David Chapman, to take one major example, is pretty oppository in his prospectus for his proposed book “In the Cells of the Eggplant”. I expect he would call it “extending”, but it’s more like hacking off all the limbs to replace them with tentacles.
My impression is that Chapman is objecting to a different kind of rationality, which he defines in a more specific and narrow way. At least, on several times in conversation when I’ve objected to him that LW-rationality already takes into account postrationality, he has responded with something like “LW-rationality has elements of what I’m criticizing, but this book is not specifically about LW-rationality”.
My impression agrees. I am inclined to say that Chapman seems to be targeting the kind of rationality criticized in Seeing Like a State, save that In the Cells of the Eggplant is about how unsatisfying the perspective is rather than the damage implementation does.
Pr is not in opposition either.
David Chapman, to take one major example, is pretty oppository in his prospectus for his proposed book “In the Cells of the Eggplant”. I expect he would call it “extending”, but it’s more like hacking off all the limbs to replace them with tentacles.
My impression is that Chapman is objecting to a different kind of rationality, which he defines in a more specific and narrow way. At least, on several times in conversation when I’ve objected to him that LW-rationality already takes into account postrationality, he has responded with something like “LW-rationality has elements of what I’m criticizing, but this book is not specifically about LW-rationality”.
My impression agrees. I am inclined to say that Chapman seems to be targeting the kind of rationality criticized in Seeing Like a State, save that In the Cells of the Eggplant is about how unsatisfying the perspective is rather than the damage implementation does.