how would a possibly insane person determine that insanity X is a possible kind of insanity?
Perhaps they couldn’t. I’m not sure what that has to do with anything.
Also, this approach presumes that your understanding of the way probabilities work and of the existence of probability at all is accurate. Using the concept of probability to justify your position here is just a very sneaky sort of circular argument
Sure. If I’m wrong about how probability works, then I might be wrong about whether I can rule out having X-type insanity (and also might be wrong about whether I can rule out being a butterfly).
Perhaps they couldn’t. I’m not sure what that has to do with anything.
I didn’t think that your argument could function on even a probabilistic level without the assumption that X-insanity is an objectively real type of insanity. On second thought, I think your argument functions just as well as it would have otherwise.
If it’s not an objectively real type of insanity, then I can certainly rule out the possibility that I suffer from it. If it is, then the assumption is justified.
Perhaps they couldn’t. I’m not sure what that has to do with anything.
Sure. If I’m wrong about how probability works, then I might be wrong about whether I can rule out having X-type insanity (and also might be wrong about whether I can rule out being a butterfly).
I didn’t think that your argument could function on even a probabilistic level without the assumption that X-insanity is an objectively real type of insanity. On second thought, I think your argument functions just as well as it would have otherwise.
If it’s not an objectively real type of insanity, then I can certainly rule out the possibility that I suffer from it. If it is, then the assumption is justified.