Just as it’s impossible to tell whether or not you’re a brain in a vat, it’s also impossible to tell whether or not you’re insane.
Well, it’s possible to tell that I’m insane in particular ways. For example, I’ve had the experience of reasoning my way to the conclusion that certain of my experiences were delusional. (This was after I’d suffered traumatic brain damage and was outright hallucinating some of the time.) For example, if syndrome X causes paranoia but not delusions, I can ask other people who know me whether I’m being paranoid and choose to believe them when they say “yes” (even if my strong intuition is that they’re just saying that because they’re part of the conspiracy, on the grounds that my suffering from syndrome X is more likely (from an outside view) than that I’ve discovered an otherwise perfectly concealed conspiracy.
It’s also possible to tell that I’m not suffering from specific forms of insanity. E.g., if nobody tells me I’m being paranoid, and they instead tell me that my belief that I’m being persecuted is consistent with the observations I report, I can be fairly confident that I don’t suffer from syndrome X.
Of course, there might be certain forms of insanity that I can’t tell I’m not suffering from.
The forms of insanity that you can’t tell if you’re suffering from invalidate your interpretation that there are specific kinds of insanity you can rule out, no? Mainly though, I was aware that the example had issues, but I was trying to get a concept across in general terms and didn’t want to muddle my point by getting bogged down in details or clarifications.
The forms of insanity that you can’t tell if you’re suffering from invalidate your interpretation that there are specific kinds of insanity you can rule out, no?
I’m not sure exactly what you mean by invalidating my interpretation. If you mean that, because there are forms of insanity I can’t tell if I’m suffering from, there are therefore no forms of insanity that I can rule out, then no, I don’t think that’s true.
And, please don’t feel obligated to defend assertions you don’t endorse upon reflection.
If you mean that, because there are forms of insanity I can’t tell if I’m suffering from, there are therefore no forms of insanity that I can rule out, then no, I don’t think that’s true.
Well, for example, consider a form of insanity X that leads to paranoia but is not compatible with delusion.
Suppose ask a randomly selected group of psychologists to evaluate whether I’m paranoid and they all report that I’m not.
Now I ask myself, “am I suffering from X?”
I reason as follows:
Given those premises, if I am paranoid, psychologists will probably report that I’m paranoid.
If I’m not delusional and psychologists report I’m paranoid, I will probably experience that report.
I do not experience that report.
Therefore, if I’m not delusional, psychologists probably have not reported that I’m paranoid.
Therefore, if I’m not delusional, I’m probably not paranoid.
If I suffered from X, I would be paranoid but not delusional.
Therefore, I probably don’t suffer from X.
Now, if you want to argue that I still can’t rule out X, because that’s just a probabilistic statement, well, OK. I also can’t rule out that I’m actually a butterfly. In that case, I don’t care whether I can rule something out or not, but I’ll agree with you and tap out here.
But if we agree that probabilistic statements are good enough for our purposes, then I submit that X is a form of insanity I can rule out.
Now, I would certainly agree that for all forms of insanity Y that cause delusions of sanity, I can’t rule out suffering from Y. And I also agree that for all forms of insanity Z that neither cause nor preclude such delusions, I can’t rule out suffering from (Z AND Y), though I can rule out suffering from Z in isolation.
a form of insanity X that leads to paranoia but is not compatible with delusion.
But how would a possibly insane person determine that insanity X is a possible kind of insanity? Or, how would they determine that the Law of Noncontradiction is actually a thing that exists as opposed to some insane sort of delusion?
Now, if you want to argue that I still can’t rule out X, because that’s just a probabilistic statement, well, OK. I also can’t rule out that I’m actually a butterfly. In that case, I don’t care whether I can rule something out or not, but I’ll agree with you and tap out here.
But if we agree that probabilistic statements are good enough for our purposes, then I submit that X is a form of insanity I can rule out.
I was talking about how we should regard unknowable puzzles (ignore them, mostly), like the butterfly thing, so I thought it was clear that I’ve been speaking in terms of possibilities this entire time. Obviously I’m not actually thinking that I’m insane. If I were, that’d just be crazy of me.
Also, this approach presumes that your understanding of the way probabilities work and of the existence of probability at all is accurate. Using the concept of probability to justify your position here is just a very sneaky sort of circular argument (unintentional, clearly, I don’t mean anything rude by this).
how would a possibly insane person determine that insanity X is a possible kind of insanity?
Perhaps they couldn’t. I’m not sure what that has to do with anything.
