Frankly, because two examples (Rhodesia and South Africa) don’t make for a well-substantiated pattern—especially when United States was less severe than most of the rest of the world in its condemnation of these states.
American opposition to communism does make for a much more obvious, simple, and clear-cut example, in contrast, with dozens of substantiated anti-communist actions. And I’m not a troll that I would give unclear and controversial examples to be disputed and argued over when more clear-cut and obvious examples suffice to make my point.
Frankly, because two examples (Rhodesia and South Africa) don’t make for a well-substantiated pattern…
[...]
American opposition to communism does make for a much more obvious, simple, and clear-cut example...
A well-substantiated more general pattern is that in U.S. foreign relations, anti-colonialism trumped anti-communism solidly. Besides Rhodesia and South Africa, some other major examples are the Katanga Crisis and the Suez Crisis. In the latter, the U.S. effectively joined forces with the Soviet Union to support Nasser against the British and the French.
Moreover, in some cases the U.S. “support” for anti-communists was of the “with friends like that, who needs enemies” variety, sometimes with major elements within the U.S. government effectively favoring the communists. China is the most notable example. Not to mention the cases where the U.S. supported communists who fought under a flimsy and transparent pretense of being non-communists, like Castro in Cuba.
So, on the whole, I wouldn’t say the pattern of U.S. Cold War anti-communism is so consistent and clear-cut.
Besides Rhodesia and South Africa, some other major examples are the Katanga Crisis and the Suez Crisis.
Are Nasser and Mobutu supposed to be communists in your model of history? They are not in mine.
In the latter, the U.S. effectively joined forces with the Soviet Union to support Nasser against the British and the French.
Nasser opposed communism. Sure, both American and the Soviet Union preferred a non-Europe-controlled Egypt, because they respectively preferred an America-controllled and a Soviet-controlled Egypt. What does that have to do with anti-colonialism trumping anti-communism? It wasn’t a communist regime that America supported then, it was Nasser’s anti-communist regime.
Look, I’m not interested in having a discussion where “communism” has been redefined to mean pretty much the entire modern world. I’m well aware that there exist some people (e.g Moldbug-type reactionaries) that believe that even modern-day America is “communist” according to their own definition, but I’m talking about ordinary definitions of “communism”.
Are Nasser and Mobutu supposed to be communists in your model of history? They are not in mine.
Mobutu consolidated power only in late 1965, and there were many other relevant people involved about whose degree of affiliation with communism we could debate. (And frankly, I’m not very knowledgeable about, or particularly interested in, the details of this particular war.) The point however is that a reflexively and consistently anti-communist U.S. policy would have simply backed Tshombe and his Katangan government.
As for the Suez crisis, the point is not about Nasser’s ideology. The point is that the U.S. took the same side as the Soviet Union and a Soviet-aided regime (though, as you correctly point out, not a Soviet-run one), and against European colonial powers that opposed the latter. Again, a model that postulates consistent anti-communism on part of the U.S. cannot predict this; it will require at the very least a few epicycles.
Moreover, note that you were the one who claimed that the U.S. anti-communism was simple and clear-cut. To dispute that claim, it is enough to demonstrate that the situation was in fact much more complicated and murky. It is not necessary to provide examples where the U.S. clearly and indisputably aided communists. (Though Castro and arguably Mao provide such examples.)
Look, I’m not interested in having a discussion where “communism” has been redefined to mean pretty much the entire modern world.
I don’t know at whom, or what, this is supposed to be directed. While I readily acknowledge that you may have reasonable disagreements with my opinions, I don’t think this is a reasonable response to anything I have written in this thread or elsewhere.
The point is that the U.S. took the same side as the Soviet Union and a Soviet-aided regime
Or that the Soviet Union took the same side as a US-aided regime. Since said regime was anti-communist, that’s a bit more surprising perhaps than the USA supporting it.
Though Castro and arguably Mao provide such examples
I’m getting tired of this contrarian view of history. America was selling guns, bombers and napalm to Batista for the majority of the duration of his government, and even for the majority of his combatting Castro. That America stopped backing Batista a couple months before the end, that’s not “supporting Castro”… that’s America cutting its losses.
Moreover, note that you were the one who claimed that the U.S. anti-communism was simple and clear-cut.
How many communist/anti-communist nations did USA invite into NATO during the cold war? How many communist/anti-communist nations did USA sell weapons to? The torturers of how many communist/anti-communist regimes did CIA help train?
