My impression is that Chapman is objecting to a different kind of rationality, which he defines in a more specific and narrow way. At least, on several times in conversation when I’ve objected to him that LW-rationality already takes into account postrationality, he has responded with something like “LW-rationality has elements of what I’m criticizing, but this book is not specifically about LW-rationality”.
My impression agrees. I am inclined to say that Chapman seems to be targeting the kind of rationality criticized in Seeing Like a State, save that In the Cells of the Eggplant is about how unsatisfying the perspective is rather than the damage implementation does.
My impression is that Chapman is objecting to a different kind of rationality, which he defines in a more specific and narrow way. At least, on several times in conversation when I’ve objected to him that LW-rationality already takes into account postrationality, he has responded with something like “LW-rationality has elements of what I’m criticizing, but this book is not specifically about LW-rationality”.
My impression agrees. I am inclined to say that Chapman seems to be targeting the kind of rationality criticized in Seeing Like a State, save that In the Cells of the Eggplant is about how unsatisfying the perspective is rather than the damage implementation does.