Coase’s “Nature of the Firm” on Polyamory
It occurred to me that Coase’s views on The Nature of the Firm might help explain why polyamory in its modern form is not particularly common or popular.
That sentence might be enough for you to grok what I’m getting at, and honestly that’s the form in which the thought first came to be, but nevertheless let me try to explain what I mean.
Coase’s original essay—and the whole body of thought proceeding from it—seeks to answer why coorporations / firms emerge. That is, it seeks to ask where people are hired for indefinite periods of time, for less-precisely-defined work rather than contracted for definite amounts of time, for precisely-defined work. If you believe in a strong version of efficiency of markets, you might expect it to almost always be cheaper to contract than to hire, because the allocation of resources by a market should be more efficient than the allocation of resources within a non-market organization. Why wouldn’t my software company just hire a contractor for everything they needed to be done, rather than relying on me, a non-expert in many things they would like me to do?
The answer, of course, is that there are transaction costs to using the market. There’s a cost to searching for and finding a trustworthy contractor, which is avoided by keeping me around. There’s the cost of a stronger asymmetry of information and asymmetry of benefit in the case of the contractor, which makes me a little more trustworthy because I’m going to be stuck with the code I write for a longer period of time. And so on and so forth.
Polyamory seems like an attempt to unbundle a group of frequently-bundled relationship goods in a way analogous to how contracting different workers can be an attempt to unbundle a group of frequently-bundled commercial goods. Vis, in polyamory you frequently unbundle from each other the following:
- Sexual satisfaction
- Intellectual companionship
- Long-term companionship and dependency
- Childbearing and rearing
Or even decompose these further: i.e., different flavors of sex and different flavors of companionship. But finding someone for each of these involves transaction costs. So you have the costs of searching for and finding trustworthy people in all these roles. And you have the stronger asymmetry of information and of benefit because of the more ephemeral nature of the relationships.
This is really just a rephrase of things I know other people have said about the disadvantages of polyamory. But it was satisfying to me to realize that it looked pretty clearly like an instance of a larger phenomenon.
(x-post)
Weakly positive on this one overall. I like Coase’s theory of the firm, and like making analogies with it to other things. I don’t think this application felt like it quite worked to me, and trying to write up why.
One thing is I think feels off is an incomplete understanding of the Coase paper. What I think the article gets correct: Coase looks at the difference between markets (economists preferred efficient mechanism) and firms / corporation, and observes that transaction costs (for people these would be contracts, but in general all transaction costs are included) are avoided in firms. What I think it misses: A primary question explored in the paper is what factors govern the size of firms, and this leads to a mechanistic model that the transaction costs internal to the firm increase with the size of the firm until they reach a limit of the same as transaction costs for the open market (and thus the expected maximum efficient size of a non-monopoly firm). A second, smaller, missed point I think is that the price mechanism works for transactions outside the firm, but does not for transactions inside the firm.
Given these, I think the metaphor presented here seems incomplete. It’s drawing connections to some of the parts of the paper, but not all of the central parts, and not enough to connect to the central question of size.
I’m confused exactly what parts of the metaphor map to the paper’s concept of market and firm. Is monogamy the market, since it doesn’t require high-order coordination? Is polyamory the market since everyone can be a free-ish actor in an unbundled way? Is monogamy the firm since it’s not using price-like mechanisms to negotiate individual unbundled goods? Is polyamory the firm since its subject to the transaction cost scaling limit of size?
I do think that it seems to use the ‘transaction costs matter’ pretty solidly from the paper, so there is that bit.
I don’t really have much I can say about the polyamory bits outside of the economics bits.
This is a fantastic piece of economic reasoning applied to a not-flagged-as-economics puzzle! As the post says, a lot of its content is floating out there on the internet somewhere: the draw here is putting all those scattered insights together under their common theory of the firm and transaction costs framework. In doing so, it explicitly hooked up two parts of my world model that had previously remained separate, because they weren’t obviously connected.
As I have now written in a below comment, see my 2016 Ribbonfarm post about this.