I understand and agree with what you’re saying here. I still don’t understand your objections to ThrustVectoring.
Did you think he conflated consciousness and awakeness? I don’t think he did, although the example he used might make you think so. The hard-problem-consciousness depends on being awake (or dreaming), so patterns of brain activity you have now correspond to hard-problem-consciousness more than patterns of brain activity you’d have if you were choked to sleep.
My objection is that he’s talking about the purely physical activity of the brain causing someone to write about consciousness and the ‘mysterious redness of red’, which is something a zombie could also do (by Chalmer’s argument). Eliezer, on the other hand, is trying to explain what’s wrong with Chalmers’ argument. He’s talking about the effect of that metaphysical ‘hearer’ on the world, something which Chalmers says is zero. That’s also what DavidPlumpton is asking about, I think.
I don’t believe that p-zombies are well defined in the first place—since consciousness is nothing more than the normal action of the brain, and p-zombies have normal brain action, p-zombies experience consciousness. This is a contradiction, which is a big problem for those who believe that p-zombies are a logically coherent concept.
Eliezer is arguing for the hearer being physical, i.e. affecting the world. Ditch the meta.
Whatever qualia are, they happen in the brain, and are physical. Presumably in the future you can connect them to particular measurable brain activity because people can report them.
I understand and agree with what you’re saying here. I still don’t understand your objections to ThrustVectoring.
Did you think he conflated consciousness and awakeness? I don’t think he did, although the example he used might make you think so. The hard-problem-consciousness depends on being awake (or dreaming), so patterns of brain activity you have now correspond to hard-problem-consciousness more than patterns of brain activity you’d have if you were choked to sleep.
Nitpick: Eliezer, not Elezier.
My objection is that he’s talking about the purely physical activity of the brain causing someone to write about consciousness and the ‘mysterious redness of red’, which is something a zombie could also do (by Chalmer’s argument). Eliezer, on the other hand, is trying to explain what’s wrong with Chalmers’ argument. He’s talking about the effect of that metaphysical ‘hearer’ on the world, something which Chalmers says is zero. That’s also what DavidPlumpton is asking about, I think.
I don’t believe that p-zombies are well defined in the first place—since consciousness is nothing more than the normal action of the brain, and p-zombies have normal brain action, p-zombies experience consciousness. This is a contradiction, which is a big problem for those who believe that p-zombies are a logically coherent concept.
Yes I guessed this might be your position, hence my reply to your top-level comment.
Eliezer is arguing for the hearer being physical, i.e. affecting the world. Ditch the meta.
Whatever qualia are, they happen in the brain, and are physical. Presumably in the future you can connect them to particular measurable brain activity because people can report them.