I used to think a primary job of a meetup/community organizer was to train their successor, and develop longterm sustainability of leadership.
I still hold out for that dream. But, it seems like a pattern is:
1) community organizer with passion and vision founds a community
2) they eventually move on, and pass it on to one successor who’s pretty closely aligned and competent
3) then the First Successor has to move on to, and then… there isn’t anyone obvious to take the reins, but if no one does the community dies, so some people reluctantly step up. and....
...then forever after it’s a pale shadow of its original self.
For semi-branded communities (such as EA, or Rationality), this also means that if someone new with energy/vision shows up in the area, they’ll see a meetup, they’ll show up, they’ll feel like the meetup isn’t all that good, and then move on. Wherein they (maybe??) might have founded a new one that they got to shape the direction of more.
I think this also applies to non-community organizations (i.e. founder hands the reins to a new CEO who hands the reins to a new CEO who doesn’t quite know what to do)
So… I’m kinda wondering if second-generation successors should just… err on the side of shutting the thing down when they leave, rather than trying desperately to find a replacement.
The answer isn’t obvious. There is value that continues to be created by the third+ generation. I think I’ve mostly gone from “having a firm opinion that you should be proactively training your successor” to “man, I dunno, finding a suitable successor is actually pretty hard, mrrr?”
Reading this makes me think of organizations which manage to successfully have several generations of competent leadership. Something that has struck me for a while is the contrast in long-term competence between republics (not direct democracies) and hereditary monarchies.
Reading through history, hereditary monarchies always seem to fall into the problem you describe, of incompetent and (physically and mentally) weak monarchs being placed at the head of a nation, leading to a lot of problems. Republics, in contrast, almost always have competent leaders—one might disagree with their goals, and they are too often appointed after their prime, when their health is declining [1], but the leaders of republics are almost always very competent people.
This makes life much better for the people in the republic, and may be in part responsible for the recent proliferation of republics (though it does raise the question of why that hasn’t happened sooner. Maybe the robust safeguards implemented by the Founding Fathers of the USA in their constitution were a sufficiently non-obvious, but important, social technology, to be able to make republics viable on the world stage? [2]).
A key difference between monarchies and republics is that each successive generation of leadership in a republic must win an intense competition to secure their position, unlike the heirs of a monarchy. Not only this, but the competitions are usually held quite often (for example, every 4 years in Denmark, every 3 years in New Zealand), which ensures that the competitive nature of the office is kept in the public mind very frequently, making it hard to become a de facto hereditary position. By holding a competition to fill the office, one ensures that, even if the leader doesn’t share the same vision as the original founder, they still have to be very competent to be appointed to the position.
I contend that the usual way of appointing successors to small organizations (appointment by the previous leader) and to corporations (elected, but by a small body in a usually non-competitive fashion that is more similar to being appointed on a personal basis) is insufficiently competitive, and so is more similar to a hereditary monarchy than a republic, in this way.
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[1] - This (The fact that the leaders of republics are often elected when their health is in decline) makes me think it may be a good idea to have a constitutional maximum age, after which individuals cannot be elected to certain important offices, to ensure that only people who are in their prime (and hence likely sufficiently healthy) can lead the nation.
[2] - The existence of elective monarchies also is suggestive that the theory may be meaningful, but it again raises the question of why elective monarchies weren’t more prominent. Maybe in practice elective monarchies were too likely to become effectively hereditary monarchies in all but name (c.f. the Hungarian kingdom and the Holy Roman Empire), that they didn’t distinguish themselves enough to have a competitive advantage.
older people have better shown themself (more time in which to do so, accumulate trust, etc.)
?
Elections (by means of voters) intentionally choose old leaders because that limits how long they can hold the position, or forces them to find a successor or delegate?
[2]
George Washington’s whole, only twice thing, almost seems more deliberate here. Wonder what would have happened if a similar check had been placed on political parties.
Regarding [1], people tend to vote for candidates they know, and politicians start out with 0 name recognition, which increases monotonically with age, always increasing but never decreasing, inherently biasing the process towards older candidates.
