, inc. bin laden, toppled Saddam, installed democracy… admittedly things might have got slightly worse after they left, but that’s an ideology problem more than a military one.
But there is a difference. Do the Crimeans see themselves as Russian or Ukranian? Do they care enough to fight a guerilla war? If not, then an analogy to Iraq can’t be drawn.
Modern militaries give very few advantages when it comes to rooting out insurgents hiding in the general populace—you deal with that old-school, either with convincing the local public to join you, co-opting local power brokers, flailing ineffectually, collective punishment, or outright slaughter(on the sliding scale of evil). The US has used the first three in roughly equal proportion.
Russia is unlikely to retreat into the shadows—they’re a line-of-battle army, always have been, and most of Putin’s appeal is restoring the pre-1991 national pride of being able to throw down with NATO and survive. If it ever got to a war, I think they’d fight it mostly straight, and they’d lose badly.
If it ever got to a war, I think they’d fight it mostly straight, and they’d lose badly.
That all depends on what kind of war we are talking about. The biggest issue for the West is political will, and everyone knows it. Even in a full-out non-nuclear war, it’s not going to be like running tanks at full speed through the desert to Baghdad. Russia’s goal would be to bog down NATO army and engage in exchange of heavy casualties. If it manages to do this, it wins—it doesn’t need clear battlefield victories.
European militaries are extremely capable, for the most part—pound for pound, they’re almost as good as the US. They just have a lot fewer pounds.
And historically, land wars in Asia haven’t been a big deal. That’s a Vietnam-era myth—WW2 involved a lot of Asian land warring, and that went pretty okay.
European militaries are extremely capable, for the most part
Err… show me. The Brits fought a short and mostly air/naval war in the Falklands, most everyone sent in a few units for the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. But other than that the European militaries haven’t done any real fighting for many decades. Even in the Yugoslavian mess nothing happened other than US air strikes.
I am sure they look good on paper. I am also sure the few elite units are very good. I have doubts about actual battlefield performance of the main part of the army, in part because because there is no data.
How recent are we talking? The French were involved in Vietnam before the US was and in the Suez Crisis around the same time, and a few years after that they fought a protracted and seriously nasty asymmetrical war in Algeria. More recently they’ve also been party to the Islamist civil wars in northern Africa, most importantly against Boko Haram in Mali, and to a number of other postcolonial squabbles.
They don’t get a lot of press in the Anglosphere, but theirs is probably the most active Western military after the US’s.
Fair concern. Still, has there been a meaningful difference between those few units and their American or British counterparts? (And Britain sent about as many soldiers per capita to Iraq as the US did, though they were posted to a quieter sector. That’s not “a few units”).
But other than that the European militaries haven’t done any real fighting for many decades.
The US fighter planes and armour haven’t faced a real opponent in a long time either. Most of the experience is in asymmetric warfare against guerillas, which would be very different from a war against Russia.
I have doubts about actual battlefield performance of the main part of the army, in part because because there is no data.
No data does justify uncertainty, but you can’t just say “I don’t know how well the German army would perform, therefore I’m going to assume they’ll do badly”.
Anyway, there is data from wargames, from testing grounds, on what distance a weapon can hit a target, and so forth.
It’s been more than twenty years, but the first Gulf War was a conventional war waged against an opponent that was serious about fighting conventionally. The strategic outcome wasn’t really in doubt, and the Iraqis at the time were largely running old and/or downgraded export versions of Russian equipment, but it still gives us good tactical data; the current reputation of American armor, for example, largely rides on the Battle of 73 Easting.
This depends whether the advantage of american combat experience is proof of abilities, or experience gained.
My understanding is that having seen combat, veterans are then less scared by future engagements. But what proportion of Gulf war vets are still serving now—wouldn’t they be getting a bit old?
Anyway, yes the Gulf war shows the massive superiority of US/UK tanks over T-72s.
Nobody in Europe is willing to freeze in the winter because there no gas to heat his home.
I agree, Europe displayed a remarkable degree of moral cowardice. It is literally “we don’t want to deal with a predator on our doorstep because we don’t want to be cold.”
