Perhaps it would help if you gave a specific example of an action that (a) follows from average utilitarianism as you understand it, and (b) you believe most people would find reprehensible?
The standard answer is killing a person with below-average well-being*, assuming no further consequences follow from this. This assumes dying has zero disutility, however.
*The term “experienced utility” seems to be producing a lot of confusion. Utility is a decision-theoretic construction only. Humans, as is, don’t have utility functions.
Yes, I’m surprised that it’s average rather than total utility is being measured. All other things being equal, twice as many people is twice as good to me.
The standard answer is killing a person with below-average well-being*, assuming no further consequences follow from this. This assumes dying has zero disutility, however.
The term “utility” means that I’m taking diminishing marginal returns into account.
My instincts are confused on the point, but my impression is that most people find average utilitarianism reprehensible.
Perhaps it would help if you gave a specific example of an action that (a) follows from average utilitarianism as you understand it, and (b) you believe most people would find reprehensible?
The standard answer is killing a person with below-average well-being*, assuming no further consequences follow from this. This assumes dying has zero disutility, however.
See comments on For The People Who Are Still Alive for lots of related discussion.
*The term “experienced utility” seems to be producing a lot of confusion. Utility is a decision-theoretic construction only. Humans, as is, don’t have utility functions.
It also involves maximizing average instantaneous welfare, rather than the average of whole-life satisfaction.
Yes, I’m surprised that it’s average rather than total utility is being measured. All other things being equal, twice as many people is twice as good to me.
The standard answer is killing a person with below-average well-being*, assuming no further consequences follow from this. This assumes dying has zero disutility, however.
See comments on For The People Who Are Still Alive for lots of related discussion.
*I consider the term “experienced utility” harmful. Utility is a decision-theoretic abstraction, not an experience.