Frankly, because two examples (Rhodesia and South Africa) don’t make for a well-substantiated pattern…
[...]
American opposition to communism does make for a much more obvious, simple, and clear-cut example...
A well-substantiated more general pattern is that in U.S. foreign relations, anti-colonialism trumped anti-communism solidly. Besides Rhodesia and South Africa, some other major examples are the Katanga Crisis and the Suez Crisis. In the latter, the U.S. effectively joined forces with the Soviet Union to support Nasser against the British and the French.
Moreover, in some cases the U.S. “support” for anti-communists was of the “with friends like that, who needs enemies” variety, sometimes with major elements within the U.S. government effectively favoring the communists. China is the most notable example. Not to mention the cases where the U.S. supported communists who fought under a flimsy and transparent pretense of being non-communists, like Castro in Cuba.
So, on the whole, I wouldn’t say the pattern of U.S. Cold War anti-communism is so consistent and clear-cut.
Besides Rhodesia and South Africa, some other major examples are the Katanga Crisis and the Suez Crisis.
Are Nasser and Mobutu supposed to be communists in your model of history? They are not in mine.
In the latter, the U.S. effectively joined forces with the Soviet Union to support Nasser against the British and the French.
Nasser opposed communism. Sure, both American and the Soviet Union preferred a non-Europe-controlled Egypt, because they respectively preferred an America-controllled and a Soviet-controlled Egypt. What does that have to do with anti-colonialism trumping anti-communism? It wasn’t a communist regime that America supported then, it was Nasser’s anti-communist regime.
Look, I’m not interested in having a discussion where “communism” has been redefined to mean pretty much the entire modern world. I’m well aware that there exist some people (e.g Moldbug-type reactionaries) that believe that even modern-day America is “communist” according to their own definition, but I’m talking about ordinary definitions of “communism”.
Are Nasser and Mobutu supposed to be communists in your model of history? They are not in mine.
Mobutu consolidated power only in late 1965, and there were many other relevant people involved about whose degree of affiliation with communism we could debate. (And frankly, I’m not very knowledgeable about, or particularly interested in, the details of this particular war.) The point however is that a reflexively and consistently anti-communist U.S. policy would have simply backed Tshombe and his Katangan government.
As for the Suez crisis, the point is not about Nasser’s ideology. The point is that the U.S. took the same side as the Soviet Union and a Soviet-aided regime (though, as you correctly point out, not a Soviet-run one), and against European colonial powers that opposed the latter. Again, a model that postulates consistent anti-communism on part of the U.S. cannot predict this; it will require at the very least a few epicycles.
Moreover, note that you were the one who claimed that the U.S. anti-communism was simple and clear-cut. To dispute that claim, it is enough to demonstrate that the situation was in fact much more complicated and murky. It is not necessary to provide examples where the U.S. clearly and indisputably aided communists. (Though Castro and arguably Mao provide such examples.)
Look, I’m not interested in having a discussion where “communism” has been redefined to mean pretty much the entire modern world.
I don’t know at whom, or what, this is supposed to be directed. While I readily acknowledge that you may have reasonable disagreements with my opinions, I don’t think this is a reasonable response to anything I have written in this thread or elsewhere.
The point is that the U.S. took the same side as the Soviet Union and a Soviet-aided regime
Or that the Soviet Union took the same side as a US-aided regime. Since said regime was anti-communist, that’s a bit more surprising perhaps than the USA supporting it.
Though Castro and arguably Mao provide such examples
I’m getting tired of this contrarian view of history. America was selling guns, bombers and napalm to Batista for the majority of the duration of his government, and even for the majority of his combatting Castro. That America stopped backing Batista a couple months before the end, that’s not “supporting Castro”… that’s America cutting its losses.
Moreover, note that you were the one who claimed that the U.S. anti-communism was simple and clear-cut.
How many communist/anti-communist nations did USA invite into NATO during the cold war? How many communist/anti-communist nations did USA sell weapons to? The torturers of how many communist/anti-communist regimes did CIA help train?
Zero and lots.
For the sake of my argument imagine that when I said “America consistently supports the anti-communist side”, that by ‘supports’ I meant “sells weapons to, invites to military alliances, or helps train its torturers”
Contrarian views of history work by focussing on minor details and enlarging them until they swamp out the plain-to-see elephant in the room.
Or that the Soviet Union took the same side as a US-aided regime.