The scenario where Putin loses in Ukraine is Russia being so screwed up by serious sanctions that there is regime change to something more moderate. But, as was well-covered elsewhere, the West lacks both the coordination and the moral spine to do serious sanctions.
Russia lost the Cold War, remember, because it did not have a functioning economy to stand on its own and compete in e.g. military spending against the West. It still does not.
The scenario where Putin loses in Ukraine is Russia being so screwed up by serious sanctions that there is regime change to something more moderate.
Sanction hurt both parties.
They also allow Putin to steal assets from Western countries that are located in Russia. The don’t create moderation but basically make political life for every moderate in Russia harder.
But, as was well-covered elsewhere, the West lacks both the coordination and the moral spine to do serious sanctions.
I’m not sure whether from a moral perspective the kind of resources it would take are a good bargain. The task for a moral imperative to do something in a situation like Darfur is much higher than Crimea.
Russia lost the Cold War, remember, because it did not have a functioning economy to stand on its own and compete in e.g. military spending against the West.
At present when Western states are at the brink of declaring bankruptcy the Western strength is different than it was at the end of the cold war.
There’s a certain type of leader, over-represented among strongmen, that will push as far as they think they can and stop when they can’t any more. They don’t care about diplomacy or treaties, they care about what they can get away with. I think Putin is one of those—weak in most meaningful ways, but strong in will and very willing to exploit our weakness in same. The way to stop someone like that is with strength. Russia simply can’t throw down, so if we tell them that they’d have to do so to get anywhere, they’d back off.
Of course, we need to be sure we don’t push too far—they can still destroy the world, after all—but Putin is sane, and doesn’t have any desire to do anything nearly so dramatic.
Putting gains inner politcs strength from the conflict.
That assumes that you can simply change from being weak to being strong. In poker you can do this as bluffing. In Chess you can’t. You actually have to calculate your moves.
Holding joint military exercises isn’t strength if you aren’t willing to use the military to fight.
Bailing out European countries is expensive enough. There not really the money to additionally prop up Ukraine.
Only as long as he’s winning.
NATO is, far and away, the strongest military alliance that has ever existed. They have the ability to be strong. When the missing element is willpower, “Man up, already!” is perfectly viable strategic advice.
That’s probably why ISIS is still alive despite years of US troops in Iraq.
Nobody in Europe is willing to freeze in the winter because there no gas to heat his home.
How would you imagine a scenario in which Putin overtly losing in Ukraine? How would it look like?
The US crushed ISIS(then called AQI) back during the Bush years—it took a while, and a change of strategy, but they were completely demolished. When the troops left, ISIS came back.
At this point, a complete loss is impossible. We can’t push him out of Crimea in any plausible way. Support for the Ukrainian military to keep the eastern bits of the country from being overrun could work. But the real move here is stationing a bunch of military hardware in the Baltics, adding whatever is left of Ukraine to NATO, seeing if we can carve Belarus out of his sphere of influence, re-starting ballistic missile defense programs and deploying them in real quantity, and getting the Europeans to start fracking already so they’re not so dependent on Putin’s goodwill.
Yes. Ukraine is not an isolated data point. There is a recent history of Russia attacking its different neighbors, which would make me bet that the future will be similar.
It’s not merely “What to do about Crimea?” but also “Who is next (and what to do about them while we can, while the Russian army is not there yet)?”. If my country had borders with Russia, I would consider fortifying those borders a #1 national priority. I would probably destroy as much roads and railways across the border as would be economically possible. But that’s only passive defense.
I don’t think this helps all that much (tanks can travel over rough terrain) and has high economic costs. Better to mine the infrastructure, and detonate the mines when a train carrying enemy soldiers passes over it.
Modern tanks are pretty capable cross-country, but they have a long supply tail. An Abrams tank (which, to be fair, is more of a gas-guzzler than average owing to its high weight and its cool-but-questionably-practical turbine engine) gets about half a mile to the gallon and has a nominal range of a bit under 300 miles, which overstates its operational range because warfare tends to involve a lot of waiting and a lot of local maneuvering.