Zero and lots.
For the sake of my argument imagine that when I said “America consistently supports the anti-communist side”, that by ‘supports’ I meant “sells weapons to, invites to military alliances, or helps train its torturers”
Contrarian views of history work by focussing on minor details and enlarging them until they swamp out the plain-to-see elephant in the room.
Or that the Soviet Union took the same side as a US-aided regime.
It is unrealistic to paint Nasser’s relationship with the U.S. and the Soviet Union as symmetrical. In any case, simple and clear-cut anti-communism would have implied joining the colonial forces against a Soviet-leaning and Soviet-armed local ruler, not joining the Soviets in an effort to restrain them.
That America stopped backing Batista a couple months before the end, that’s not “supporting Castro”… that’s America cutting its losses.
However you turn it, the U.S. at some point did go out of its way to support Castro and destroy Batista. (This is a simple matter of public record, not a conspiracy theory. It involved, among other things, placing an arms embargo on Batista in a critical moment.) The fact that this was a reversal still makes it a problem for your “simple and clear-cut” theory.
How many communist/anti-communist nations did USA sell weapons to? ... Zero and lots.
This is just plain false—if anything, the communist Yugoslavia received plenty of U.S. aid and weapons after its break with the U.S.S.R. in 1948. Thus demonstrating another problem with your theory: the U.S. apparently did’t mind getting friendly with at least some communists who were willing to show some degree of cooperation. Again, not what I’d call simple and clear-cut anti-communism.
Contrarian views of history work by focussing on minor details and enlarging them until they swamp out the plain-to-see elephant in the room.
The existence of even minor contrary details (and I wouldn’t call these minor) is a valid argument against a theory that presents things as simple and clear-cut. You are writing as if I were arguing for some bizarre mirror image of your position, whereas I’m merely pointing out that reality is much more complex.
Does this argument help your case about “national character”? It’s clearly true that a naive anti-communist would do a terrible job of predicting the actions of the United States during the Cold War. That’s an argument that anti-communism was not a part of the national character of the US. But your position seems to require that national character have some predictive power in policy decisions. So what particular national character drove US actions in the Cold War? I personally think that national self-interest (i.e. Great Power politics) drove the Cold War, not ideology. But self-interest is an odd thing to label a “national characteristic” because it seems unlikely that there are nations that lack that quality.
To recap, this is the quote that started this sub-debate:
To the extent that there’s a “national character” that affects policy, I feel it has primarily, perhaps even solely to do with concepts of self-identification similar in type to the concept of Clash of Civilizations by Huntington. e.g. Greece supported the Serbs in the Yugoslav wars for no more and no less reason than that its “national character” contained a self-identification with Eastern Orthodox significantly more than with Catholics or with Muslims. Now there’s predictive power. In any dispute between orthodox and non-orthodox, I know that Greece will back the orthodox. I know that Arab nations will back the Palestinians against Israel. America in the Cold War self-identified as anti-communist, so in any dispute between people identifying as communists and people that didn’t , I know America would back the people that didn’t.
There’s the extent that national character plays in regards to policy. If there’s some other element in it with predictive power, I don’t see it.
I don’t see how disproving the highlighted portion shows that the following sentences are untrue.
So your complaint is that Vladimir is arguing a point that doesn’t necessarily advance his main argument. Why is this bad? That’s what rationalist discussions are supposed to look like.
So your complaint is that Vladimir is arguing a point that doesn’t necessarily advance his main argument. Why is this bad? That’s what rationalist discussions are supposed to look like.
Usually, yes. So long as it is not used as a logically rude tactic, verbal sleight of hand to make it look like a position is being supported while doing something completely different.
(I have no idea whether that is the case here. From what I understand the conversation is a mix of ‘philosophizing’ about a trivial conversation by that Wittgenstein fellow and bickering about American politics. I try to avoid both.)
As I understand Vladimir, his point is that “national character” is more than a semantic stop sign. But political realism—i.e. Great Power politics (as opposed to other theories of international relations) does not really include “national character” as a variable for predicting the acts of nations. So, I saw the invocation of political realism as contradicting Vladimir’s overarching point that “national character” is a meaningful thing.
But your position seems to require that national character have some predictive power in policy decisions.