It is unrealistic to paint Nasser’s relationship with the U.S. and the Soviet Union as symmetrical. In any case, simple and clear-cut anti-communism would have implied joining the colonial forces against a Soviet-leaning and Soviet-armed local ruler, not joining the Soviets in an effort to restrain them.
That America stopped backing Batista a couple months before the end, that’s not “supporting Castro”… that’s America cutting its losses.
However you turn it, the U.S. at some point did go out of its way to support Castro and destroy Batista. (This is a simple matter of public record, not a conspiracy theory. It involved, among other things, placing an arms embargo on Batista in a critical moment.) The fact that this was a reversal still makes it a problem for your “simple and clear-cut” theory.
How many communist/anti-communist nations did USA sell weapons to? ... Zero and lots.
This is just plain false—if anything, the communist Yugoslavia received plenty of U.S. aid and weapons after its break with the U.S.S.R. in 1948. Thus demonstrating another problem with your theory: the U.S. apparently did’t mind getting friendly with at least some communists who were willing to show some degree of cooperation. Again, not what I’d call simple and clear-cut anti-communism.
Contrarian views of history work by focussing on minor details and enlarging them until they swamp out the plain-to-see elephant in the room.
The existence of even minor contrary details (and I wouldn’t call these minor) is a valid argument against a theory that presents things as simple and clear-cut. You are writing as if I were arguing for some bizarre mirror image of your position, whereas I’m merely pointing out that reality is much more complex.
Does this argument help your case about “national character”? It’s clearly true that a naive anti-communist would do a terrible job of predicting the actions of the United States during the Cold War. That’s an argument that anti-communism was not a part of the national character of the US. But your position seems to require that national character have some predictive power in policy decisions. So what particular national character drove US actions in the Cold War? I personally think that national self-interest (i.e. Great Power politics) drove the Cold War, not ideology. But self-interest is an odd thing to label a “national characteristic” because it seems unlikely that there are nations that lack that quality.
To recap, this is the quote that started this sub-debate:
To the extent that there’s a “national character” that affects policy, I feel it has primarily, perhaps even solely to do with concepts of self-identification similar in type to the concept of Clash of Civilizations by Huntington. e.g. Greece supported the Serbs in the Yugoslav wars for no more and no less reason than that its “national character” contained a self-identification with Eastern Orthodox significantly more than with Catholics or with Muslims. Now there’s predictive power. In any dispute between orthodox and non-orthodox, I know that Greece will back the orthodox. I know that Arab nations will back the Palestinians against Israel. America in the Cold War self-identified as anti-communist, so in any dispute between people identifying as communists and people that didn’t , I know America would back the people that didn’t.
There’s the extent that national character plays in regards to policy. If there’s some other element in it with predictive power, I don’t see it.
I don’t see how disproving the highlighted portion shows that the following sentences are untrue.
So your complaint is that Vladimir is arguing a point that doesn’t necessarily advance his main argument. Why is this bad? That’s what rationalist discussions are supposed to look like.
So your complaint is that Vladimir is arguing a point that doesn’t necessarily advance his main argument. Why is this bad? That’s what rationalist discussions are supposed to look like.
Usually, yes. So long as it is not used as a logically rude tactic, verbal sleight of hand to make it look like a position is being supported while doing something completely different.
(I have no idea whether that is the case here. From what I understand the conversation is a mix of ‘philosophizing’ about a trivial conversation by that Wittgenstein fellow and bickering about American politics. I try to avoid both.)
As I understand Vladimir, his point is that “national character” is more than a semantic stop sign. But political realism—i.e. Great Power politics (as opposed to other theories of international relations) does not really include “national character” as a variable for predicting the acts of nations. So, I saw the invocation of political realism as contradicting Vladimir’s overarching point that “national character” is a meaningful thing.
But your position seems to require that national character have some predictive power in policy decisions.
Indeed, but it has significant predictive power only in cases where some state of affairs would be in striking contradiction with the “national character.” It’s clearly not a heuristic that would give concrete and reliable predictions about all issues.
My objection to the comment you cite is that: (1) the proposed anti-communism heuristic, while not entirely devoid of predictive power, is nowhere as consistently accurate as the commennter claims, and (2) contrary to the commenter’s claim, there are issues outside of the proposed category (religious, ideological, etc. identification with parties in foreign disputes) where heuristics based on national character make accurate predictions.
contrary to the commenter’s claim, there are issues outside of the proposed category (religious, ideological, etc. identification with parties in foreign disputes) where heuristics based on national character make accurate predictions.
