The reason why an inequitable distribution of money is problematic is that money has diminishing marginal utility; so if a millionaire gives $1000 to a poor person, the poor person gains more than the millionaire loses.
If your instincts are telling you that an inequitable distribution of utility is bad, are you sure you’re not falling into the “diminishing marginal utility of utility” error that people have been empirically shown to exhibit? (can’t find link now, sorry, I saw it here).
The reason why an inequitable distribution of money is problematic is that money has diminishing marginal utility; so if a millionaire gives $1000 to a poor person, the poor person gains more than the millionaire loses.
Perhaps it would help if you gave a specific example of an action that (a) follows from average utilitarianism as you understand it, and (b) you believe most people would find reprehensible?
The standard answer is killing a person with below-average well-being*, assuming no further consequences follow from this. This assumes dying has zero disutility, however.
*The term “experienced utility” seems to be producing a lot of confusion. Utility is a decision-theoretic construction only. Humans, as is, don’t have utility functions.
Yes, I’m surprised that it’s average rather than total utility is being measured. All other things being equal, twice as many people is twice as good to me.
The standard answer is killing a person with below-average well-being*, assuming no further consequences follow from this. This assumes dying has zero disutility, however.
The reason why an inequitable distribution of money is problematic is that money has diminishing marginal utility; so if a millionaire gives $1000 to a poor person, the poor person gains more than the millionaire loses.
If your instincts are telling you that an inequitable distribution of utility is bad, are you sure you’re not falling into the “diminishing marginal utility of utility” error that people have been empirically shown to exhibit? (can’t find link now, sorry, I saw it here).
That’s why I said “utility” instead of “money”.
Er, I know, I’m contrasting money and utility. Could you expand a little more on what you’re trying to say about my point?
The term “utility” means that I’m taking diminishing marginal returns into account.
My instincts are confused on the point, but my impression is that most people find average utilitarianism reprehensible.
Perhaps it would help if you gave a specific example of an action that (a) follows from average utilitarianism as you understand it, and (b) you believe most people would find reprehensible?
The standard answer is killing a person with below-average well-being*, assuming no further consequences follow from this. This assumes dying has zero disutility, however.
See comments on For The People Who Are Still Alive for lots of related discussion.
*The term “experienced utility” seems to be producing a lot of confusion. Utility is a decision-theoretic construction only. Humans, as is, don’t have utility functions.
It also involves maximizing average instantaneous welfare, rather than the average of whole-life satisfaction.
Yes, I’m surprised that it’s average rather than total utility is being measured. All other things being equal, twice as many people is twice as good to me.
The standard answer is killing a person with below-average well-being*, assuming no further consequences follow from this. This assumes dying has zero disutility, however.
See comments on For The People Who Are Still Alive for lots of related discussion.
*I consider the term “experienced utility” harmful. Utility is a decision-theoretic abstraction, not an experience.