Suppose that you update on the evidence that you experience conscious qualia
What exactly would it mean to perform a baysian update on you not experiencing qualia?
The only ontological primitive is my own mind.
The primitives of materialism are described in equations. Does a solipsist seek an equation to tell them how angry they will be next Tuesday? If not, what is the substance of a solipsistic model of the world?
This belief in some mysterious ability for the mental to supervene on the physical
I am not sure what you mean my that, I consider my mind to be just an arrangement of atoms. An arrangement governed by the same laws as the rest of the universe.
how puzzling is the view, that the activity of these little material things somehow is responsible for conscious qualia?
I am not sure where the instinct that consciousness can’t be materialistic comes from, although I would suspect that it might come from a large amount of uncertainty, and an inability to imagine any specific answer that you would consider a good explanation. Wherever this instinct comes from, I don’t think it is reliable.
You know that “if a tree falls in a forest, and there is no one there to hear it, does it make a sound?” thing. Even after all the factual questions, like if audio equipment would record something, have been answered, there is a feeling of a question remaining. I expect any explanation of qualia to look somewhat similar, a description of how mental imperfections produce a sensation of something.
Consider the limiting case of describing minds in terms of algorithms, you scan a philosophers brain, put the data into a computer, and predict exactly their discussion on qualia. Once you have a complete understanding of why the philosopher talks about qualia, if the philosopher has any info about qualia at all, the process by which they gained that info should be part of the model.
Pick something up, drop it, watch it fall. Can solipsism consider this observation to be more likely than some max entropy observation? How does a solipsist predict the experience of watching the object fall.
I am not sure where the instinct that consciousness can’t be materialistic comes from, although I would suspect that it might come from a large amount of uncertainty, and an inability to imagine any specific answer that you would consider a good explanation. Wherever this instinct comes from, I don’t think it is reliable.
The unstated background assumption of the article you are responding to is that the hard Problem is real and hard. It is certainly hard to dispute that we have made no progress in writing algorithms that experience sensations or feelings. Whether we ever will is another matter, but impossibility arguments exist.
I don’t know how your brain works either, but I am equally sure it is made of (atoms, quantum waves, strings or whatever).
Is that a falsifiable hypothesis? What would falsify it?
Consider the limiting case of describing minds in terms of algorithms, you scan a philosophers brain, put the data into a computer, and predict exactly their discussion on qualia. Once you have a complete understanding of why the philosopher talks about qualia, if the philosopher has any info about qualia at all, the process by which they gained that info should be part of the model.
That isn’t an understanding of a philosophers brain, it’s an artificial construct that produces the same outputs given the same inputs. The function of the human kidney can be replaced by a kidney dialysis machine ,but that does not mean kidneys do just exist,nor does it mean that you can understand how kidneys work by looking at dialysis machines.
What exactly would it mean to perform a baysian update on you not experiencing qualia?
Good point. In an anthropic sense, the sentence this is a reply to could be redacted. Experiencing qualia themselves would not be evidence to prefer one theory over another. Only experiencing certain types of observations would cause a meaningful update.
The primitives of materialism are described in equations. Does a solipsist seek an equation to tell them how angry they will be next Tuesday? If not, what is the substance of a solipsistic model of the world?
I think this is the same type of argument as saying that other people whom I observe seem to be very similar to me. The materialistic interpretation makes us believe in a less capricious world, but there’s the trouble of explaining how conscious results from material phenomena. This is similar to my thoughts on the final 4 paragraphs of what you wrote.
I am not sure what you mean my that, I consider my mind to be just an arrangement of atoms. An arrangement governed by the same laws as the rest of the universe.
I think that works well. But I don’t think that subjective experience falls out of this interpretation for free.
Someone that knows quantum physics but almost no computing looks at a phone. They don’t know how it works inside. They are uncertain about how apps result from material phenomenon. This is just normal uncertainty over a set of hypothesis. One of those hypotheses is the actual answer, many others will look like alternate choices of circuit board layout or programming language. They still need to find out how the phone works, but that is because they have many hypothesis that involve atoms. They have no reason to doubt that the phone is made of atoms.
I don’t know how your brain works either, but I am equally sure it is made of (atoms, quantum waves, strings or whatever). I apply the same to my own brain.
In the materialist paradigm I can understand Newtonian gravity as at least an approximation of whatever the real rules are. How does a solipsist consider it?
What exactly would it mean to perform a baysian update on you not experiencing qualia?
The primitives of materialism are described in equations. Does a solipsist seek an equation to tell them how angry they will be next Tuesday? If not, what is the substance of a solipsistic model of the world?
I am not sure what you mean my that, I consider my mind to be just an arrangement of atoms. An arrangement governed by the same laws as the rest of the universe.
I am not sure where the instinct that consciousness can’t be materialistic comes from, although I would suspect that it might come from a large amount of uncertainty, and an inability to imagine any specific answer that you would consider a good explanation. Wherever this instinct comes from, I don’t think it is reliable.
You know that “if a tree falls in a forest, and there is no one there to hear it, does it make a sound?” thing. Even after all the factual questions, like if audio equipment would record something, have been answered, there is a feeling of a question remaining. I expect any explanation of qualia to look somewhat similar, a description of how mental imperfections produce a sensation of something.
Consider the limiting case of describing minds in terms of algorithms, you scan a philosophers brain, put the data into a computer, and predict exactly their discussion on qualia. Once you have a complete understanding of why the philosopher talks about qualia, if the philosopher has any info about qualia at all, the process by which they gained that info should be part of the model.
Pick something up, drop it, watch it fall. Can solipsism consider this observation to be more likely than some max entropy observation? How does a solipsist predict the experience of watching the object fall.
The unstated background assumption of the article you are responding to is that the hard Problem is real and hard. It is certainly hard to dispute that we have made no progress in writing algorithms that experience sensations or feelings. Whether we ever will is another matter, but impossibility arguments exist.
Is that a falsifiable hypothesis? What would falsify it?
That isn’t an understanding of a philosophers brain, it’s an artificial construct that produces the same outputs given the same inputs. The function of the human kidney can be replaced by a kidney dialysis machine ,but that does not mean kidneys do just exist,nor does it mean that you can understand how kidneys work by looking at dialysis machines.
Thanks! This is insightful.
Good point. In an anthropic sense, the sentence this is a reply to could be redacted. Experiencing qualia themselves would not be evidence to prefer one theory over another. Only experiencing certain types of observations would cause a meaningful update.
I think this is the same type of argument as saying that other people whom I observe seem to be very similar to me. The materialistic interpretation makes us believe in a less capricious world, but there’s the trouble of explaining how conscious results from material phenomena. This is similar to my thoughts on the final 4 paragraphs of what you wrote.
I think that works well. But I don’t think that subjective experience falls out of this interpretation for free.
Someone that knows quantum physics but almost no computing looks at a phone. They don’t know how it works inside. They are uncertain about how apps result from material phenomenon. This is just normal uncertainty over a set of hypothesis. One of those hypotheses is the actual answer, many others will look like alternate choices of circuit board layout or programming language. They still need to find out how the phone works, but that is because they have many hypothesis that involve atoms. They have no reason to doubt that the phone is made of atoms.
I don’t know how your brain works either, but I am equally sure it is made of (atoms, quantum waves, strings or whatever). I apply the same to my own brain.
In the materialist paradigm I can understand Newtonian gravity as at least an approximation of whatever the real rules are. How does a solipsist consider it?