Can you give examples? Because my paradigmatic example of the use of national character to make predictions is Napoleon’s (failed) prediction that a “nation of shopkeepers” would not be able to successfully resist his domination of Europe based on their supposed lack of will.
That was indeed a prediction driven by obvious biases. But there are many examples where it’s easy to make predictions so clearly true that they seem trivially obvious based on certain norms that are a matter of wide consensus in particular nations.
For example, the same plan for a public project implemented in a country known for notoriously corrupt practices in business in government will result in vastly more graft and embezzlement than if it’s implemented in a country known for a low level (and generally zero tolerance) for such corruption. What’s more, even if tomorrow both these countries were occupied by some third country and had the same system of government imposed on them, in practice the former one would likely still end up with a more corrupt system, since this sort of thing tends to be influenced by deeper cultural factors that can’t be readily changed by dictate from above.
Whether or not you think “national character” is an appropriate term for these factors (and it is indeed a somewhat antiquated term), it’s this sort of thing I have in mind, and it’s easy to think of many such examples. Surely you have often thought yourself that something is much more or less likely to happen in one place than another based on the deeply ingrained local culture, customs, attitudes, etc.
A well-substantiated more general pattern is that in U.S. foreign relations, anti-colonialism trumped anti-communism solidly. Besides Rhodesia and South Africa, some other major examples are the Katanga Crisis and the Suez Crisis. In the latter, the U.S. effectively joined forces with the Soviet Union to support Nasser against the British and the French.
Moreover, in some cases the U.S. “support” for anti-communists was of the “with friends like that, who needs enemies” variety, sometimes with major elements within the U.S. government effectively favoring the communists. China is the most notable example. Not to mention the cases where the U.S. supported communists who fought under a flimsy and transparent pretense of being non-communists, like Castro in Cuba.
So, on the whole, I wouldn’t say the pattern of U.S. Cold War anti-communism is so consistent and clear-cut.
Are Nasser and Mobutu supposed to be communists in your model of history? They are not in mine.
Nasser opposed communism. Sure, both American and the Soviet Union preferred a non-Europe-controlled Egypt, because they respectively preferred an America-controllled and a Soviet-controlled Egypt. What does that have to do with anti-colonialism trumping anti-communism? It wasn’t a communist regime that America supported then, it was Nasser’s anti-communist regime.
Look, I’m not interested in having a discussion where “communism” has been redefined to mean pretty much the entire modern world. I’m well aware that there exist some people (e.g Moldbug-type reactionaries) that believe that even modern-day America is “communist” according to their own definition, but I’m talking about ordinary definitions of “communism”.
Mobutu consolidated power only in late 1965, and there were many other relevant people involved about whose degree of affiliation with communism we could debate. (And frankly, I’m not very knowledgeable about, or particularly interested in, the details of this particular war.) The point however is that a reflexively and consistently anti-communist U.S. policy would have simply backed Tshombe and his Katangan government.
As for the Suez crisis, the point is not about Nasser’s ideology. The point is that the U.S. took the same side as the Soviet Union and a Soviet-aided regime (though, as you correctly point out, not a Soviet-run one), and against European colonial powers that opposed the latter. Again, a model that postulates consistent anti-communism on part of the U.S. cannot predict this; it will require at the very least a few epicycles.
Moreover, note that you were the one who claimed that the U.S. anti-communism was simple and clear-cut. To dispute that claim, it is enough to demonstrate that the situation was in fact much more complicated and murky. It is not necessary to provide examples where the U.S. clearly and indisputably aided communists. (Though Castro and arguably Mao provide such examples.)
I don’t know at whom, or what, this is supposed to be directed. While I readily acknowledge that you may have reasonable disagreements with my opinions, I don’t think this is a reasonable response to anything I have written in this thread or elsewhere.
Or that the Soviet Union took the same side as a US-aided regime. Since said regime was anti-communist, that’s a bit more surprising perhaps than the USA supporting it.
I’m getting tired of this contrarian view of history. America was selling guns, bombers and napalm to Batista for the majority of the duration of his government, and even for the majority of his combatting Castro. That America stopped backing Batista a couple months before the end, that’s not “supporting Castro”… that’s America cutting its losses.
How many communist/anti-communist nations did USA invite into NATO during the cold war?
How many communist/anti-communist nations did USA sell weapons to?
The torturers of how many communist/anti-communist regimes did CIA help train?
Zero and lots.