Indeed, but it has significant predictive power only in cases where some state of affairs would be in striking contradiction with the “national character.” It’s clearly not a heuristic that would give concrete and reliable predictions about all issues.
My objection to the comment you cite is that: (1) the proposed anti-communism heuristic, while not entirely devoid of predictive power, is nowhere as consistently accurate as the commennter claims, and (2) contrary to the commenter’s claim, there are issues outside of the proposed category (religious, ideological, etc. identification with parties in foreign disputes) where heuristics based on national character make accurate predictions.
contrary to the commenter’s claim, there are issues outside of the proposed category (religious, ideological, etc. identification with parties in foreign disputes) where heuristics based on national character make accurate predictions.
Can you give examples? Because my paradigmatic example of the use of national character to make predictions is Napoleon’s (failed) prediction that a “nation of shopkeepers” would not be able to successfully resist his domination of Europe based on their supposed lack of will.
That was indeed a prediction driven by obvious biases. But there are many examples where it’s easy to make predictions so clearly true that they seem trivially obvious based on certain norms that are a matter of wide consensus in particular nations.
For example, the same plan for a public project implemented in a country known for notoriously corrupt practices in business in government will result in vastly more graft and embezzlement than if it’s implemented in a country known for a low level (and generally zero tolerance) for such corruption. What’s more, even if tomorrow both these countries were occupied by some third country and had the same system of government imposed on them, in practice the former one would likely still end up with a more corrupt system, since this sort of thing tends to be influenced by deeper cultural factors that can’t be readily changed by dictate from above.
Whether or not you think “national character” is an appropriate term for these factors (and it is indeed a somewhat antiquated term), it’s this sort of thing I have in mind, and it’s easy to think of many such examples. Surely you have often thought yourself that something is much more or less likely to happen in one place than another based on the deeply ingrained local culture, customs, attitudes, etc.
Frankly, because two examples (Rhodesia and South Africa) don’t make for a well-substantiated pattern—especially when United States was less severe than most of the rest of the world in its condemnation of these states.
What about the Portuguese colonial wars, with Holden Roberto and the CIA backed FNLA and UPA?
Greece supported the Serbs in the Yugoslav wars for no more and no less reason than that its “national character” contained a self-identification with Eastern Orthodox significantly more than with Catholics or with Muslims. Now there’s predictive power. In any dispute between orthodox and non-orthodox, I know that Greece will back the orthodox. I know that Arab nations will back the Palestinians against Israel. America in the Cold War self-identified as anti-communist, so in any dispute between people identifying as communists and people that didn’t , I know America would back the people that didn’t.”
I could take a standard die and tell you, or even someone who had never seen a die before, that of its six faces, one, two, three, four, or five dots are always face up after a roll. In such a case, it’s not clear that’s better than not knowing anything—it would depend on exactly what you were doing with the information. The correct rule (when we only care about whether or not a six is rolled) is “one, two, three, four, or five dots are face up after a roll 5⁄6 of the time, and 1⁄6 of the time the six dots are face up.”
The Estado Novo), (“New State”), or the Second Republic, was the corporatist authoritarian regime installed in Portugal in 1933. It was established following the army-led coup d’état of 28 May 1926 against the democratic but unstable First Republic. The Estado Novo, greatly inspired by conservative and authoritarian ideologies, was developed by António de Oliveira Salazar, ruler of Portugal from 1932 to 1968, when he fell ill.
Opposed to communism, socialism, liberalism, and anti-colonialism, the pro-Roman Catholic Estado Novo regime advocated the retention of Portuguese colonies as a pluricontinental empire.
This isn’t explained by the US cutting losses by abandoning a doomed anti-communist regime, even with US support, those rebels didn’t win:
The combined forces of the MPLA, the UNITA, and the FNLA succeeded in their rebellion not because of their success in battle, but because of the Movimento das Forças Armadas’ coup in Portugal.
That coup succeeded significantly because of Portuguese defeats in Guinea.
By most accounts, Portugal’s counterinsurgency campaign in Angola was the most successful of all its campaigns in the Colonial War. Angola is a large territory, and the long distances from safe havens in neighboring countries supporting the rebel forces made it difficult for the latter to escape detection...Another factor was internecine struggles between three competing revolutionary movements - (FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA) - and their guerrilla armies. For most of the conflict, the three rebel groups spent as much time fighting each other as they did fighting the Portuguese...Strategy also played a role, as a successful hearts and minds campaign led by General Costa Gomes helped blunt the influence of the various revolutionary movements. Finally, unlike other overseas possessions, Portuguese Angola was able to receive support from a local ally, in this case South Africa...The combined forces of the MPLA, the UNITA, and the FNLA succeeded in their rebellion not because of their success in battle, but because of the Movimento das Forças Armadas’ coup in Portugal.