The two-term limit was actually not intended by Washington to become a tradition, he retired after his second term because he was declining in health. It was only later that it became expected for presidents not to serve more than 2 terms. I do think the term limit on the presidency is an important guard in maintaining the competitive and representative nature of the office, and I think it’s good to wonder if extending term limits to other things can be beneficial, though I am also aware of arguments pushing in the opposite direction
From Wikipedia: George Washington, which cites Korzi, Michael J. (2011). Presidential Term Limits in American History: Power, Principles, and Politics page 43, -and- Peabody, Bruce G. (September 1, 2001). “George Washington, Presidential Term Limits, and the Problem of Reluctant Political Leadership”. Presidential Studies Quarterly. 31 (3): 439–453:
At the end of his second term, Washington retired for personal and political reasons, dismayed with personal attacks, and to ensure that a truly contested presidential election could be held. He did not feel bound to a two-term limit, but his retirement set a significant precedent. Washington is often credited with setting the principle of a two-term presidency, but it was Thomas Jefferson who first refused to run for a third term on political grounds.
A note on the part that says “to ensure that a truly contested presidential election could be held”: at this time, Washington’s health was failing, and he indeed died during what would have been his 3rd term if he had run for a 3rd term. If he had died in office, he would have been immediately succeeded by the Vice President, which would set an unfortunate precedent of presidents serving until they die, then being followed by an appointed heir until that heir dies, blurring the distinction between the republic and a monarchy.
What’s different for the organizer and first successor, in terms of their ability to do the primary job of finding their successor? I also note the pattern you mention (one handoff mostly succeeds, community degrades rapidly around the time the first successor leaves with no great second successor). But I also have seen a lot of cases where the founder fails to hand off in the first place, and some where it’s handed off to a committee or formal governance structure, and then eventually dies for reasons that don’t seem caused by succession.
I wonder if you’ve got the causality wrong—communities have a growth/maintenance/decline curve, which varies greatly in the parameters, but not so much in the shape. It seems likely to me that the leaders/organizers REACT to changes in the community by joining, changing their involvement, or leaving, rather than causing those changes.
The founder has a complete vision for the community/meetup/company/etc. They were able to design a thing that (as long as they continue putting in energy) is engaging, and they instinctively know how to change it so that it continues being great for participants.
The first successor has an incomplete, operational/keep-things-running-the-way-they-were type vision. They cargo-cult whatever the founder was doing. They don’t have enough vision to understand the ‘why’ behind all the decisions. But putting your finger on their precise blind spot is quite hard. It’s their “fault” (to the extent that we can blame anyone) that things go off the rails, but their bad decision-making doesn’t actually have short term impacts that anyone can see. Instead, the impacts come all at once, once they disappear, and there becomes common knowledge that it was a house of cards the whole time.
(or something. my models are fairly imprecise on this.)
Anyway, why did the founder get fooled into anointing the first successor even though they don’t have the skills to continue the thing? My guess is that there’s a fairly strong selection effect for founders combined with “market fit”—founders who fail to reach this resonant frequency don’t pick successors, they just fail. Whatever made them great at building this particular community doesn’t translate into skills at picking a successor, and that resonance may not happen to exist in any other person. Another founder-quality person would not necessarily have resonated with the existing community’s frequency, so there could also be an anti-selection effect there.
My model differs from yours. In my view, the first successor isn’t the source of most problems. The first successor usually has enough interaction and knowledge transfer from the founder, that they are able to keep things working more-or-less perfectly fine during their tenure, but they aren’t able to innovate and create substantial new value, since they lack the creativity and vision of the founder. In your terms, they are cargo-culting, but they are able to cargo-cult sufficiently well to keep the organization running smoothly; but when the second (and nth) successor comes in, they haven’t interacted much directly with the original founder, but instead are basing their decisions based, at most, on a vague notion of what the founder was like (though are often better served when they don’t even try to follow in the footsteps of the founder), and so are unable to keep things working according to the original vision. They are cargo-culting a cargo-cult, which isn’t enough to keep things working the way they need to work, at which point the organization stops being worth keeping around.
During the reign of the founder, the slope of the value created over time is positive, during the reign of the first successor, the slope is approximately zero, but once the second successor and beyond take over, the slope will be negative.
My read on this is that it’s still obviously worthwhile to train a successor, but to consider giving them clear instructions to shut down the group when it’s time for them to move on, to avoid the problems that come with 3rd-generational leadership.
