Nothing incoherent about the first part with the spaceship.
What’s an actual mind? How do you know that a dog has it? Would you care about an alien living creature that has a different mind-design and doesn’t feel qualia? Anyway, if you have no reason to think that the element is absent, then you’ll believe that it’s present. It’s precisely because you feel that something is (or will be) missing, you refuse the offer. You do have some priors about what consequences will be produced by your choice, and that’s OK. Nothing incoherent in refusing the offer. That is, if you do have reasons to believe that that’s the case.
I’m talking consequentialism, not logical positivism.
EDIT: It might just be a misunderstanding. When I’m talking about phenomena, I’m not talking about qualia, I’m talking about the general category of “events that take place in reality”.
EDIT2: Ah. I don’t think that there can be two worlds which are completely identical yet different (p-zombies stuff). But yeah, if we find out that the differences between a mind that experiences qualia and the mind that doesn’t are insignificant (e.g. aliens!), then I do think it’s weird to care about qualia, especially when there are so many other things to care about. But that’s, like, my opinion, dude. It’s fine if you disagree.
My philosophy of mind is not yet advanced enough to answer this question. (However, the fact that I am unable to answer a question at present does not imply that there is no answer.)
How do you know that a dog has it?
In a certain sense, I don’t. However, I am reasonably confident that regardless of whatever actually constitutes mindfulness, enough of it is shared between the dog and myself that if the dog turns out not to have a mind, then I also do not have a mind. Since I currently believe I do, in fact, have a mind, it follows that I believe the dog does as well.
(Perhaps you do not believe dogs have minds. In that case, the correct response would be to replace the dog in the thought experiment with something you do believe has a mind—for example, a close friend or family member.)
Would you care about an alien living creature that has a different mind-design and doesn’t feel qualia?
Most likely not, though I remain uncertain enough about my own preferences that what I just said could be false.
Anyway, if you have no reason to think that the element is absent, then you’ll believe that it’s present. It’s precisely because you feel that something is (or will be) missing, you refuse the offer. You do have some priors about what consequences will be produced by your choice, and that’s OK. Nothing incoherent in refusing the offer. That is, if you do have reasons to believe that that’s the case.
I agree with this, but it seems not to square with what you wrote originally:
Do you still think that taking a dollar is the wrong choice, even though literally nothing changes afterwards? If you do, do you think it’s a rational choice? Or is your S1 deluding you?
We’re assuming that ‘literally nothing [of importance] changes’.
I’m not claiming it follows from what I described earlier in the post, it’s an assumption, made in order to make a point, because thought experiment :)
Albeit I concede that it’s not clear from what I wrote.
Nothing incoherent about the first part with the spaceship.
What’s an actual mind? How do you know that a dog has it? Would you care about an alien living creature that has a different mind-design and doesn’t feel qualia? Anyway, if you have no reason to think that the element is absent, then you’ll believe that it’s present. It’s precisely because you feel that something is (or will be) missing, you refuse the offer. You do have some priors about what consequences will be produced by your choice, and that’s OK. Nothing incoherent in refusing the offer. That is, if you do have reasons to believe that that’s the case.
I’m talking consequentialism, not logical positivism.
EDIT: It might just be a misunderstanding. When I’m talking about phenomena, I’m not talking about qualia, I’m talking about the general category of “events that take place in reality”.
EDIT2: Ah. I don’t think that there can be two worlds which are completely identical yet different (p-zombies stuff). But yeah, if we find out that the differences between a mind that experiences qualia and the mind that doesn’t are insignificant (e.g. aliens!), then I do think it’s weird to care about qualia, especially when there are so many other things to care about. But that’s, like, my opinion, dude. It’s fine if you disagree.
My philosophy of mind is not yet advanced enough to answer this question. (However, the fact that I am unable to answer a question at present does not imply that there is no answer.)
In a certain sense, I don’t. However, I am reasonably confident that regardless of whatever actually constitutes mindfulness, enough of it is shared between the dog and myself that if the dog turns out not to have a mind, then I also do not have a mind. Since I currently believe I do, in fact, have a mind, it follows that I believe the dog does as well.
(Perhaps you do not believe dogs have minds. In that case, the correct response would be to replace the dog in the thought experiment with something you do believe has a mind—for example, a close friend or family member.)
Most likely not, though I remain uncertain enough about my own preferences that what I just said could be false.
I agree with this, but it seems not to square with what you wrote originally:
We’re assuming that ‘literally nothing [of importance] changes’.
I’m not claiming it follows from what I described earlier in the post, it’s an assumption, made in order to make a point, because thought experiment :)
Albeit I concede that it’s not clear from what I wrote.