I used the words “truly real”. The dog doesn’t matter, the consequences of the phenomenon that you call “dog” matter.
Wrong. This misses the point of the thought experiment entirely, which is precisely that people are allowed to care about things that aren’t detectable by any empirical test. If someone is being tortured in a spaceship that’s constantly accelerating away from me, such that the ship and I cannot interact with each other even in principle, I can nonetheless hold that it would be morally better if that person were rescued from their torture (though I myself obviously can’t do the rescuing). There is nothing incoherent about this.
In the case of the dog, what matters to me is the dog’s mental state. I do not care that I observe a phenomenon exhibiting dog-like behavior; I care that there is an actual mind producing that behavior. If the dog wags its tail to indicate contentment, I want the dog to actually feel content. If the dog is actually dead and I’m observing a phantom dog, then there is no mental state to which the dog’s behavior is tied, and hence a crucial element is missing—even if that element is something I can’t detect even in principle, even if I myself have no reason to think the element is absent. There is nothing incoherent about this, either.
Fundamentally, you seem to be demanding that other people toss out any preferences they may have that do not conform to the doctrine of the logical positivists. I see no reason to accede to this demand, and as there is nothing in standard preference theory that forces me to accede, I think I will continue to maintain preferences whose scope includes things that actually exist, and not just things I think exist.
Nothing incoherent about the first part with the spaceship.
What’s an actual mind? How do you know that a dog has it? Would you care about an alien living creature that has a different mind-design and doesn’t feel qualia? Anyway, if you have no reason to think that the element is absent, then you’ll believe that it’s present. It’s precisely because you feel that something is (or will be) missing, you refuse the offer. You do have some priors about what consequences will be produced by your choice, and that’s OK. Nothing incoherent in refusing the offer. That is, if you do have reasons to believe that that’s the case.
I’m talking consequentialism, not logical positivism.
EDIT: It might just be a misunderstanding. When I’m talking about phenomena, I’m not talking about qualia, I’m talking about the general category of “events that take place in reality”.
EDIT2: Ah. I don’t think that there can be two worlds which are completely identical yet different (p-zombies stuff). But yeah, if we find out that the differences between a mind that experiences qualia and the mind that doesn’t are insignificant (e.g. aliens!), then I do think it’s weird to care about qualia, especially when there are so many other things to care about. But that’s, like, my opinion, dude. It’s fine if you disagree.
My philosophy of mind is not yet advanced enough to answer this question. (However, the fact that I am unable to answer a question at present does not imply that there is no answer.)
How do you know that a dog has it?
In a certain sense, I don’t. However, I am reasonably confident that regardless of whatever actually constitutes mindfulness, enough of it is shared between the dog and myself that if the dog turns out not to have a mind, then I also do not have a mind. Since I currently believe I do, in fact, have a mind, it follows that I believe the dog does as well.
(Perhaps you do not believe dogs have minds. In that case, the correct response would be to replace the dog in the thought experiment with something you do believe has a mind—for example, a close friend or family member.)
Would you care about an alien living creature that has a different mind-design and doesn’t feel qualia?
Most likely not, though I remain uncertain enough about my own preferences that what I just said could be false.
Anyway, if you have no reason to think that the element is absent, then you’ll believe that it’s present. It’s precisely because you feel that something is (or will be) missing, you refuse the offer. You do have some priors about what consequences will be produced by your choice, and that’s OK. Nothing incoherent in refusing the offer. That is, if you do have reasons to believe that that’s the case.
I agree with this, but it seems not to square with what you wrote originally:
Do you still think that taking a dollar is the wrong choice, even though literally nothing changes afterwards? If you do, do you think it’s a rational choice? Or is your S1 deluding you?
We’re assuming that ‘literally nothing [of importance] changes’.
I’m not claiming it follows from what I described earlier in the post, it’s an assumption, made in order to make a point, because thought experiment :)
Albeit I concede that it’s not clear from what I wrote.
Wrong. This misses the point of the thought experiment entirely, which is precisely that people are allowed to care about things that aren’t detectable by any empirical test. If someone is being tortured in a spaceship that’s constantly accelerating away from me, such that the ship and I cannot interact with each other even in principle, I can nonetheless hold that it would be morally better if that person were rescued from their torture (though I myself obviously can’t do the rescuing). There is nothing incoherent about this.
In the case of the dog, what matters to me is the dog’s mental state. I do not care that I observe a phenomenon exhibiting dog-like behavior; I care that there is an actual mind producing that behavior. If the dog wags its tail to indicate contentment, I want the dog to actually feel content. If the dog is actually dead and I’m observing a phantom dog, then there is no mental state to which the dog’s behavior is tied, and hence a crucial element is missing—even if that element is something I can’t detect even in principle, even if I myself have no reason to think the element is absent. There is nothing incoherent about this, either.
Fundamentally, you seem to be demanding that other people toss out any preferences they may have that do not conform to the doctrine of the logical positivists. I see no reason to accede to this demand, and as there is nothing in standard preference theory that forces me to accede, I think I will continue to maintain preferences whose scope includes things that actually exist, and not just things I think exist.
Nothing incoherent about the first part with the spaceship.
What’s an actual mind? How do you know that a dog has it? Would you care about an alien living creature that has a different mind-design and doesn’t feel qualia? Anyway, if you have no reason to think that the element is absent, then you’ll believe that it’s present. It’s precisely because you feel that something is (or will be) missing, you refuse the offer. You do have some priors about what consequences will be produced by your choice, and that’s OK. Nothing incoherent in refusing the offer. That is, if you do have reasons to believe that that’s the case.
I’m talking consequentialism, not logical positivism.
EDIT: It might just be a misunderstanding. When I’m talking about phenomena, I’m not talking about qualia, I’m talking about the general category of “events that take place in reality”.
EDIT2: Ah. I don’t think that there can be two worlds which are completely identical yet different (p-zombies stuff). But yeah, if we find out that the differences between a mind that experiences qualia and the mind that doesn’t are insignificant (e.g. aliens!), then I do think it’s weird to care about qualia, especially when there are so many other things to care about. But that’s, like, my opinion, dude. It’s fine if you disagree.
My philosophy of mind is not yet advanced enough to answer this question. (However, the fact that I am unable to answer a question at present does not imply that there is no answer.)
In a certain sense, I don’t. However, I am reasonably confident that regardless of whatever actually constitutes mindfulness, enough of it is shared between the dog and myself that if the dog turns out not to have a mind, then I also do not have a mind. Since I currently believe I do, in fact, have a mind, it follows that I believe the dog does as well.
(Perhaps you do not believe dogs have minds. In that case, the correct response would be to replace the dog in the thought experiment with something you do believe has a mind—for example, a close friend or family member.)
Most likely not, though I remain uncertain enough about my own preferences that what I just said could be false.
I agree with this, but it seems not to square with what you wrote originally:
We’re assuming that ‘literally nothing [of importance] changes’.
I’m not claiming it follows from what I described earlier in the post, it’s an assumption, made in order to make a point, because thought experiment :)
Albeit I concede that it’s not clear from what I wrote.