Nothing incoherent about the first part with the spaceship.
What’s an actual mind? How do you know that a dog has it? Would you care about an alien living creature that has a different mind-design and doesn’t feel qualia? Anyway, if you have no reason to think that the element is absent, then you’ll believe that it’s present. It’s precisely because you feel that something is (or will be) missing, you refuse the offer. You do have some priors about what consequences will be produced by your choice, and that’s OK. Nothing incoherent in refusing the offer. That is, if you do have reasons to believe that that’s the case.
I’m talking consequentialism, not logical positivism.
EDIT: It might just be a misunderstanding. When I’m talking about phenomena, I’m not talking about qualia, I’m talking about the general category of “events that take place in reality”.
EDIT2: Ah. I don’t think that there can be two worlds which are completely identical yet different (p-zombies stuff). But yeah, if we find out that the differences between a mind that experiences qualia and the mind that doesn’t are insignificant (e.g. aliens!), then I do think it’s weird to care about qualia, especially when there are so many other things to care about. But that’s, like, my opinion, dude. It’s fine if you disagree.
We’re assuming that ‘literally nothing [of importance] changes’.
I’m not claiming it follows from what I described earlier in the post, it’s an assumption, made in order to make a point, because thought experiment :)
Albeit I concede that it’s not clear from what I wrote.