Or that the Soviet Union took the same side as a US-aided regime.
It is unrealistic to paint Nasser’s relationship with the U.S. and the Soviet Union as symmetrical. In any case, simple and clear-cut anti-communism would have implied joining the colonial forces against a Soviet-leaning and Soviet-armed local ruler, not joining the Soviets in an effort to restrain them.
That America stopped backing Batista a couple months before the end, that’s not “supporting Castro”… that’s America cutting its losses.
However you turn it, the U.S. at some point did go out of its way to support Castro and destroy Batista. (This is a simple matter of public record, not a conspiracy theory. It involved, among other things, placing an arms embargo on Batista in a critical moment.) The fact that this was a reversal still makes it a problem for your “simple and clear-cut” theory.
How many communist/anti-communist nations did USA sell weapons to? ... Zero and lots.
This is just plain false—if anything, the communist Yugoslavia received plenty of U.S. aid and weapons after its break with the U.S.S.R. in 1948. Thus demonstrating another problem with your theory: the U.S. apparently did’t mind getting friendly with at least some communists who were willing to show some degree of cooperation. Again, not what I’d call simple and clear-cut anti-communism.
Contrarian views of history work by focussing on minor details and enlarging them until they swamp out the plain-to-see elephant in the room.
The existence of even minor contrary details (and I wouldn’t call these minor) is a valid argument against a theory that presents things as simple and clear-cut. You are writing as if I were arguing for some bizarre mirror image of your position, whereas I’m merely pointing out that reality is much more complex.
Does this argument help your case about “national character”? It’s clearly true that a naive anti-communist would do a terrible job of predicting the actions of the United States during the Cold War. That’s an argument that anti-communism was not a part of the national character of the US. But your position seems to require that national character have some predictive power in policy decisions. So what particular national character drove US actions in the Cold War? I personally think that national self-interest (i.e. Great Power politics) drove the Cold War, not ideology. But self-interest is an odd thing to label a “national characteristic” because it seems unlikely that there are nations that lack that quality.
To recap, this is the quote that started this sub-debate:
To the extent that there’s a “national character” that affects policy, I feel it has primarily, perhaps even solely to do with concepts of self-identification similar in type to the concept of Clash of Civilizations by Huntington. e.g. Greece supported the Serbs in the Yugoslav wars for no more and no less reason than that its “national character” contained a self-identification with Eastern Orthodox significantly more than with Catholics or with Muslims. Now there’s predictive power. In any dispute between orthodox and non-orthodox, I know that Greece will back the orthodox. I know that Arab nations will back the Palestinians against Israel. America in the Cold War self-identified as anti-communist, so in any dispute between people identifying as communists and people that didn’t , I know America would back the people that didn’t.
There’s the extent that national character plays in regards to policy. If there’s some other element in it with predictive power, I don’t see it.
I don’t see how disproving the highlighted portion shows that the following sentences are untrue.
So your complaint is that Vladimir is arguing a point that doesn’t necessarily advance his main argument. Why is this bad? That’s what rationalist discussions are supposed to look like.
So your complaint is that Vladimir is arguing a point that doesn’t necessarily advance his main argument. Why is this bad? That’s what rationalist discussions are supposed to look like.
Usually, yes. So long as it is not used as a logically rude tactic, verbal sleight of hand to make it look like a position is being supported while doing something completely different.
(I have no idea whether that is the case here. From what I understand the conversation is a mix of ‘philosophizing’ about a trivial conversation by that Wittgenstein fellow and bickering about American politics. I try to avoid both.)
As I understand Vladimir, his point is that “national character” is more than a semantic stop sign. But political realism—i.e. Great Power politics (as opposed to other theories of international relations) does not really include “national character” as a variable for predicting the acts of nations. So, I saw the invocation of political realism as contradicting Vladimir’s overarching point that “national character” is a meaningful thing.
But your position seems to require that national character have some predictive power in policy decisions.
Indeed, but it has significant predictive power only in cases where some state of affairs would be in striking contradiction with the “national character.” It’s clearly not a heuristic that would give concrete and reliable predictions about all issues.
My objection to the comment you cite is that: (1) the proposed anti-communism heuristic, while not entirely devoid of predictive power, is nowhere as consistently accurate as the commennter claims, and (2) contrary to the commenter’s claim, there are issues outside of the proposed category (religious, ideological, etc. identification with parties in foreign disputes) where heuristics based on national character make accurate predictions.
contrary to the commenter’s claim, there are issues outside of the proposed category (religious, ideological, etc. identification with parties in foreign disputes) where heuristics based on national character make accurate predictions.
Can you give examples? Because my paradigmatic example of the use of national character to make predictions is Napoleon’s (failed) prediction that a “nation of shopkeepers” would not be able to successfully resist his domination of Europe based on their supposed lack of will.
That was indeed a prediction driven by obvious biases. But there are many examples where it’s easy to make predictions so clearly true that they seem trivially obvious based on certain norms that are a matter of wide consensus in particular nations.
