The USA has 120,022,084 people fit for military service according to Wikipedia.
(...)
That’s 0.22% of the number of soldiers.
Excuse me? You are taking the number of military-age males and using it as the number of soldiers! The actual US armed forces are a few million. 5% would be a much better estimate. This aside, you are ignoring that “lethal autonomy” is nowhere near the same thing as “operational autonomy”. A Predator drone requires more people to run it—fuelling, arming, polishing the paint—than a fighter aircraft does.
Of course, once the killer robots are made, then they can just use them to coerce the maintenance and logistics people.
How? “Do as I say, or else I’ll order you to fire up the drones on your base and have them shoot you!” And while you might credibly threaten to instead order the people on the next base over to fire up their drones, well, now you’ve started a civil war in your own armed forces. Why will that work better with drones than with rifles?
Again, you are confusing lethal with operational autonomy. A lethally-autonomous robot is just a weapon whose operator is well out of range at the moment of killing. It still has to be pointed in the general direction of the enemy, loaded, fuelled, and launched; and you still have to convince the people doing the work that it needs to be done.
A Predator drone requires more people to run it—fuelling, arming, polishing the paint—than a fighter aircraft does.
It does? I would’ve guessed the exact opposite and that the difference would be by a large margin: drones are smaller, eliminate all the equipment necessary to support a human, don’t have to be man-rated, and are expected to have drastically less performance in terms of going supersonic or executing high-g maneuvers.
Yes. An F-16 requires 100 support personnel; a Predator 168; a Reaper, 180. Source.
It seems like some but not all of the difference is that manned planes have only a single pilot, whereas UAV’s not only have multiple pilots, but also perform much more analysis on recorded data and split the job of piloting up into multiple subtasks for different people, since they are not limited by the need to have only 1 or 2 people controlling the plane.
If I had to guess, some of the remaining difference is probably due to the need to maintain the equipment connecting the pilots to the UAV, in addition to the UAV itself; the most high-profile UAV failure thus far was due to a failure in the connection between the pilots and the UAV.
I’m not sure that’s comparing apples and oranges. From the citation for the Predator figure:
About 168 people are needed to keep a single Predator aloft for 24 hours, according to the Air Force. The larger Global Hawk surveillance drone requires 300 people. In contrast, an F-16 fighter aircraft needs fewer than 100 people per mission.
I’m not sure how long the average mission for an F-16 is, but if it’s less than ~12 hours, then the Predator would seem to have a manpower advantage; and the CRS paper cited also specifically says:
In addition to having lower operating costs per flight hour, specialized unmanned aircraft systems can reduce flight hours for fighter aircraft
The F-16 seems to have a maximum endurance of 3-4 hours, so I’m pretty sure its average mission is less than 12 hours.
My understanding was that Rolf’s argument depended on the ratio personnel:plane, not on the ratio personnel:flight hour; the latter is more relevant for reconnaissance, ground attack against hidden targets, or potentially for strikes at range, whereas the former is more relevant for air superiority or short range strikes.
The actual US armed forces are a few million. 5% would be a much better estimate. This aside, you are ignoring that “lethal autonomy” is nowhere near the same thing as “operational autonomy”. A Predator drone requires more people to run it—fuelling, arming, polishing the paint—than a fighter aircraft does.
If you are getting >6x more flight-hours out of a drone for 6x for an increased man power of <2x—even if you keep the manpower constant and shrink the size of the fleet to compensate for that <2x manpower penalty, you’ve still got a new fleet which is somewhere around 6x more lethal. Or you could take the tradeoff even further and have an equally lethal fleet with a small fraction of the total manpower, because each drone goes so much further than its equivalent. So a drone fleet off similar lethality does have more operational autonomy!
That’s why per flight hour costs matter—because ultimately, the entire point of having these airplanes is to fly them.
Would you happen to be able to provide these figures:
The ratio of human resources-to-firepower on the current generation of weapons.