The US chose to support an anti-communist insurgency as a means of opposing colonial rule and also opposing communism. An excellent chance of having a successful colonialist anti-communist regime was dropped in favor of a decent chance of having an anti-communist anti-colonial regime and a decent chance of having a communist anti-colonial regime.
Anti-communism was one very important factor of American foreign policy after the second world war, but it wasn’t of overriding importance. American anti-white-rule positions towards Rhodesia and South Africa aren’t the only examples of how egalitarianism/anti-colonialism/etc. was a feature of American decision making in determining whom to support, how to support them, etc.
This example actually conforms to the language ArisKatsaris used regarding the main point of contention, “in any dispute between people identifying as communists and people that didn’t , I know America would back the people that didn’t.” This shifts the maximized policy goals from causing desired outcomes of conflicts to acting according to favored procedures, but doesn’t tell us if the procedure is just supporting favored groups or if it is also supporting groups acting according to favored norms.
I.e., it doesn’t help us distinguish between those procedures being almost exclusively based on the identity of the supported, i.e. “I feel it has primarily, perhaps even solely to do with concepts of self-identification,” or based substantially on the sorts of actions taken by the supported, i.e. “a violation of certain norms that the British government is known to follow consistently in practice, and expected to follow by a broad consensus of the British people—such consensus being strong enough that it can be considered part of their national character.” That is the main claim in question here, this comment of mine addresses an apparent shift in ArisKatsaris’ position on the minor point of opposition to white-minority colonial regimes.
He had first correctly said, “If the exceptions are about opposition to white-racist regimes, I believe this is explained by modern-day United States identifying itself even more as multiracial and egalitarian (atleast in regards to race), than it does as anti-communist.” He later said, “Frankly, because two examples (Rhodesia and South Africa) don’t make for a well-substantiated pattern—especially when United States was less severe than most of the rest of the world in its condemnation of these states”
I added a third example. Furthermore, I think there are good reasons to support his earlier statement besides examples of it actually occurring, in the way that I think there are good reasons to believe the US would oppose a military dictatorship of octopuses riding flying shark cavalry with laser weapons, despite the absence of even one example.
So on a side point at issue here, I think ArisKatsaris changed from a reasonable position to an unreasonable one. He also backs it up with literally true but misleading or inadequate statements like saying that the two examples cited don’t make a pattern, though there are more examples and there are also reasons other than the examples to believe his original statement was correct.
Frankly, because two examples (Rhodesia and South Africa) don’t make for a well-substantiated pattern—especially when United States was less severe than most of the rest of the world in its condemnation of these states.
Really depends on which period. In the 1950s you didn’t hear much condemnation from anyone except maybe Communist countries. Makes sense since much of the US was segregated in the 1960s, also South Africa did get some non-military support from the US in the name of fighting communism, because the US needed the country for operations in Africa. Perhaps the phenomena we talked about with regards to their hostility with South Africa and Rhodesia, where basically meant as a disingenuous ploy by some US anti-communist players. It is no secret that many important politicians in private argued that eliminating segregation in the US was necessary to try and reduce the appeal of Soviet propaganda in the Third world.
Maybe relations with South Africa where at first seen as a delicate balance looking good and helping the Communists take over the country versus looking bad and helping Soviets gain influence elsewhere.
In a way the “egalitarian” bent wasn’t something that affected only those two states, but more the general US attitude towards decolonialization, which was a significant phenomena and trend of the second half of the 20th century. Overall making states independent didn’t help slowing the spread of Communism but it arguably often made direct political influence easier, so why this impulse found expression in action rather than just sympathy isn’t exactly a mystery.
Also to check the other side of “less hostile than others” statement, this wasn’t always true. I think Israel was cooperating rather closely with South Africa even in a military sense during the 1970s (there is even speculation of cooperation on their nuclear programs), and places like Japan just didn’t care (say in the late 80s) and simply wanted to do business. Even Britain’s opposition was much muted due to economic concerns.