Also, this approach presumes that your understanding of the way probabilities work and of the existence of probability at all is accurate. Using the concept of probability to justify your position here is just a very sneaky sort of circular argument
Sure. If I’m wrong about how probability works, then I might be wrong about whether I can rule out having X-type insanity (and also might be wrong about whether I can rule out being a butterfly).
Perhaps they couldn’t. I’m not sure what that has to do with anything.
I didn’t think that your argument could function on even a probabilistic level without the assumption that X-insanity is an objectively real type of insanity. On second thought, I think your argument functions just as well as it would have otherwise.
If it’s not an objectively real type of insanity, then I can certainly rule out the possibility that I suffer from it. If it is, then the assumption is justified.
Well, it’s possible to tell that I’m insane in particular ways. For example, I’ve had the experience of reasoning my way to the conclusion that certain of my experiences were delusional. (This was after I’d suffered traumatic brain damage and was outright hallucinating some of the time.) For example, if syndrome X causes paranoia but not delusions, I can ask other people who know me whether I’m being paranoid and choose to believe them when they say “yes” (even if my strong intuition is that they’re just saying that because they’re part of the conspiracy, on the grounds that my suffering from syndrome X is more likely (from an outside view) than that I’ve discovered an otherwise perfectly concealed conspiracy.
It’s also possible to tell that I’m not suffering from specific forms of insanity. E.g., if nobody tells me I’m being paranoid, and they instead tell me that my belief that I’m being persecuted is consistent with the observations I report, I can be fairly confident that I don’t suffer from syndrome X.
Of course, there might be certain forms of insanity that I can’t tell I’m not suffering from.
The forms of insanity that you can’t tell if you’re suffering from invalidate your interpretation that there are specific kinds of insanity you can rule out, no? Mainly though, I was aware that the example had issues, but I was trying to get a concept across in general terms and didn’t want to muddle my point by getting bogged down in details or clarifications.
I’m not sure exactly what you mean by invalidating my interpretation. If you mean that, because there are forms of insanity I can’t tell if I’m suffering from, there are therefore no forms of insanity that I can rule out, then no, I don’t think that’s true.
And, please don’t feel obligated to defend assertions you don’t endorse upon reflection.
Why not?
Well, for example, consider a form of insanity X that leads to paranoia but is not compatible with delusion.
Suppose ask a randomly selected group of psychologists to evaluate whether I’m paranoid and they all report that I’m not.
Now I ask myself, “am I suffering from X?”
I reason as follows:
Given those premises, if I am paranoid, psychologists will probably report that I’m paranoid.
If I’m not delusional and psychologists report I’m paranoid, I will probably experience that report.
I do not experience that report.
Therefore, if I’m not delusional, psychologists probably have not reported that I’m paranoid.
Therefore, if I’m not delusional, I’m probably not paranoid.
If I suffered from X, I would be paranoid but not delusional.
Therefore, I probably don’t suffer from X.
Now, if you want to argue that I still can’t rule out X, because that’s just a probabilistic statement, well, OK. I also can’t rule out that I’m actually a butterfly. In that case, I don’t care whether I can rule something out or not, but I’ll agree with you and tap out here.
But if we agree that probabilistic statements are good enough for our purposes, then I submit that X is a form of insanity I can rule out.
Now, I would certainly agree that for all forms of insanity Y that cause delusions of sanity, I can’t rule out suffering from Y. And I also agree that for all forms of insanity Z that neither cause nor preclude such delusions, I can’t rule out suffering from (Z AND Y), though I can rule out suffering from Z in isolation.
But how would a possibly insane person determine that insanity X is a possible kind of insanity? Or, how would they determine that the Law of Noncontradiction is actually a thing that exists as opposed to some insane sort of delusion?
I was talking about how we should regard unknowable puzzles (ignore them, mostly), like the butterfly thing, so I thought it was clear that I’ve been speaking in terms of possibilities this entire time. Obviously I’m not actually thinking that I’m insane. If I were, that’d just be crazy of me.
Also, this approach presumes that your understanding of the way probabilities work and of the existence of probability at all is accurate. Using the concept of probability to justify your position here is just a very sneaky sort of circular argument (unintentional, clearly, I don’t mean anything rude by this).
Perhaps they couldn’t. I’m not sure what that has to do with anything.
Sure. If I’m wrong about how probability works, then I might be wrong about whether I can rule out having X-type insanity (and also might be wrong about whether I can rule out being a butterfly).
I didn’t think that your argument could function on even a probabilistic level without the assumption that X-insanity is an objectively real type of insanity. On second thought, I think your argument functions just as well as it would have otherwise.
If it’s not an objectively real type of insanity, then I can certainly rule out the possibility that I suffer from it. If it is, then the assumption is justified.