Yeah, I guess the preceding post needs some obvious amendments in light of this post (though the general point still stands). I hope people are smart enough to see them anyway.
I just don’t understand what sense it makes for a perfect Bayesian to distinguish between equivalent theories. Is it still honestly about “degrees of belief”, or is it now about those other informal properties that you list?
I just don’t understand what sense it makes for a perfect Bayesian to distinguish between equivalent theories.
No sense. It’s a correct thing to do if depth of understanding of these theories is valuable and one is not logically omnipotent, but using complexity-leading-to-improbability to justify this principle would be cargo cult Bayesianism.
The prior probability of a simple explanation is inherently greater than the prior probability of a complex explanation.
If all evidence/observation confirm both explanations equally, then the simple explanation still is on the lead: because it started out with a higher prior probability.
Yeah, I guess the preceding post needs some obvious amendments in light of this post (though the general point still stands). I hope people are smart enough to see them anyway.
I just don’t understand what sense it makes for a perfect Bayesian to distinguish between equivalent theories. Is it still honestly about “degrees of belief”, or is it now about those other informal properties that you list?
No sense. It’s a correct thing to do if depth of understanding of these theories is valuable and one is not logically omnipotent, but using complexity-leading-to-improbability to justify this principle would be cargo cult Bayesianism.
The prior probability of a simple explanation is inherently greater than the prior probability of a complex explanation.
If all evidence/observation confirm both explanations equally, then the simple explanation still is on the lead: because it started out with a higher prior probability.