Based on what I recall reading about Pizzaro’s conquest, I feel you might be underestimating the importance of horses. It took centuries for European powers to figure out how to break a heavy cavalry charge with infantry; the amerindians didn’t have the time to figure it out (see various battles where small cavalry forces routed thousands of troops). Once they had got more used to horses, later Inca forces (though much diminished) were more able to win open battles against the Spanish.
Maybe this was the problem for these empires: they were used to winning open battles, but were presented with a situation where only irregular warfare or siege defences could win. They reacted as an empire, when they should have been reacting as a recalcitrant province.
Mmm, interesting. I’m now reading a 1400-page history book on the subject (after all the attention my post got, I figured I should read more than just a bunch of wiki pages!) so we’ll know one way or another soon enough. Thanks for the tip.
Thanks for your research, especially the Afonso stuff. One question for that: were these empires used to gaining/losing small pieces of territory? ie did they really dedicate all their might to getting these ports back, or did they eventually write them off as minor losses not worth the cost of fighting (given Portuguese naval advantages)?
Yes. Distinguishing between not having an empire and not being willing to fight all-out, they suffered from the first problem, whereas (perhaps, we shall see) the other port cities suffered from the second.
Based on what I recall reading about Pizzaro’s conquest, I feel you might be underestimating the importance of horses. It took centuries for European powers to figure out how to break a heavy cavalry charge with infantry; the amerindians didn’t have the time to figure it out (see various battles where small cavalry forces routed thousands of troops). Once they had got more used to horses, later Inca forces (though much diminished) were more able to win open battles against the Spanish.
Maybe this was the problem for these empires: they were used to winning open battles, but were presented with a situation where only irregular warfare or siege defences could win. They reacted as an empire, when they should have been reacting as a recalcitrant province.
Mmm, interesting. I’m now reading a 1400-page history book on the subject (after all the attention my post got, I figured I should read more than just a bunch of wiki pages!) so we’ll know one way or another soon enough. Thanks for the tip.
Thanks for your research, especially the Afonso stuff. One question for that: were these empires used to gaining/losing small pieces of territory? ie did they really dedicate all their might to getting these ports back, or did they eventually write them off as minor losses not worth the cost of fighting (given Portuguese naval advantages)?
Good question; I’ll find out. Malacca at least was a city-state, so the Portuguese attack was an existential threat.
...which also means that they didn’t have an empire to back them up?
Yes. Distinguishing between not having an empire and not being willing to fight all-out, they suffered from the first problem, whereas (perhaps, we shall see) the other port cities suffered from the second.
(this is, obviously, very speculative ^_^ )