The only thing that changed is that you don’t have this easy way to prescribe the label of “methaphysical realness” to free will. But what is this label for, other than just vibes? What actual properties “not methaphysically real” free will lacks compared to “methaphysically real” one
The ability to make a difference , and choose non-inevitable futures.
Libertarian free will allows the future to depend on decisions which are not themselves determined. That means there are valid statements of the form “if I had made choice b instead of choice a, then future B would have happened instead of future A”. Moreover, these are real possibilities, not merely conceptual or logical ones.
Under determinism, events still need to be caused,and your (determined) actions can be part of the cause of a future state that is itself determined, that has probability 1.0. Determinism allows you to cause the future ,but it doesn’t allow you to control the future in any sense other than causing it. (and the sense in which you are casusing the future is just the sense in which any future state depends on causes in he past—it is nothing different from physical causation). It allows, in a purely theoretical sense “if I had made choice b instead of choice a, then future B would have happened instead of future A” … but without the ability to have actually chosen b.
The ability to make a difference , and choose non-inevitable futures.
Actually, absolutely not the case here! The way Macias uses “real” has nothing to do with non-inevitability.
Moreover, these are real possibilities, not merely conceptual or logical ones.
And here you failed to describe the word “real” without using the word “real” not only in spirit but also in letter.
The ability to make a difference , and choose non-inevitable futures.
And this ability affects our desicion making or moral responsibility, how exactly? Last time I directly asked you this question about five times and you kept dodging it. Now, when you just renamed “real choice” to “non-inevitable” choice, the question still stands.
Are you actually talking about an epiphenomenon? Like is it logically possible to have two universe where everything happened exactly the same for the same reason but one had libertarian free will and the other didn’t?
Actually, absolutely not the case here! The way Macias uses “real” has nothing to do with non-inevitability.
I was speaking for myself.
Moreover, these are real possibilities, not merely conceptual or logical ones.
And here you failed to describe the word “real” without using the word “real” not only in spirit but also in letter.
I mean the same thing by “real” as you do..”in the territory”.
A possibility could be a feature of reality, “in the territory” or it could be a merely apparent, in the map as, a result of ignorance, AKA “Knightian uncertainty”. The existence of real, in the territory possibilities is the equivalent to the falsehood of strict causal dterminism. Which means Laplace’s Demon could settle the question of the existence of real possibilities: if it cant predict the future given perfect knowledge of the present, determinism is false, and real possibilities exist.
The ability to make a difference , and choose non-inevitable futures.
And this ability affects our desicion making or moral responsibility, how exactly?
It makes it more worth having, since it makes more of a difference. That’s the question I was answering: why is libertarian free will worth wanting?
You might make the same decisions, whether it not you have LFW, but that’s another question.
Last time I directly asked you this question about five times and you kept dodging it. Now, when you just renamed “real choice” to “non-inevitable” choice, the question still stands.
I’ve always answered your questions as stated, but you keep jumping from one to another.
Are you actually talking about an epiphenomenon? Like is it logically possible to have two universe where everything happened exactly the same for the same reason but one had libertarian free will and the other didn’t?
Yes it is, but that has nothing to do with epiphenomenality. Given a finite sequence of random events that have already happened you could always construct a deterministic algorithm that produces the same sequence...but that doesn’t show the initial sequence was deterministic.
OTOH, given an infinite random universe, you can find any compressible sequence, too. (Boltzman brains). Randomness can be mistaken for determinism.
There are circumstances under which determinism and indeterminism are hard to distinguish, but that doesn’t mean they are the same, and it doesn’t mean they are of equal value.
I mean the same thing by “real” as you do..”in the territory”.
Maps are embedded in the territory. So everything that is on the map is also in some sense in the territory. The question is whether it is the same sense that the map claims to be or not. That’s why I dislike “real” as a category. It’s a legacy of the times where philosophers didn’t understand map-territory relations, when they were talking about it as single variable property of an object and not two-variable property of both object and subject.
since it makes more of a difference
How it “makes difference” if then you agree that there can be no difference whatsoever?
Yes it is, but that has nothing to do with epiphenomenality.
Seems very much like epiphenomenalism from my perspective. We can even construct a similar mind experiment to p-zombies with the sole difference that it will actually make sense.
Imagine there are two universes U1, U2 with exactly the same physics, yet in U1 the outcome of random events are selected through a deterministic process. Say, the universes are run on two computers in a parent universe Up, one computer uses a pseudorandom generator, and the other a “true random” one. And for the symmetry lets assume that the sequence of outcome of both random generators happened to be the same for U1 and U2. Now a Laplacian demon who knows everything about U1 and U2 will also have to know an additional fact whether the computer than implements them uses pseudorandom generator or “trully random” one, which is a fact about a parent universe Up and not U1 or U2.
