Thanks for answering my question directly in the second half.
I find the testimonies of rationalists who experimented with meditation less convincing than perhaps I should, simply because of selection bias. People who have pre-existing affinity towards “woo” will presumably be more likely to try meditation. And they will be more likely to report that it works, whether it does or not. I am not sure how much should I discount for this, perhaps I overdo it. I don’t know.
A proper experiment would require a control group—some people who were originally skeptical about meditation and Buddhism in general, and only agreed to do some exactly defined exercises, and preferably the reported differences should be measurable somehow. Otherwise, we have another selection bias, that if there are people for whom meditation does nothing, or is even harmful, they will stop trying. So at the end, 100% of people who tried will report success (whether real or imaginary), because those who didn’t see any success have selected themselves out.
I approve of making the “secular version of Buddhism”, but in a similar way, we could make a “secular version of Christianity”. (For example, how is gratitude journaling significantly different from thanking God for all his blessing before you go sleep?) And yet, I assume that the objection against “secular Christianity” on Less Wrong would be much greater than against “secular Buddhism”. Maybe I am wrong, but the fact that no one is currently promoting “secular Christianity” on LW sounds like weak evidence. I suspect, the relevant difference is that for an American atheist, Christianity is outgroup, and Buddhism is fargroup. Meditation is culturally acceptable among contrarians, because our neighbors don’t do it. But that is unrelated to whether it works or not.
Also, I am not sure how secular the “secular Buddhism” actually is, given that people still go to retreats organized by religious people, etc. It feels too much for me to trust that someone is getting lots of important information from religious people, without unknowingly also getting some of their biases.
Thanks for answering my question directly in the second half.
I find the testimonies of rationalists who experimented with meditation less convincing than perhaps I should, simply because of selection bias. People who have pre-existing affinity towards “woo” will presumably be more likely to try meditation. And they will be more likely to report that it works, whether it does or not. I am not sure how much should I discount for this, perhaps I overdo it. I don’t know.
A proper experiment would require a control group—some people who were originally skeptical about meditation and Buddhism in general, and only agreed to do some exactly defined exercises, and preferably the reported differences should be measurable somehow. Otherwise, we have another selection bias, that if there are people for whom meditation does nothing, or is even harmful, they will stop trying. So at the end, 100% of people who tried will report success (whether real or imaginary), because those who didn’t see any success have selected themselves out.
I approve of making the “secular version of Buddhism”, but in a similar way, we could make a “secular version of Christianity”. (For example, how is gratitude journaling significantly different from thanking God for all his blessing before you go sleep?) And yet, I assume that the objection against “secular Christianity” on Less Wrong would be much greater than against “secular Buddhism”. Maybe I am wrong, but the fact that no one is currently promoting “secular Christianity” on LW sounds like weak evidence. I suspect, the relevant difference is that for an American atheist, Christianity is outgroup, and Buddhism is fargroup. Meditation is culturally acceptable among contrarians, because our neighbors don’t do it. But that is unrelated to whether it works or not.
Also, I am not sure how secular the “secular Buddhism” actually is, given that people still go to retreats organized by religious people, etc. It feels too much for me to trust that someone is getting lots of important information from religious people, without unknowingly also getting some of their biases.