American opposition to communism does make for a much more obvious, simple, and clear-cut example, in contrast, with dozens of substantiated anti-communist actions. And I’m not a troll that I would give unclear and controversial examples to be disputed and argued over when more clear-cut and obvious examples suffice to make my point.
Frankly, because two examples (Rhodesia and South Africa) don’t make for a well-substantiated pattern—especially when United States was less severe than most of the rest of the world in its condemnation of these states.
American opposition to communism does make for a much more obvious, simple, and clear-cut example, in contrast, with dozens of substantiated anti-communist actions. And I’m not a troll that I would give unclear and controversial examples to be disputed and argued over when more clear-cut and obvious examples suffice to make my point.
A well-substantiated more general pattern is that in U.S. foreign relations, anti-colonialism trumped anti-communism solidly. Besides Rhodesia and South Africa, some other major examples are the Katanga Crisis and the Suez Crisis. In the latter, the U.S. effectively joined forces with the Soviet Union to support Nasser against the British and the French.
Moreover, in some cases the U.S. “support” for anti-communists was of the “with friends like that, who needs enemies” variety, sometimes with major elements within the U.S. government effectively favoring the communists. China is the most notable example. Not to mention the cases where the U.S. supported communists who fought under a flimsy and transparent pretense of being non-communists, like Castro in Cuba.
So, on the whole, I wouldn’t say the pattern of U.S. Cold War anti-communism is so consistent and clear-cut.
Are Nasser and Mobutu supposed to be communists in your model of history? They are not in mine.
Nasser opposed communism. Sure, both American and the Soviet Union preferred a non-Europe-controlled Egypt, because they respectively preferred an America-controllled and a Soviet-controlled Egypt. What does that have to do with anti-colonialism trumping anti-communism? It wasn’t a communist regime that America supported then, it was Nasser’s anti-communist regime.
Look, I’m not interested in having a discussion where “communism” has been redefined to mean pretty much the entire modern world. I’m well aware that there exist some people (e.g Moldbug-type reactionaries) that believe that even modern-day America is “communist” according to their own definition, but I’m talking about ordinary definitions of “communism”.
Mobutu consolidated power only in late 1965, and there were many other relevant people involved about whose degree of affiliation with communism we could debate. (And frankly, I’m not very knowledgeable about, or particularly interested in, the details of this particular war.) The point however is that a reflexively and consistently anti-communist U.S. policy would have simply backed Tshombe and his Katangan government.
As for the Suez crisis, the point is not about Nasser’s ideology. The point is that the U.S. took the same side as the Soviet Union and a Soviet-aided regime (though, as you correctly point out, not a Soviet-run one), and against European colonial powers that opposed the latter. Again, a model that postulates consistent anti-communism on part of the U.S. cannot predict this; it will require at the very least a few epicycles.
Moreover, note that you were the one who claimed that the U.S. anti-communism was simple and clear-cut. To dispute that claim, it is enough to demonstrate that the situation was in fact much more complicated and murky. It is not necessary to provide examples where the U.S. clearly and indisputably aided communists. (Though Castro and arguably Mao provide such examples.)
I don’t know at whom, or what, this is supposed to be directed. While I readily acknowledge that you may have reasonable disagreements with my opinions, I don’t think this is a reasonable response to anything I have written in this thread or elsewhere.
Or that the Soviet Union took the same side as a US-aided regime. Since said regime was anti-communist, that’s a bit more surprising perhaps than the USA supporting it.
I’m getting tired of this contrarian view of history. America was selling guns, bombers and napalm to Batista for the majority of the duration of his government, and even for the majority of his combatting Castro. That America stopped backing Batista a couple months before the end, that’s not “supporting Castro”… that’s America cutting its losses.
How many communist/anti-communist nations did USA invite into NATO during the cold war?
How many communist/anti-communist nations did USA sell weapons to?
The torturers of how many communist/anti-communist regimes did CIA help train?
Zero and lots.
For the sake of my argument imagine that when I said “America consistently supports the anti-communist side”, that by ‘supports’ I meant “sells weapons to, invites to military alliances, or helps train its torturers”
Contrarian views of history work by focussing on minor details and enlarging them until they swamp out the plain-to-see elephant in the room.
It is unrealistic to paint Nasser’s relationship with the U.S. and the Soviet Union as symmetrical. In any case, simple and clear-cut anti-communism would have implied joining the colonial forces against a Soviet-leaning and Soviet-armed local ruler, not joining the Soviets in an effort to restrain them.