Strategically, you can only move armor as fast as the trucks or railroad cars carrying fuel, food, and ammunition, and that means that roads, rails, and bridges remain important. (A bit less so if you’re somewhere like Iraq, though, where you’ve got lots of open, hard-surfaced desert to work with.)
Well, destruction of infrastructure is certainly some help, but I imagine that the supply train would be reasonably adapted to rough terrain as well. Even if you can slow the Russians down, this only really helps if reinforcements are on the way, which depends on whether NATO is willing to get involved.
Destroying bridges is certainly really useful though.
That seems… excessive (and pretty useless). Do you actually believe that, say, Finland should do this now?
This is the situation where it could be useful to have a prediction market for “which country will be next invaded by Russia?”. I don’t have high confidence for my predictions here.
My guess is merely: within 10 years, Russia will invade another country, one they share a border with. But I’m not sure which one.
Finland seems like an interesting target: it is a EU member, but not a NATO member. NATO has weapons, EU has rationalizations why not doing anything is the wisest policy ever.
On the other hand, there are former Soviet Union countries where Russia can use the excuse “they belonged to us historically anyway, and there is our minority we have to protect”. I don’t know how important each of these factors is for Russia when deciding its next target.
NATO has far higher military expenditure than Russia. I think if nukes were out of the picture then retaking the Crimea would be a possibility. But this is unlikely because the main objective has to be preventing nuclear war, and the more we escalate, the more likely it is that nukes will be used by accident if nothing else. For this reason its probably a good idea not to add the Ukraine to NATO—its simply not worth the risk to get involved.
Ballistic missile defence stops mutually assured destruction, and so gives ones enemies an incentive to strike first before the defence can be completed. I’m not saying Putin would launch a first strike, but it still seems needlessly antagonising even if its technologically feasible.
Finally, couldn’t we do without fracking by using nuclear power?
1) Adding Ukraine to NATO is iffy—their politics are so conflicted that it’d be tough to guarantee they join, or that they stay, and we don’t want them thinking we’re as bad as the Russians. But an offer should be made. And yes, nukes are the reason we can’t squish Russia like a bug(well, that and morality).
2) Doesn’t need to be deployed tomorrow, or deployed publicly. Step up R+D, at a minimum, though.
3) Longer lead time, higher capital costs, and electricity-fuelled transport is still in its infancy(other than trains, but not even Europe runs on trains alone). Also, Europe(bar France) is about as anti-nuclear as they are anti-fracking, so I don’t see any obvious gains in political viability here.
1) Why should we let the Ukraine join NATO? It escalates us towards a war against Russia, and really if we wanted the Ukraine to join then the offer would have been made before the war started.
2) I’d guess that something with the complexity of a ballistic missile shield probably can’t be kept secret. For instance, if you were going the ‘star wars’ route and sticking weapons in space, then the Russians are going to wonder what all these new satellites being launched are for. I suppose you could disguise them as spy satellites, but its still a clue that something’s going on.
3) Isn’t Russia exporting gas rather than oil? In which case it is being used for heating and power rather than transport.
1) Before the war started, Ukraine was run by a corrupt Russian toady. Russia’s in the process of carving off all the regions of Ukraine that voted for said toady, so it’s unlikely another would win. Also, it’s become clear that conciliation isn’t working, so deference to not aggravating the Russians matters a lot less than it used to. That makes them a lot more appealing.
2) Depends on the shield. The GWB-era defence system is land-based, for example.
3) They export both.
US does. European military isn’t particularly large or capable.
Sigh. Do the words “land war in Asia” ring any bells? (yes, I know that Crimea is technically in Europe)
Some “land wars in Asia” are successful. For example, Germany successfully conquered Russia in 1917. Even more relevantly, Poland ejected the Russians from large parts of the Ukraine in 1921. I think the saying gets its popularity from a very superficial reading of history. Yes, Napoleon and Hitler famously came a cropper, but there have been plenty of successes.
You must be using a pretty strange definition of the word “successfully”.
Certainly Russian armies have been defeated and Russia lost chunks of territory on occasion. But the last guy who, I’d say, successfully invaded Russia went by the name of Genghis Khan.
