If there is no identity substance, then copies even outside the light cone matter. And even non-exact copies matter if the difference is almost unobservable. So I think that countable infinity is enough.
I suspect we don’t agree on what it means for something to matter. If outside the causal/observable cone (add dimensions to cover MWI if you like), the difference or similarity is by definition not observable.
And the distinction between “imaginary” and “real, but fully causally disconnected” is itself imaginary.
There is no identity substance, and only experience-reachable things matter. All agency and observation is embedded, there is no viewpoint from outside.
The problem with observables here is that there is another copy of me in another light cone, which has the same observables. So we can’t say that another light cone is unobservable—I am already there and observing it. This is a paradoxical property of big world immortality: it requires actually existing but causally disconnected copies, which contradicts some definitions of actuality.
BTW, can you comment below to Vladinir Nesov, who seems to think that first-person perspective is illusion and only third-person perspective is real?
who seems to think that first-person perspective is illusion and only third-person perspective is real
The taste of cheese is quite real, it’s just not a technical consideration relevant for chip design. Concepts worth noticing are usually meaningful in some way, but most of them are unclear and don’t offer a technical foothold in any given endeavor.
If there is no identity substance, then copies even outside the light cone matter. And even non-exact copies matter if the difference is almost unobservable. So I think that countable infinity is enough.
I suspect we don’t agree on what it means for something to matter. If outside the causal/observable cone (add dimensions to cover MWI if you like), the difference or similarity is by definition not observable.
And the distinction between “imaginary” and “real, but fully causally disconnected” is itself imaginary.
There is no identity substance, and only experience-reachable things matter. All agency and observation is embedded, there is no viewpoint from outside.
The problem with observables here is that there is another copy of me in another light cone, which has the same observables. So we can’t say that another light cone is unobservable—I am already there and observing it. This is a paradoxical property of big world immortality: it requires actually existing but causally disconnected copies, which contradicts some definitions of actuality.
BTW, can you comment below to Vladinir Nesov, who seems to think that first-person perspective is illusion and only third-person perspective is real?
The taste of cheese is quite real, it’s just not a technical consideration relevant for chip design. Concepts worth noticing are usually meaningful in some way, but most of them are unclear and don’t offer a technical foothold in any given endeavor.
I think that first perspective is meaningful as it allows me to treat my self as a random sample from some group of minds.