However you turn it, the U.S. at some point did go out of its way to support Castro and destroy Batista. (This is a simple matter of public record, not a conspiracy theory. It involved, among other things, placing an arms embargo on Batista in a critical moment.) The fact that this was a reversal still makes it a problem for your “simple and clear-cut” theory.
This is just plain false—if anything, the communist Yugoslavia received plenty of U.S. aid and weapons after its break with the U.S.S.R. in 1948. Thus demonstrating another problem with your theory: the U.S. apparently did’t mind getting friendly with at least some communists who were willing to show some degree of cooperation. Again, not what I’d call simple and clear-cut anti-communism.
The existence of even minor contrary details (and I wouldn’t call these minor) is a valid argument against a theory that presents things as simple and clear-cut. You are writing as if I were arguing for some bizarre mirror image of your position, whereas I’m merely pointing out that reality is much more complex.
Does this argument help your case about “national character”? It’s clearly true that a naive anti-communist would do a terrible job of predicting the actions of the United States during the Cold War. That’s an argument that anti-communism was not a part of the national character of the US.
But your position seems to require that national character have some predictive power in policy decisions. So what particular national character drove US actions in the Cold War? I personally think that national self-interest (i.e. Great Power politics) drove the Cold War, not ideology. But self-interest is an odd thing to label a “national characteristic” because it seems unlikely that there are nations that lack that quality.
To recap, this is the quote that started this sub-debate:
I don’t see how disproving the highlighted portion shows that the following sentences are untrue.
So your complaint is that Vladimir is arguing a point that doesn’t necessarily advance his main argument. Why is this bad? That’s what rationalist discussions are supposed to look like.
Usually, yes. So long as it is not used as a logically rude tactic, verbal sleight of hand to make it look like a position is being supported while doing something completely different.
(I have no idea whether that is the case here. From what I understand the conversation is a mix of ‘philosophizing’ about a trivial conversation by that Wittgenstein fellow and bickering about American politics. I try to avoid both.)
As I understand Vladimir, his point is that “national character” is more than a semantic stop sign. But political realism—i.e. Great Power politics (as opposed to other theories of international relations) does not really include “national character” as a variable for predicting the acts of nations.
So, I saw the invocation of political realism as contradicting Vladimir’s overarching point that “national character” is a meaningful thing.
Indeed, but it has significant predictive power only in cases where some state of affairs would be in striking contradiction with the “national character.” It’s clearly not a heuristic that would give concrete and reliable predictions about all issues.
My objection to the comment you cite is that: (1) the proposed anti-communism heuristic, while not entirely devoid of predictive power, is nowhere as consistently accurate as the commennter claims, and (2) contrary to the commenter’s claim, there are issues outside of the proposed category (religious, ideological, etc. identification with parties in foreign disputes) where heuristics based on national character make accurate predictions.
Can you give examples? Because my paradigmatic example of the use of national character to make predictions is Napoleon’s (failed) prediction that a “nation of shopkeepers” would not be able to successfully resist his domination of Europe based on their supposed lack of will.
That was indeed a prediction driven by obvious biases. But there are many examples where it’s easy to make predictions so clearly true that they seem trivially obvious based on certain norms that are a matter of wide consensus in particular nations.
For example, the same plan for a public project implemented in a country known for notoriously corrupt practices in business in government will result in vastly more graft and embezzlement than if it’s implemented in a country known for a low level (and generally zero tolerance) for such corruption. What’s more, even if tomorrow both these countries were occupied by some third country and had the same system of government imposed on them, in practice the former one would likely still end up with a more corrupt system, since this sort of thing tends to be influenced by deeper cultural factors that can’t be readily changed by dictate from above.
Whether or not you think “national character” is an appropriate term for these factors (and it is indeed a somewhat antiquated term), it’s this sort of thing I have in mind, and it’s easy to think of many such examples. Surely you have often thought yourself that something is much more or less likely to happen in one place than another based on the deeply ingrained local culture, customs, attitudes, etc.
What about the Portuguese colonial wars, with Holden Roberto and the CIA backed FNLA and UPA?