A thing I might have maybe changed my mind about:
I used to think a primary job of a meetup/community organizer was to train their successor, and develop longterm sustainability of leadership.
I still hold out for that dream. But, it seems like a pattern is:
1) community organizer with passion and vision founds a community
2) they eventually move on, and pass it on to one successor who’s pretty closely aligned and competent
3) then the First Successor has to move on to, and then… there isn’t anyone obvious to take the reins, but if no one does the community dies, so some people reluctantly step up. and....
...then forever after it’s a pale shadow of its original self.
For semi-branded communities (such as EA, or Rationality), this also means that if someone new with energy/vision shows up in the area, they’ll see a meetup, they’ll show up, they’ll feel like the meetup isn’t all that good, and then move on. Wherein they (maybe??) might have founded a new one that they got to shape the direction of more.
I think this also applies to non-community organizations (i.e. founder hands the reins to a new CEO who hands the reins to a new CEO who doesn’t quite know what to do)
So… I’m kinda wondering if second-generation successors should just… err on the side of shutting the thing down when they leave, rather than trying desperately to find a replacement.
The answer isn’t obvious. There is value that continues to be created by the third+ generation. I think I’ve mostly gone from “having a firm opinion that you should be proactively training your successor” to “man, I dunno, finding a suitable successor is actually pretty hard, mrrr?”
What if the replacement isn’t a replacement? If only a different person/people with a different vision/s can be found then...why not that?
Or, what does the leader do, that can’t be carried on?
Reading this makes me think of organizations which manage to successfully have several generations of competent leadership. Something that has struck me for a while is the contrast in long-term competence between republics (not direct democracies) and hereditary monarchies.
Reading through history, hereditary monarchies always seem to fall into the problem you describe, of incompetent and (physically and mentally) weak monarchs being placed at the head of a nation, leading to a lot of problems. Republics, in contrast, almost always have competent leaders—one might disagree with their goals, and they are too often appointed after their prime, when their health is declining [1], but the leaders of republics are almost always very competent people.
This makes life much better for the people in the republic, and may be in part responsible for the recent proliferation of republics (though it does raise the question of why that hasn’t happened sooner. Maybe the robust safeguards implemented by the Founding Fathers of the USA in their constitution were a sufficiently non-obvious, but important, social technology, to be able to make republics viable on the world stage? [2]).
A key difference between monarchies and republics is that each successive generation of leadership in a republic must win an intense competition to secure their position, unlike the heirs of a monarchy. Not only this, but the competitions are usually held quite often (for example, every 4 years in Denmark, every 3 years in New Zealand), which ensures that the competitive nature of the office is kept in the public mind very frequently, making it hard to become a de facto hereditary position. By holding a competition to fill the office, one ensures that, even if the leader doesn’t share the same vision as the original founder, they still have to be very competent to be appointed to the position.
I contend that the usual way of appointing successors to small organizations (appointment by the previous leader) and to corporations (elected, but by a small body in a usually non-competitive fashion that is more similar to being appointed on a personal basis) is insufficiently competitive, and so is more similar to a hereditary monarchy than a republic, in this way.
---
[1] - This (The fact that the leaders of republics are often elected when their health is in decline) makes me think it may be a good idea to have a constitutional maximum age, after which individuals cannot be elected to certain important offices, to ensure that only people who are in their prime (and hence likely sufficiently healthy) can lead the nation.
[2] - The existence of elective monarchies also is suggestive that the theory may be meaningful, but it again raises the question of why elective monarchies weren’t more prominent. Maybe in practice elective monarchies were too likely to become effectively hereditary monarchies in all but name (c.f. the Hungarian kingdom and the Holy Roman Empire), that they didn’t distinguish themselves enough to have a competitive advantage.
[1]
Does this demonstrate:
a lack of younger leaders
older people have better shown themself (more time in which to do so, accumulate trust, etc.)
?
Elections (by means of voters) intentionally choose old leaders because that limits how long they can hold the position, or forces them to find a successor or delegate?
[2]
George Washington’s whole, only twice thing, almost seems more deliberate here. Wonder what would have happened if a similar check had been placed on political parties.
Regarding [1], people tend to vote for candidates they know, and politicians start out with 0 name recognition, which increases monotonically with age, always increasing but never decreasing, inherently biasing the process towards older candidates.