I think I’m using the standard one. Germany invaded Russia, forced it to renounce huge amounts of territory, and knocked it out of WW1. Incidentally, it was that invasion which led to the formation of Finland, the Baltic States, Ukraine and Belarus which persist (some with interruptions) to this day. Looks like a pretty resounding victory to most. And Germany did all that while fighting on two fronts! Now, Germany later lost on the Western front, but the moral there isn’t “Don’t start a land war in Asia,” it’s “Don’t fight serious enemies on two fronts at once.”
Great, so you agree with skeptical_lurker that, nukes aside, NATO retaking the Crimea from Russia is a possibility. (Frankly I’d say it would be a certainty).
I think Russia’s conventional army today would fold in a matter of weeks. Yes I know who else said that.
It would be bloody though, on both sides.
Lenin’s peace with Germany in WW1 isn’t even applicable to the saying about land wars in Asia, as only the European part of Russia was a part of the theatre. The historically relevant bit of Russia is in Europe both culturally and geographically. Maybe the saying should be “don’t get involved in land wars with Russia.” China was partitioned just fine back in the day. Commodore Perry got what he wanted from Japan just by showing up in a fancy ship, right? The East India Company did ok for a while, etc.
You’re right that the WW1 invasion was entirely in the European part of Russia… but then, so were the Napoleonic and WW2 invasions. And the Crimea too, the point in question.
And you are of course quite right that lots of people have successfully invaded Asia by land, from Alexander onwards. I think the saying is nonsense, relying entirely on a highly selective reading of history.
I think that facing an Eastern Front meatgrinder over some intra-Slav land squabble, the West’s political will today would fold faster.
The saying, I think, is a quote from Princess Bride and at the time the relevant war was Vietnam (and to a lesser degree, Korea).
I feel like Princess Bride was probably repeating Baby Boomer wisdom from the anti-Vietnam protests. A quick Googling attributes the quote to Douglas MacArthur, of all people(who fought no less than three of them, which makes me wonder...)
I like how you ignore Russia’s, um, internal problems at the time :-/ Not to mention that what you are showing is that Russia lost WW1, not that Germany successfully conquered it.
No, I do not, not in the real world. If you want to do simulated war-games which abstract from most everything except for numbers and hardware, maybe, but I don’t see how that’s relevant to anything.
But those internal problems were largely caused by the hardships and stresses of losing the war. Similarly, the proximate cause of the German surrender in WW1 was “internal problems” in Germany (the revolutions in Kiel and Bavaria, etc) but those are inseparable from the fact that the hardships of the war and the psychological sense that Germany was losing put an intolerable strain on German morale. Loss of morale leading to institutional overthrow is often the mechanism by which countries collapse when at war.
I agree that Russia lost WW1. What I don’t agree with is that Germany “successfully conquered” Russia in 1917.
Russia faced Germany and its allies, fought until the country collapsed, and then surrendered and gave up a massive chunk of land to secure an ignominious and punitive peace.
Germany faced France and its allies, fought until the country collapsed, and then surrendered and gave up a massive chunk of land to secure an ignominious and punitive peace.
I see no difference between the two.
http://www.globalfirepower.com/ says that the UK, France and Germany are the 5th-7th most powerful countries respectively. UK tanks are probably the most powerful in the world, based on the idea that whoever shoots first wins (at least when you’re firing depleted uranium rounds that can punch straight through a tank), and the UK holds the record for longest distance tank-on-tank kill.
The US alone has over 8x the defence budget. The UK, France and Germany together have almost twice the defence budget.
Yes… this is because Asia is very big, and armies can freeze on the way to Moscow. But the Crimea isn’t that big.
No one froze in Iraq or Afghanistan where the world’s #1 superpower with the defence budget that’s a large multiple of the entire GDP of those countries used the most sophisticated military hardware to achieve… what?
Well, the US conquered these countries, killed a lot of Taliban, inc. bin laden, toppled Saddam, installed democracy… admittedly things might have got slightly worse after they left, but that’s an ideology problem more than a military one.
But there is a difference. Do the Crimeans see themselves as Russian or Ukranian? Do they care enough to fight a guerilla war? If not, then an analogy to Iraq can’t be drawn.