I could take a standard die and tell you, or even someone who had never seen a die before, that of its six faces, one, two, three, four, or five dots are always face up after a roll. In such a case, it’s not clear that’s better than not knowing anything—it would depend on exactly what you were doing with the information. The correct rule (when we only care about whether or not a six is rolled) is “one, two, three, four, or five dots are face up after a roll 5⁄6 of the time, and 1⁄6 of the time the six dots are face up.”
That’s pretty well-explained by the anti-communist rule of thumb.
Wikipedia:
This isn’t explained by the US cutting losses by abandoning a doomed anti-communist regime, even with US support, those rebels didn’t win:
That coup succeeded significantly because of Portuguese defeats in Guinea.
The US chose to support an anti-communist insurgency as a means of opposing colonial rule and also opposing communism. An excellent chance of having a successful colonialist anti-communist regime was dropped in favor of a decent chance of having an anti-communist anti-colonial regime and a decent chance of having a communist anti-colonial regime.
Anti-communism was one very important factor of American foreign policy after the second world war, but it wasn’t of overriding importance. American anti-white-rule positions towards Rhodesia and South Africa aren’t the only examples of how egalitarianism/anti-colonialism/etc. was a feature of American decision making in determining whom to support, how to support them, etc.
This example actually conforms to the language ArisKatsaris used regarding the main point of contention, “in any dispute between people identifying as communists and people that didn’t , I know America would back the people that didn’t.” This shifts the maximized policy goals from causing desired outcomes of conflicts to acting according to favored procedures, but doesn’t tell us if the procedure is just supporting favored groups or if it is also supporting groups acting according to favored norms.
I.e., it doesn’t help us distinguish between those procedures being almost exclusively based on the identity of the supported, i.e. “I feel it has primarily, perhaps even solely to do with concepts of self-identification,” or based substantially on the sorts of actions taken by the supported, i.e. “a violation of certain norms that the British government is known to follow consistently in practice, and expected to follow by a broad consensus of the British people—such consensus being strong enough that it can be considered part of their national character.” That is the main claim in question here, this comment of mine addresses an apparent shift in ArisKatsaris’ position on the minor point of opposition to white-minority colonial regimes.
He had first correctly said, “If the exceptions are about opposition to white-racist regimes, I believe this is explained by modern-day United States identifying itself even more as multiracial and egalitarian (atleast in regards to race), than it does as anti-communist.” He later said, “Frankly, because two examples (Rhodesia and South Africa) don’t make for a well-substantiated pattern—especially when United States was less severe than most of the rest of the world in its condemnation of these states”
I added a third example. Furthermore, I think there are good reasons to support his earlier statement besides examples of it actually occurring, in the way that I think there are good reasons to believe the US would oppose a military dictatorship of octopuses riding flying shark cavalry with laser weapons, despite the absence of even one example.
So on a side point at issue here, I think ArisKatsaris changed from a reasonable position to an unreasonable one. He also backs it up with literally true but misleading or inadequate statements like saying that the two examples cited don’t make a pattern, though there are more examples and there are also reasons other than the examples to believe his original statement was correct.
Really depends on which period. In the 1950s you didn’t hear much condemnation from anyone except maybe Communist countries. Makes sense since much of the US was segregated in the 1960s, also South Africa did get some non-military support from the US in the name of fighting communism, because the US needed the country for operations in Africa. Perhaps the phenomena we talked about with regards to their hostility with South Africa and Rhodesia, where basically meant as a disingenuous ploy by some US anti-communist players. It is no secret that many important politicians in private argued that eliminating segregation in the US was necessary to try and reduce the appeal of Soviet propaganda in the Third world. Maybe relations with South Africa where at first seen as a delicate balance looking good and helping the Communists take over the country versus looking bad and helping Soviets gain influence elsewhere.
In a way the “egalitarian” bent wasn’t something that affected only those two states, but more the general US attitude towards decolonialization, which was a significant phenomena and trend of the second half of the 20th century. Overall making states independent didn’t help slowing the spread of Communism but it arguably often made direct political influence easier, so why this impulse found expression in action rather than just sympathy isn’t exactly a mystery.
Also to check the other side of “less hostile than others” statement, this wasn’t always true. I think Israel was cooperating rather closely with South Africa even in a military sense during the 1970s (there is even speculation of cooperation on their nuclear programs), and places like Japan just didn’t care (say in the late 80s) and simply wanted to do business. Even Britain’s opposition was much muted due to economic concerns.
I think agree with this.