The ratio of human resources-to-firepower on the weapons used during eras where oppression was common.
I’d like to compare them.
Hmm, “firepower” is vague. I think the relevant number here would be something along the lines of how many people can be killed or subdued in a conflict situation.
I have no idea; as I said, my expectations are just guesses based on broad principles (slow planes are cheaper than ultra-fast planes; clunk planes are cheaper than ultra-maneuverable ones; machines whose failure do not immediately kill humans are cheaper to make than machines whose failure do entail human death; the cheapest, lightest, and easiest to maintain machine parts are the ones that aren’t there). You should ask Rolf, since apparently he’s knowledgeable in the topic.
Would you happen to be able to provide these figures:
The ratio of human resources-to-firepower on the current generation of weapons.
The ratio of human resources-to-firepower on the weapons used during eras where oppression was common.
I’d like to compare them.
Hmm, “firepower” is vague. I think the relevant number here would be something along the lines of how many people can be killed or subdued in a conflict situation.
Excuse me? You are taking the number of military-age males and using it as the number of soldiers!
Yes!
The actual US armed forces are a few million. 5% would be a much better estimate.
If the question here is “How many people are currently in the military” my figure is wrong. However, that’s not the question. The question is “In the event that a robot army tries to take over the American population, how many American soldiers might there be to defend America?” You’re estimating in a different context than the one in my comment.
This aside, you are ignoring that “lethal autonomy” is nowhere near the same thing as “operational autonomy”
Actually, if you’re defining “operational autonomy” as “how many people it takes to run weapons”, I did address that when I said “I’m not sure how many maintenance people and logistics people it would require, but even if we double that .22%, we still have only .44%.” If you have better estimates, would you share them?
How? “Do as I say, or else I’ll order you to fire up the drones on your base and have them shoot you!”
Method A. They could wait until the country is in turmoil and prey on people’s irrationality like Hitler did.
Method B. They could get those people to operate the drones under the guise of fighting for a good cause. Then they could threaten to use the army to kill anyone who opposes them. This doesn’t have to be sudden—it could happen quite gradually, as a series of small and oppressive steps and rules wrapped in doublespeak that eventually lead up to complete tyranny. If people don’t realize that most other people disagree with the tyrant, they will feel threatened and probably comply in order to survive.
Method C. Check out the Milgram experiment. Those people didn’t even need to be coerced to apply lethal force. It’s a lot easier than you think.
Method D. If they can get just a small group to operate a small number of drones, they can coerce a larger group of people to operate more drones. With the larger group of people operating drones, they can coerce even more people, and so on.
Why will that work better with drones than with rifles?
This all depends on the ratio of people it takes to operate the weapons vs. number of people the weapons can subdue. Your perception appears to be that predator drones require more people to run them than a fighter aircraft. My perception is that it doesn’t matter how many people it takes to operate a predator drone because war technology is likely to be optimized further than it is today, and if it is possible to decrease the number of people it requires to build/maintain/run/etc. the killer robots significantly below the number of people it would take to get the same amount of firepower otherwise, then of course they can take over a population more easily.
A high firepower to human resource ratio means takeovers would work better.
A lethally-autonomous robot is just a weapon whose operator is well out of range at the moment of killing.
That’s not what Suarez says. Even if he’s wrong do you deny that it’s likely that technology will advance to the point where people can make robots capable of killing without a human making the decision? That’s what this conversation is about. Don’t let us get all mixed up like Eliezer warns us about in 37 ways words can be wrong. If we’re talking about robots that can kill without a human’s decision, those are a threat, and could potentially reduce the human resources-to-firepower ratio enough to threaten democracy. If you want to disagree with me about what words I should use to speak about this, that’s great. In that case, though, I’d like to know where your credible sources are so that I can read authoritative definitions please.
and you still have to convince the people doing the work that it needs to be done.