For the sake of my argument imagine that when I said “America consistently supports the anti-communist side”, that by ‘supports’ I meant “sells weapons to, invites to military alliances, or helps train its torturers”
Contrarian views of history work by focussing on minor details and enlarging them until they swamp out the plain-to-see elephant in the room.
It is unrealistic to paint Nasser’s relationship with the U.S. and the Soviet Union as symmetrical. In any case, simple and clear-cut anti-communism would have implied joining the colonial forces against a Soviet-leaning and Soviet-armed local ruler, not joining the Soviets in an effort to restrain them.
However you turn it, the U.S. at some point did go out of its way to support Castro and destroy Batista. (This is a simple matter of public record, not a conspiracy theory. It involved, among other things, placing an arms embargo on Batista in a critical moment.) The fact that this was a reversal still makes it a problem for your “simple and clear-cut” theory.
This is just plain false—if anything, the communist Yugoslavia received plenty of U.S. aid and weapons after its break with the U.S.S.R. in 1948. Thus demonstrating another problem with your theory: the U.S. apparently did’t mind getting friendly with at least some communists who were willing to show some degree of cooperation. Again, not what I’d call simple and clear-cut anti-communism.
The existence of even minor contrary details (and I wouldn’t call these minor) is a valid argument against a theory that presents things as simple and clear-cut. You are writing as if I were arguing for some bizarre mirror image of your position, whereas I’m merely pointing out that reality is much more complex.
Does this argument help your case about “national character”? It’s clearly true that a naive anti-communist would do a terrible job of predicting the actions of the United States during the Cold War. That’s an argument that anti-communism was not a part of the national character of the US.
But your position seems to require that national character have some predictive power in policy decisions. So what particular national character drove US actions in the Cold War? I personally think that national self-interest (i.e. Great Power politics) drove the Cold War, not ideology. But self-interest is an odd thing to label a “national characteristic” because it seems unlikely that there are nations that lack that quality.
To recap, this is the quote that started this sub-debate:
I don’t see how disproving the highlighted portion shows that the following sentences are untrue.
So your complaint is that Vladimir is arguing a point that doesn’t necessarily advance his main argument. Why is this bad? That’s what rationalist discussions are supposed to look like.
Usually, yes. So long as it is not used as a logically rude tactic, verbal sleight of hand to make it look like a position is being supported while doing something completely different.
(I have no idea whether that is the case here. From what I understand the conversation is a mix of ‘philosophizing’ about a trivial conversation by that Wittgenstein fellow and bickering about American politics. I try to avoid both.)
As I understand Vladimir, his point is that “national character” is more than a semantic stop sign. But political realism—i.e. Great Power politics (as opposed to other theories of international relations) does not really include “national character” as a variable for predicting the acts of nations.
So, I saw the invocation of political realism as contradicting Vladimir’s overarching point that “national character” is a meaningful thing.
Indeed, but it has significant predictive power only in cases where some state of affairs would be in striking contradiction with the “national character.” It’s clearly not a heuristic that would give concrete and reliable predictions about all issues.
My objection to the comment you cite is that: (1) the proposed anti-communism heuristic, while not entirely devoid of predictive power, is nowhere as consistently accurate as the commennter claims, and (2) contrary to the commenter’s claim, there are issues outside of the proposed category (religious, ideological, etc. identification with parties in foreign disputes) where heuristics based on national character make accurate predictions.
Can you give examples? Because my paradigmatic example of the use of national character to make predictions is Napoleon’s (failed) prediction that a “nation of shopkeepers” would not be able to successfully resist his domination of Europe based on their supposed lack of will.
That was indeed a prediction driven by obvious biases. But there are many examples where it’s easy to make predictions so clearly true that they seem trivially obvious based on certain norms that are a matter of wide consensus in particular nations.
For example, the same plan for a public project implemented in a country known for notoriously corrupt practices in business in government will result in vastly more graft and embezzlement than if it’s implemented in a country known for a low level (and generally zero tolerance) for such corruption. What’s more, even if tomorrow both these countries were occupied by some third country and had the same system of government imposed on them, in practice the former one would likely still end up with a more corrupt system, since this sort of thing tends to be influenced by deeper cultural factors that can’t be readily changed by dictate from above.
Whether or not you think “national character” is an appropriate term for these factors (and it is indeed a somewhat antiquated term), it’s this sort of thing I have in mind, and it’s easy to think of many such examples. Surely you have often thought yourself that something is much more or less likely to happen in one place than another based on the deeply ingrained local culture, customs, attitudes, etc.