The two-term limit was actually not intended by Washington to become a tradition, he retired after his second term because he was declining in health. It was only later that it became expected for presidents not to serve more than 2 terms. I do think the term limit on the presidency is an important guard in maintaining the competitive and representative nature of the office, and I think it’s good to wonder if extending term limits to other things can be beneficial, though I am also aware of arguments pushing in the opposite direction
Citation? (I’ve only really read American Propaganda about this so not very surprised if this is the case, but hadn’t heard it before)
From Wikipedia: George Washington, which cites Korzi, Michael J. (2011). Presidential Term Limits in American History: Power, Principles, and Politics page 43, -and- Peabody, Bruce G. (September 1, 2001). “George Washington, Presidential Term Limits, and the Problem of Reluctant Political Leadership”. Presidential Studies Quarterly. 31 (3): 439–453:
A note on the part that says “to ensure that a truly contested presidential election could be held”: at this time, Washington’s health was failing, and he indeed died during what would have been his 3rd term if he had run for a 3rd term. If he had died in office, he would have been immediately succeeded by the Vice President, which would set an unfortunate precedent of presidents serving until they die, then being followed by an appointed heir until that heir dies, blurring the distinction between the republic and a monarchy.
Thanks!
What’s different for the organizer and first successor, in terms of their ability to do the primary job of finding their successor? I also note the pattern you mention (one handoff mostly succeeds, community degrades rapidly around the time the first successor leaves with no great second successor). But I also have seen a lot of cases where the founder fails to hand off in the first place, and some where it’s handed off to a committee or formal governance structure, and then eventually dies for reasons that don’t seem caused by succession.
I wonder if you’ve got the causality wrong—communities have a growth/maintenance/decline curve, which varies greatly in the parameters, but not so much in the shape. It seems likely to me that the leaders/organizers REACT to changes in the community by joining, changing their involvement, or leaving, rather than causing those changes.
I’m not Ray, but I’ll take a stab --
The founder has a complete vision for the community/meetup/company/etc. They were able to design a thing that (as long as they continue putting in energy) is engaging, and they instinctively know how to change it so that it continues being great for participants.
The first successor has an incomplete, operational/keep-things-running-the-way-they-were type vision. They cargo-cult whatever the founder was doing. They don’t have enough vision to understand the ‘why’ behind all the decisions. But putting your finger on their precise blind spot is quite hard. It’s their “fault” (to the extent that we can blame anyone) that things go off the rails, but their bad decision-making doesn’t actually have short term impacts that anyone can see. Instead, the impacts come all at once, once they disappear, and there becomes common knowledge that it was a house of cards the whole time.
(or something. my models are fairly imprecise on this.)
Anyway, why did the founder get fooled into anointing the first successor even though they don’t have the skills to continue the thing? My guess is that there’s a fairly strong selection effect for founders combined with “market fit”—founders who fail to reach this resonant frequency don’t pick successors, they just fail. Whatever made them great at building this particular community doesn’t translate into skills at picking a successor, and that resonance may not happen to exist in any other person. Another founder-quality person would not necessarily have resonated with the existing community’s frequency, so there could also be an anti-selection effect there.
My model differs from yours. In my view, the first successor isn’t the source of most problems. The first successor usually has enough interaction and knowledge transfer from the founder, that they are able to keep things working more-or-less perfectly fine during their tenure, but they aren’t able to innovate and create substantial new value, since they lack the creativity and vision of the founder. In your terms, they are cargo-culting, but they are able to cargo-cult sufficiently well to keep the organization running smoothly; but when the second (and nth) successor comes in, they haven’t interacted much directly with the original founder, but instead are basing their decisions based, at most, on a vague notion of what the founder was like (though are often better served when they don’t even try to follow in the footsteps of the founder), and so are unable to keep things working according to the original vision. They are cargo-culting a cargo-cult, which isn’t enough to keep things working the way they need to work, at which point the organization stops being worth keeping around.
During the reign of the founder, the slope of the value created over time is positive, during the reign of the first successor, the slope is approximately zero, but once the second successor and beyond take over, the slope will be negative.
My read on this is that it’s still obviously worthwhile to train a successor, but to consider giving them clear instructions to shut down the group when it’s time for them to move on, to avoid the problems that come with 3rd-generational leadership.