Actually it’s even worse than that. What if Up has its own parent universe Upp? And what if Up is implemented via pseudorandom generator in Upp? Then what we thought to be a “trully random” generator in Up is also only a pseudorandom one. Now the Laplacian demon will have to know all these extra facts about all the universes in chain just to claim whether entities in U2 has libertarian free will.
So the “libertarian free will” is an epiphenomenon. An extra badge of “metaphysical reality” without any causal effect on the decision making and moral responsibility.
Everything that is on the map is also in some sense in the territory.
In a misleading sense. There are maps of Narnia, but Narnia is not in the territory. The map as meaningless squiggles of ink is in the territory, but that’s misleading.
The question is whether it is the same sense that the map claims to be or not. That’s why I dislike “real” as a category.
I don’t see how you can dispense wit the concept, even if you don’t like the word,
It’s a legacy of the times where philosophers didn’t understand map-territory relations, when they were talking about it as single variable property of
an object and not two-variable property of both object and subject.
It’s not wrong to say the territory itself is real, as a one place predicate, and it’s possible to use some other term for successful correspondence.
How it “makes difference” if then you agree that there can be no difference whatsoever?
I didn’t say it makes no difference in the sense that that it doesn’t matter. I said it could be indetectable (to finite minds). That’s not the same thing. Things you can’t know can matter a lot. For instance don’t know when you will die, but it matters to you. “isn’t detectable”, “doesn’t matter”, and “casually idle” are all different properties.
Seems very much like epiphenomenalism from my perspective. We can even construct a similar mind experiment to p-zombies with the sole difference that it will actually make sense.
Imagine there are two universes U1, U2 with exactly the same physics, yet in U1 the outcome of random events are selected through a deterministic process. Say, the universes are run on two computers in a parent universe Up, one computer uses a pseudorandom generator, and the other a “true random” one. And for the symmetry lets assume that the sequence of outcome of both random generators happened to be the same for U1 and U2. Now a Laplacian demon who knows everything about U1 and U2 will also have to know an additional fact whether the computer than implements them uses pseudorandom generator or “trully random” one, which is a fact about a parent universe Up and not U1 or U2.
Knowing that U2 is using genuine randomness is no help to the LD, because it won’t be able to make predictions. In fact, it can deduce the the existence of genuine randomness from it’s own failure. Considering only the special case where genuine randomness corresponds to pseudo randomness disguises the point. Of course, the fact that an LD would not work on a genuinely random universe is a difference that indeterminism makes.
Actually it’s even worse than that. What if Up has its own parent universe Upp? And what if Up is implemented via pseudorandom generator in Upp? Then what we thought to be a “trully random” generator in Up is also only a pseudorandom one.
Who’s we? You and I are finite and ignorant, an LD isnt. A deterministic PRNG is just part of the laws of physics, and a LD is supposed to know all the laws of physics , so it would know which PRNG the pseudo random universe is running on by default..it’s not an extra assumption. So parent universes are irrelevant: they don’t tell the LD anything it doesn’t know, and they can’t help it predict the random.
So the “libertarian free will” is an epiphenomenon. An extra badge of “metaphysical reality” without any causal effect on the decision making and moral responsibility
Again, indeterminism and free will affect the nature of causality. It’s a category error to say that causality itself is a cause. So determinism , as a form of causation , is an epiphenomenon too!
The ability to make a difference , and choose non-inevitable futures.
Libertarian free will allows the future to depend on decisions which are not themselves determined. That means there are valid statements of the form “if I had made choice b instead of choice a, then future B would have happened instead of future A”. Moreover, these are real possibilities, not merely conceptual or logical ones.
Under determinism, events still need to be caused,and your (determined) actions can be part of the cause of a future state that is itself determined, that has probability 1.0. Determinism allows you to cause the future ,but it doesn’t allow you to control the future in any sense other than causing it. (and the sense in which you are casusing the future is just the sense in which any future state depends on causes in he past—it is nothing different from physical causation). It allows, in a purely theoretical sense “if I had made choice b instead of choice a, then future B would have happened instead of future A” … but without the ability to have actually chosen b.
Actually, absolutely not the case here! The way Macias uses “real” has nothing to do with non-inevitability.
And here you failed to describe the word “real” without using the word “real” not only in spirit but also in letter.
And this ability affects our desicion making or moral responsibility, how exactly? Last time I directly asked you this question about five times and you kept dodging it. Now, when you just renamed “real choice” to “non-inevitable” choice, the question still stands.
