What exactly would it mean to perform a baysian update on you not experiencing qualia?
Good point. In an anthropic sense, the sentence this is a reply to could be redacted. Experiencing qualia themselves would not be evidence to prefer one theory over another. Only experiencing certain types of observations would cause a meaningful update.
The primitives of materialism are described in equations. Does a solipsist seek an equation to tell them how angry they will be next Tuesday? If not, what is the substance of a solipsistic model of the world?
I think this is the same type of argument as saying that other people whom I observe seem to be very similar to me. The materialistic interpretation makes us believe in a less capricious world, but there’s the trouble of explaining how conscious results from material phenomena. This is similar to my thoughts on the final 4 paragraphs of what you wrote.
I am not sure what you mean my that, I consider my mind to be just an arrangement of atoms. An arrangement governed by the same laws as the rest of the universe.
I think that works well. But I don’t think that subjective experience falls out of this interpretation for free.
Someone that knows quantum physics but almost no computing looks at a phone. They don’t know how it works inside. They are uncertain about how apps result from material phenomenon. This is just normal uncertainty over a set of hypothesis. One of those hypotheses is the actual answer, many others will look like alternate choices of circuit board layout or programming language. They still need to find out how the phone works, but that is because they have many hypothesis that involve atoms. They have no reason to doubt that the phone is made of atoms.
I don’t know how your brain works either, but I am equally sure it is made of (atoms, quantum waves, strings or whatever). I apply the same to my own brain.
In the materialist paradigm I can understand Newtonian gravity as at least an approximation of whatever the real rules are. How does a solipsist consider it?
Thanks! This is insightful.
Good point. In an anthropic sense, the sentence this is a reply to could be redacted. Experiencing qualia themselves would not be evidence to prefer one theory over another. Only experiencing certain types of observations would cause a meaningful update.
I think this is the same type of argument as saying that other people whom I observe seem to be very similar to me. The materialistic interpretation makes us believe in a less capricious world, but there’s the trouble of explaining how conscious results from material phenomena. This is similar to my thoughts on the final 4 paragraphs of what you wrote.
I think that works well. But I don’t think that subjective experience falls out of this interpretation for free.
Someone that knows quantum physics but almost no computing looks at a phone. They don’t know how it works inside. They are uncertain about how apps result from material phenomenon. This is just normal uncertainty over a set of hypothesis. One of those hypotheses is the actual answer, many others will look like alternate choices of circuit board layout or programming language. They still need to find out how the phone works, but that is because they have many hypothesis that involve atoms. They have no reason to doubt that the phone is made of atoms.
I don’t know how your brain works either, but I am equally sure it is made of (atoms, quantum waves, strings or whatever). I apply the same to my own brain.
In the materialist paradigm I can understand Newtonian gravity as at least an approximation of whatever the real rules are. How does a solipsist consider it?