I am not sure where the instinct that consciousness can’t be materialistic comes from, although I would suspect that it might come from a large amount of uncertainty, and an inability to imagine any specific answer that you would consider a good explanation. Wherever this instinct comes from, I don’t think it is reliable.
The unstated background assumption of the article you are responding to is that the hard Problem is real and hard. It is certainly hard to dispute that we have made no progress in writing algorithms that experience sensations or feelings. Whether we ever will is another matter, but impossibility arguments exist.
I don’t know how your brain works either, but I am equally sure it is made of (atoms, quantum waves, strings or whatever).
Is that a falsifiable hypothesis? What would falsify it?
The unstated background assumption of the article you are responding to is that the hard Problem is real and hard. It is certainly hard to dispute that we have made no progress in writing algorithms that experience sensations or feelings. Whether we ever will is another matter, but impossibility arguments exist.
Is that a falsifiable hypothesis? What would falsify it?