Are you actually talking about an epiphenomenon? Like is it logically possible to have two universe where everything happened exactly the same for the same reason but one had libertarian free will and the other didn’t?
I was speaking for myself.
I mean the same thing by “real” as you do..”in the territory”.
A possibility could be a feature of reality, “in the territory” or it could be a merely apparent, in the map as, a result of ignorance, AKA “Knightian uncertainty”. The existence of real, in the territory possibilities is the equivalent to the falsehood of strict causal dterminism. Which means Laplace’s Demon could settle the question of the existence of real possibilities: if it cant predict the future given perfect knowledge of the present, determinism is false, and real possibilities exist.
It makes it more worth having, since it makes more of a difference. That’s the question I was answering: why is libertarian free will worth wanting?
You might make the same decisions, whether it not you have LFW, but that’s another question.
I’ve always answered your questions as stated, but you keep jumping from one to another.
Yes it is, but that has nothing to do with epiphenomenality. Given a finite sequence of random events that have already happened you could always construct a deterministic algorithm that produces the same sequence...but that doesn’t show the initial sequence was deterministic.
OTOH, given an infinite random universe, you can find any compressible sequence, too. (Boltzman brains). Randomness can be mistaken for determinism.
There are circumstances under which determinism and indeterminism are hard to distinguish, but that doesn’t mean they are the same, and it doesn’t mean they are of equal value.
Maps are embedded in the territory. So everything that is on the map is also in some sense in the territory. The question is whether it is the same sense that the map claims to be or not. That’s why I dislike “real” as a category. It’s a legacy of the times where philosophers didn’t understand map-territory relations, when they were talking about it as single variable property of an object and not two-variable property of both object and subject.
How it “makes difference” if then you agree that there can be no difference whatsoever?
Seems very much like epiphenomenalism from my perspective. We can even construct a similar mind experiment to p-zombies with the sole difference that it will actually make sense.
Imagine there are two universes U1, U2 with exactly the same physics, yet in U1 the outcome of random events are selected through a deterministic process. Say, the universes are run on two computers in a parent universe Up, one computer uses a pseudorandom generator, and the other a “true random” one. And for the symmetry lets assume that the sequence of outcome of both random generators happened to be the same for U1 and U2. Now a Laplacian demon who knows everything about U1 and U2 will also have to know an additional fact whether the computer than implements them uses pseudorandom generator or “trully random” one, which is a fact about a parent universe Up and not U1 or U2.
Actually it’s even worse than that. What if Up has its own parent universe Upp? And what if Up is implemented via pseudorandom generator in Upp? Then what we thought to be a “trully random” generator in Up is also only a pseudorandom one. Now the Laplacian demon will have to know all these extra facts about all the universes in chain just to claim whether entities in U2 has libertarian free will.
So the “libertarian free will” is an epiphenomenon. An extra badge of “metaphysical reality” without any causal effect on the decision making and moral responsibility.
In a misleading sense. There are maps of Narnia, but Narnia is not in the territory. The map as meaningless squiggles of ink is in the territory, but that’s misleading.
I don’t see how you can dispense wit the concept, even if you don’t like the word,
It’s not wrong to say the territory itself is real, as a one place predicate, and it’s possible to use some other term for successful correspondence.
I didn’t say it makes no difference in the sense that that it doesn’t matter. I said it could be indetectable (to finite minds). That’s not the same thing. Things you can’t know can matter a lot. For instance don’t know when you will die, but it matters to you. “isn’t detectable”, “doesn’t matter”, and “casually idle” are all different properties.
Seems very much like epiphenomenalism from my perspective. We can even construct a similar mind experiment to p-zombies with the sole difference that it will actually make sense.
Knowing that U2 is using genuine randomness is no help to the LD, because it won’t be able to make predictions. In fact, it can deduce the the existence of genuine randomness from it’s own failure. Considering only the special case where genuine randomness corresponds to pseudo randomness disguises the point. Of course, the fact that an LD would not work on a genuinely random universe is a difference that indeterminism makes.
Who’s we? You and I are finite and ignorant, an LD isnt. A deterministic PRNG is just part of the laws of physics, and a LD is supposed to know all the laws of physics , so it would know which PRNG the pseudo random universe is running on by default..it’s not an extra assumption. So parent universes are irrelevant: they don’t tell the LD anything it doesn’t know, and they can’t help it predict the random.
Again, indeterminism and free will affect the nature of causality. It’s a category error to say that causality itself is a cause. So determinism , as a form of causation , is an epiphenomenon too!