a form of insanity X that leads to paranoia but is not compatible with delusion.
But how would a possibly insane person determine that insanity X is a possible kind of insanity? Or, how would they determine that the Law of Noncontradiction is actually a thing that exists as opposed to some insane sort of delusion?
Now, if you want to argue that I still can’t rule out X, because that’s just a probabilistic statement, well, OK. I also can’t rule out that I’m actually a butterfly. In that case, I don’t care whether I can rule something out or not, but I’ll agree with you and tap out here.
But if we agree that probabilistic statements are good enough for our purposes, then I submit that X is a form of insanity I can rule out.
I was talking about how we should regard unknowable puzzles (ignore them, mostly), like the butterfly thing, so I thought it was clear that I’ve been speaking in terms of possibilities this entire time. Obviously I’m not actually thinking that I’m insane. If I were, that’d just be crazy of me.
Also, this approach presumes that your understanding of the way probabilities work and of the existence of probability at all is accurate. Using the concept of probability to justify your position here is just a very sneaky sort of circular argument (unintentional, clearly, I don’t mean anything rude by this).
how would a possibly insane person determine that insanity X is a possible kind of insanity?
Perhaps they couldn’t. I’m not sure what that has to do with anything.
Also, this approach presumes that your understanding of the way probabilities work and of the existence of probability at all is accurate. Using the concept of probability to justify your position here is just a very sneaky sort of circular argument
Sure. If I’m wrong about how probability works, then I might be wrong about whether I can rule out having X-type insanity (and also might be wrong about whether I can rule out being a butterfly).
Perhaps they couldn’t. I’m not sure what that has to do with anything.
I didn’t think that your argument could function on even a probabilistic level without the assumption that X-insanity is an objectively real type of insanity. On second thought, I think your argument functions just as well as it would have otherwise.
If it’s not an objectively real type of insanity, then I can certainly rule out the possibility that I suffer from it. If it is, then the assumption is justified.
But how would a possibly insane person determine that insanity X is a possible kind of insanity? Or, how would they determine that the Law of Noncontradiction is actually a thing that exists as opposed to some insane sort of delusion?
I was talking about how we should regard unknowable puzzles (ignore them, mostly), like the butterfly thing, so I thought it was clear that I’ve been speaking in terms of possibilities this entire time. Obviously I’m not actually thinking that I’m insane. If I were, that’d just be crazy of me.
Also, this approach presumes that your understanding of the way probabilities work and of the existence of probability at all is accurate. Using the concept of probability to justify your position here is just a very sneaky sort of circular argument (unintentional, clearly, I don’t mean anything rude by this).
Perhaps they couldn’t. I’m not sure what that has to do with anything.
Sure. If I’m wrong about how probability works, then I might be wrong about whether I can rule out having X-type insanity (and also might be wrong about whether I can rule out being a butterfly).
I didn’t think that your argument could function on even a probabilistic level without the assumption that X-insanity is an objectively real type of insanity. On second thought, I think your argument functions just as well as it would have otherwise.
If it’s not an objectively real type of insanity, then I can certainly rule out the possibility that I suffer from it. If it is, then the assumption is justified.