What prevents these methods from being used with rifles? What is special about robots in this context?
Even if he’s wrong do you deny that it’s likely that technology will advance to the point where people can make robots capable of killing without a human making the decision?
No, we already have those. The decision to kill has nothing to do with it. The decisions of where to put the robot, and its ammunition, and the fuel, and everything else it needs, so that it’s in a position to make the decision to kill, is what we cannot yet do programmatically. You’re confusing tactics and strategy. You cannot run an army without strategic decisionmakers. Robots are not in a position to do that for, I would guess, at least twenty years.
Hitler.
Milgram experiment.
Number of sociopaths: 1 in 20.
Is rationality taught in school?: No.
Ok, so this being so, how come we don’t already have oppressive societies being run with plain old rifles?
Excuse me? You are taking the number of military-age males and using it as the number of soldiers! The actual US armed forces are a few million. 5% would be a much better estimate. This aside, you are ignoring that “lethal autonomy” is nowhere near the same thing as “operational autonomy”. A Predator drone requires more people to run it—fuelling, arming, polishing the paint—than a fighter aircraft does.
How? “Do as I say, or else I’ll order you to fire up the drones on your base and have them shoot you!” And while you might credibly threaten to instead order the people on the next base over to fire up their drones, well, now you’ve started a civil war in your own armed forces. Why will that work better with drones than with rifles?
Again, you are confusing lethal with operational autonomy. A lethally-autonomous robot is just a weapon whose operator is well out of range at the moment of killing. It still has to be pointed in the general direction of the enemy, loaded, fuelled, and launched; and you still have to convince the people doing the work that it needs to be done.
It does? I would’ve guessed the exact opposite and that the difference would be by a large margin: drones are smaller, eliminate all the equipment necessary to support a human, don’t have to be man-rated, and are expected to have drastically less performance in terms of going supersonic or executing high-g maneuvers.
Yes. An F-16 requires 100 support personnel; a Predator 168; a Reaper, 180. Source.
It seems like some but not all of the difference is that manned planes have only a single pilot, whereas UAV’s not only have multiple pilots, but also perform much more analysis on recorded data and split the job of piloting up into multiple subtasks for different people, since they are not limited by the need to have only 1 or 2 people controlling the plane.
If I had to guess, some of the remaining difference is probably due to the need to maintain the equipment connecting the pilots to the UAV, in addition to the UAV itself; the most high-profile UAV failure thus far was due to a failure in the connection between the pilots and the UAV.
I’m not sure that’s comparing apples and oranges. From the citation for the Predator figure:
I’m not sure how long the average mission for an F-16 is, but if it’s less than ~12 hours, then the Predator would seem to have a manpower advantage; and the CRS paper cited also specifically says:
The F-16 seems to have a maximum endurance of 3-4 hours, so I’m pretty sure its average mission is less than 12 hours.
My understanding was that Rolf’s argument depended on the ratio personnel:plane, not on the ratio personnel:flight hour; the latter is more relevant for reconnaissance, ground attack against hidden targets, or potentially for strikes at range, whereas the former is more relevant for air superiority or short range strikes.
I don’t think it saves Rolf’s point:
If you are getting >6x more flight-hours out of a drone for 6x for an increased man power of <2x—even if you keep the manpower constant and shrink the size of the fleet to compensate for that <2x manpower penalty, you’ve still got a new fleet which is somewhere around 6x more lethal. Or you could take the tradeoff even further and have an equally lethal fleet with a small fraction of the total manpower, because each drone goes so much further than its equivalent. So a drone fleet off similar lethality does have more operational autonomy!
That’s why per flight hour costs matter—because ultimately, the entire point of having these airplanes is to fly them.
Would you happen to be able to provide these figures:
The ratio of human resources-to-firepower on the current generation of weapons.
The ratio of human resources-to-firepower on the weapons used during eras where oppression was common.
I’d like to compare them.