Modern militaries give very few advantages when it comes to rooting out insurgents hiding in the general populace—you deal with that old-school, either with convincing the local public to join you, co-opting local power brokers, flailing ineffectually, collective punishment, or outright slaughter(on the sliding scale of evil). The US has used the first three in roughly equal proportion.
Russia is unlikely to retreat into the shadows—they’re a line-of-battle army, always have been, and most of Putin’s appeal is restoring the pre-1991 national pride of being able to throw down with NATO and survive. If it ever got to a war, I think they’d fight it mostly straight, and they’d lose badly.
That all depends on what kind of war we are talking about. The biggest issue for the West is political will, and everyone knows it. Even in a full-out non-nuclear war, it’s not going to be like running tanks at full speed through the desert to Baghdad. Russia’s goal would be to bog down NATO army and engage in exchange of heavy casualties. If it manages to do this, it wins—it doesn’t need clear battlefield victories.
European militaries are extremely capable, for the most part—pound for pound, they’re almost as good as the US. They just have a lot fewer pounds.
And historically, land wars in Asia haven’t been a big deal. That’s a Vietnam-era myth—WW2 involved a lot of Asian land warring, and that went pretty okay.
Err… show me. The Brits fought a short and mostly air/naval war in the Falklands, most everyone sent in a few units for the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. But other than that the European militaries haven’t done any real fighting for many decades. Even in the Yugoslavian mess nothing happened other than US air strikes.
I am sure they look good on paper. I am also sure the few elite units are very good. I have doubts about actual battlefield performance of the main part of the army, in part because because there is no data.
How recent are we talking? The French were involved in Vietnam before the US was and in the Suez Crisis around the same time, and a few years after that they fought a protracted and seriously nasty asymmetrical war in Algeria. More recently they’ve also been party to the Islamist civil wars in northern Africa, most importantly against Boko Haram in Mali, and to a number of other postcolonial squabbles.
They don’t get a lot of press in the Anglosphere, but theirs is probably the most active Western military after the US’s.
Fair concern. Still, has there been a meaningful difference between those few units and their American or British counterparts? (And Britain sent about as many soldiers per capita to Iraq as the US did, though they were posted to a quieter sector. That’s not “a few units”).
The US fighter planes and armour haven’t faced a real opponent in a long time either. Most of the experience is in asymmetric warfare against guerillas, which would be very different from a war against Russia.
No data does justify uncertainty, but you can’t just say “I don’t know how well the German army would perform, therefore I’m going to assume they’ll do badly”. Anyway, there is data from wargames, from testing grounds, on what distance a weapon can hit a target, and so forth.
It’s been more than twenty years, but the first Gulf War was a conventional war waged against an opponent that was serious about fighting conventionally. The strategic outcome wasn’t really in doubt, and the Iraqis at the time were largely running old and/or downgraded export versions of Russian equipment, but it still gives us good tactical data; the current reputation of American armor, for example, largely rides on the Battle of 73 Easting.
This depends whether the advantage of american combat experience is proof of abilities, or experience gained.
My understanding is that having seen combat, veterans are then less scared by future engagements. But what proportion of Gulf war vets are still serving now—wouldn’t they be getting a bit old?
Anyway, yes the Gulf war shows the massive superiority of US/UK tanks over T-72s.
I agree, Europe displayed a remarkable degree of moral cowardice. It is literally “we don’t want to deal with a predator on our doorstep because we don’t want to be cold.”
The scenario where Putin loses in Ukraine is Russia being so screwed up by serious sanctions that there is regime change to something more moderate. But, as was well-covered elsewhere, the West lacks both the coordination and the moral spine to do serious sanctions.
Russia lost the Cold War, remember, because it did not have a functioning economy to stand on its own and compete in e.g. military spending against the West. It still does not.
Sanction hurt both parties.
They also allow Putin to steal assets from Western countries that are located in Russia. The don’t create moderation but basically make political life for every moderate in Russia harder.
I’m not sure whether from a moral perspective the kind of resources it would take are a good bargain. The task for a moral imperative to do something in a situation like Darfur is much higher than Crimea.
At present when Western states are at the brink of declaring bankruptcy the Western strength is different than it was at the end of the cold war.