My take on Elezier’s position is this: If consciousness cannot affect the real world, then our behavior is exactly the same behavior as would be expected if we were zombies, and so the fact that zombies (us) can somehow talk about aspects of consciousness (such as the “mysterious redness of red”), without any sort of input from the consciousness itself, and somehow have these aspects of consciousness be in full agreement with what the non-zombie would think, seems unlikely. It would be like watching a show on TV and the presenter telling the viewer exactly what the viewer is thinking.
The ‘changing the world’ thing he’s talking about refers to the idea that this startling agreement between what zombies and non-zombies think must be the result of some causal effect of consciousness on the world. Say, a phone call from the viewer on to the TV show.
Or otherwise just stop assuming that consciousness exists as a separate thing. Or, even better, admit our ignorance (which I agree with).
It’s an interesting argument but it requires a bit more effort to prove. One possibility is that both the physical world and consciousness are both causal effects of some deeper underlying reality. In this case consciousness and physics would be entirely mutually consistent, but one need not have any causal effect on the other.
I understand and agree with what you’re saying here. I still don’t understand your objections to ThrustVectoring.
Did you think he conflated consciousness and awakeness? I don’t think he did, although the example he used might make you think so. The hard-problem-consciousness depends on being awake (or dreaming), so patterns of brain activity you have now correspond to hard-problem-consciousness more than patterns of brain activity you’d have if you were choked to sleep.
My objection is that he’s talking about the purely physical activity of the brain causing someone to write about consciousness and the ‘mysterious redness of red’, which is something a zombie could also do (by Chalmer’s argument). Eliezer, on the other hand, is trying to explain what’s wrong with Chalmers’ argument. He’s talking about the effect of that metaphysical ‘hearer’ on the world, something which Chalmers says is zero. That’s also what DavidPlumpton is asking about, I think.
I don’t believe that p-zombies are well defined in the first place—since consciousness is nothing more than the normal action of the brain, and p-zombies have normal brain action, p-zombies experience consciousness. This is a contradiction, which is a big problem for those who believe that p-zombies are a logically coherent concept.
Eliezer is arguing for the hearer being physical, i.e. affecting the world. Ditch the meta.
Whatever qualia are, they happen in the brain, and are physical. Presumably in the future you can connect them to particular measurable brain activity because people can report them.
My take on Elezier’s position is this: If consciousness cannot affect the real world, then our behavior is exactly the same behavior as would be expected if we were zombies, and so the fact that zombies (us) can somehow talk about aspects of consciousness (such as the “mysterious redness of red”), without any sort of input from the consciousness itself, and somehow have these aspects of consciousness be in full agreement with what the non-zombie would think, seems unlikely. It would be like watching a show on TV and the presenter telling the viewer exactly what the viewer is thinking.
The ‘changing the world’ thing he’s talking about refers to the idea that this startling agreement between what zombies and non-zombies think must be the result of some causal effect of consciousness on the world. Say, a phone call from the viewer on to the TV show.
Or otherwise just stop assuming that consciousness exists as a separate thing. Or, even better, admit our ignorance (which I agree with).
It’s an interesting argument but it requires a bit more effort to prove. One possibility is that both the physical world and consciousness are both causal effects of some deeper underlying reality. In this case consciousness and physics would be entirely mutually consistent, but one need not have any causal effect on the other.
I understand and agree with what you’re saying here. I still don’t understand your objections to ThrustVectoring.
Did you think he conflated consciousness and awakeness? I don’t think he did, although the example he used might make you think so. The hard-problem-consciousness depends on being awake (or dreaming), so patterns of brain activity you have now correspond to hard-problem-consciousness more than patterns of brain activity you’d have if you were choked to sleep.
Nitpick: Eliezer, not Elezier.
My objection is that he’s talking about the purely physical activity of the brain causing someone to write about consciousness and the ‘mysterious redness of red’, which is something a zombie could also do (by Chalmer’s argument). Eliezer, on the other hand, is trying to explain what’s wrong with Chalmers’ argument. He’s talking about the effect of that metaphysical ‘hearer’ on the world, something which Chalmers says is zero. That’s also what DavidPlumpton is asking about, I think.
I don’t believe that p-zombies are well defined in the first place—since consciousness is nothing more than the normal action of the brain, and p-zombies have normal brain action, p-zombies experience consciousness. This is a contradiction, which is a big problem for those who believe that p-zombies are a logically coherent concept.
Yes I guessed this might be your position, hence my reply to your top-level comment.
Eliezer is arguing for the hearer being physical, i.e. affecting the world. Ditch the meta.
Whatever qualia are, they happen in the brain, and are physical. Presumably in the future you can connect them to particular measurable brain activity because people can report them.