Hmm, “firepower” is vague. I think the relevant number here would be something along the lines of how many people can be killed or subdued in a conflict situation.
I have no idea; as I said, my expectations are just guesses based on broad principles (slow planes are cheaper than ultra-fast planes; clunk planes are cheaper than ultra-maneuverable ones; machines whose failure do not immediately kill humans are cheaper to make than machines whose failure do entail human death; the cheapest, lightest, and easiest to maintain machine parts are the ones that aren’t there). You should ask Rolf, since apparently he’s knowledgeable in the topic.
Thanks. I will ask Rolf.
Would you happen to be able to provide these figures:
The ratio of human resources-to-firepower on the current generation of weapons.
The ratio of human resources-to-firepower on the weapons used during eras where oppression was common.
I’d like to compare them.
Hmm, “firepower” is vague. I think the relevant number here would be something along the lines of how many people can be killed or subdued in a conflict situation.
Yes!
If the question here is “How many people are currently in the military” my figure is wrong. However, that’s not the question. The question is “In the event that a robot army tries to take over the American population, how many American soldiers might there be to defend America?” You’re estimating in a different context than the one in my comment.
Actually, if you’re defining “operational autonomy” as “how many people it takes to run weapons”, I did address that when I said “I’m not sure how many maintenance people and logistics people it would require, but even if we double that .22%, we still have only .44%.” If you have better estimates, would you share them?
Method A. They could wait until the country is in turmoil and prey on people’s irrationality like Hitler did.
Method B. They could get those people to operate the drones under the guise of fighting for a good cause. Then they could threaten to use the army to kill anyone who opposes them. This doesn’t have to be sudden—it could happen quite gradually, as a series of small and oppressive steps and rules wrapped in doublespeak that eventually lead up to complete tyranny. If people don’t realize that most other people disagree with the tyrant, they will feel threatened and probably comply in order to survive.
Method C. Check out the Milgram experiment. Those people didn’t even need to be coerced to apply lethal force. It’s a lot easier than you think.
Method D. If they can get just a small group to operate a small number of drones, they can coerce a larger group of people to operate more drones. With the larger group of people operating drones, they can coerce even more people, and so on.
This all depends on the ratio of people it takes to operate the weapons vs. number of people the weapons can subdue. Your perception appears to be that predator drones require more people to run them than a fighter aircraft. My perception is that it doesn’t matter how many people it takes to operate a predator drone because war technology is likely to be optimized further than it is today, and if it is possible to decrease the number of people it requires to build/maintain/run/etc. the killer robots significantly below the number of people it would take to get the same amount of firepower otherwise, then of course they can take over a population more easily.
A high firepower to human resource ratio means takeovers would work better.
That’s not what Suarez says. Even if he’s wrong do you deny that it’s likely that technology will advance to the point where people can make robots capable of killing without a human making the decision? That’s what this conversation is about. Don’t let us get all mixed up like Eliezer warns us about in 37 ways words can be wrong. If we’re talking about robots that can kill without a human’s decision, those are a threat, and could potentially reduce the human resources-to-firepower ratio enough to threaten democracy. If you want to disagree with me about what words I should use to speak about this, that’s great. In that case, though, I’d like to know where your credible sources are so that I can read authoritative definitions please.
Hitler.
Milgram experiment.
Number of sociopaths: 1 in 20.
Is rationality taught in school?: No.
What prevents these methods from being used with rifles? What is special about robots in this context?
No, we already have those. The decision to kill has nothing to do with it. The decisions of where to put the robot, and its ammunition, and the fuel, and everything else it needs, so that it’s in a position to make the decision to kill, is what we cannot yet do programmatically. You’re confusing tactics and strategy. You cannot run an army without strategic decisionmakers. Robots are not in a position to do that for, I would guess, at least twenty years.
Ok, so this being so, how come we don’t already have oppressive societies being run with plain old rifles?