Utility functions are actually an extreme of consequentialism; they state that your actions should not just be based on consequences, but a weighted probability distribution over outcomes.
Hmm… I think Eliezer might have overstated his case a little (for the lay audience). If you take a utility function to be normative with respect to your actions, it’s not merely descriptive of your preferences, for some meanings of “preference”—not including, I would think, the definition Eliezer would use.
Using more ordinary language, a Kantian might have preferences about the outcomes of his actions, but doesn’t think such preferences are the primary concern in what one ought to do.
Using more ordinary language, a Kantian might have preferences about the outcomes of his actions, but doesn’t think such preferences are the primary concern in what one ought to do.
Oh. Well, that’s not a distinction that seems terribly important to me. I’m happy to talk about “preferences” as being (necessarily) causally related to one’s actions.
Utility functions are actually an extreme of consequentialism; they state that your actions should not just be based on consequences, but a weighted probability distribution over outcomes.
In that case, how could you be said to have preferences about outcomes without being a consequentialist?
Can we not have preferences without a utility function?
Hmm… I think Eliezer might have overstated his case a little (for the lay audience). If you take a utility function to be normative with respect to your actions, it’s not merely descriptive of your preferences, for some meanings of “preference”—not including, I would think, the definition Eliezer would use.
Using more ordinary language, a Kantian might have preferences about the outcomes of his actions, but doesn’t think such preferences are the primary concern in what one ought to do.
Oh. Well, that’s not a distinction that seems terribly important to me. I’m happy to talk about “preferences” as being (necessarily) causally related to one’s actions.