For example, the same plan for a public project implemented in a country known for notoriously corrupt practices in business in government will result in vastly more graft and embezzlement than if it’s implemented in a country known for a low level (and generally zero tolerance) for such corruption. What’s more, even if tomorrow both these countries were occupied by some third country and had the same system of government imposed on them, in practice the former one would likely still end up with a more corrupt system, since this sort of thing tends to be influenced by deeper cultural factors that can’t be readily changed by dictate from above.
Whether or not you think “national character” is an appropriate term for these factors (and it is indeed a somewhat antiquated term), it’s this sort of thing I have in mind, and it’s easy to think of many such examples. Surely you have often thought yourself that something is much more or less likely to happen in one place than another based on the deeply ingrained local culture, customs, attitudes, etc.
It is unrealistic to paint Nasser’s relationship with the U.S. and the Soviet Union as symmetrical. In any case, simple and clear-cut anti-communism would have implied joining the colonial forces against a Soviet-leaning and Soviet-armed local ruler, not joining the Soviets in an effort to restrain them.
However you turn it, the U.S. at some point did go out of its way to support Castro and destroy Batista. (This is a simple matter of public record, not a conspiracy theory. It involved, among other things, placing an arms embargo on Batista in a critical moment.) The fact that this was a reversal still makes it a problem for your “simple and clear-cut” theory.
This is just plain false—if anything, the communist Yugoslavia received plenty of U.S. aid and weapons after its break with the U.S.S.R. in 1948. Thus demonstrating another problem with your theory: the U.S. apparently did’t mind getting friendly with at least some communists who were willing to show some degree of cooperation. Again, not what I’d call simple and clear-cut anti-communism.
The existence of even minor contrary details (and I wouldn’t call these minor) is a valid argument against a theory that presents things as simple and clear-cut. You are writing as if I were arguing for some bizarre mirror image of your position, whereas I’m merely pointing out that reality is much more complex.
Does this argument help your case about “national character”? It’s clearly true that a naive anti-communist would do a terrible job of predicting the actions of the United States during the Cold War. That’s an argument that anti-communism was not a part of the national character of the US.
But your position seems to require that national character have some predictive power in policy decisions. So what particular national character drove US actions in the Cold War? I personally think that national self-interest (i.e. Great Power politics) drove the Cold War, not ideology. But self-interest is an odd thing to label a “national characteristic” because it seems unlikely that there are nations that lack that quality.
To recap, this is the quote that started this sub-debate:
I don’t see how disproving the highlighted portion shows that the following sentences are untrue.
So your complaint is that Vladimir is arguing a point that doesn’t necessarily advance his main argument. Why is this bad? That’s what rationalist discussions are supposed to look like.
Usually, yes. So long as it is not used as a logically rude tactic, verbal sleight of hand to make it look like a position is being supported while doing something completely different.
(I have no idea whether that is the case here. From what I understand the conversation is a mix of ‘philosophizing’ about a trivial conversation by that Wittgenstein fellow and bickering about American politics. I try to avoid both.)
As I understand Vladimir, his point is that “national character” is more than a semantic stop sign. But political realism—i.e. Great Power politics (as opposed to other theories of international relations) does not really include “national character” as a variable for predicting the acts of nations.
So, I saw the invocation of political realism as contradicting Vladimir’s overarching point that “national character” is a meaningful thing.
Indeed, but it has significant predictive power only in cases where some state of affairs would be in striking contradiction with the “national character.” It’s clearly not a heuristic that would give concrete and reliable predictions about all issues.
My objection to the comment you cite is that: (1) the proposed anti-communism heuristic, while not entirely devoid of predictive power, is nowhere as consistently accurate as the commennter claims, and (2) contrary to the commenter’s claim, there are issues outside of the proposed category (religious, ideological, etc. identification with parties in foreign disputes) where heuristics based on national character make accurate predictions.
Can you give examples? Because my paradigmatic example of the use of national character to make predictions is Napoleon’s (failed) prediction that a “nation of shopkeepers” would not be able to successfully resist his domination of Europe based on their supposed lack of will.
That was indeed a prediction driven by obvious biases. But there are many examples where it’s easy to make predictions so clearly true that they seem trivially obvious based on certain norms that are a matter of wide consensus in particular nations.
For example, the same plan for a public project implemented in a country known for notoriously corrupt practices in business in government will result in vastly more graft and embezzlement than if it’s implemented in a country known for a low level (and generally zero tolerance) for such corruption. What’s more, even if tomorrow both these countries were occupied by some third country and had the same system of government imposed on them, in practice the former one would likely still end up with a more corrupt system, since this sort of thing tends to be influenced by deeper cultural factors that can’t be readily changed by dictate from above.
Whether or not you think “national character” is an appropriate term for these factors (and it is indeed a somewhat antiquated term), it’s this sort of thing I have in mind, and it’s easy to think of many such examples. Surely you have often thought yourself that something is much more or less likely to happen in one place than another based on the deeply ingrained local culture, customs, attitudes, etc.