I feel the term “repugnant conclusion” is unfair, and biases people against accepting the said “repugnant conclusion”, regardless of whether or not the “repugnant conclusion” is, in fact, something one might want to accept. Maybe you could instead call the “repugnant conclusion” something like “the happiness-sharing principle”, if you wanted more people to accept it.
I feel that the fact that people are presented with the repugnant conclusion only in the context of the mere addition paradox (whereas adding happy people and redistributing utility are often presented on their own) is unfair ^_^
I am more inclined to reject the premise about adding very happy lives increasing overall happiness. If inequality is bad, adding very happy lives to a larger population produces more inequality than adding them to a smaller population. If the population is large enough, adding the happy lives can decrease overall utility.
Freaky. Adding very happy lives at no cost to others seems like an unqualified win to me. I do reject the idea that inequality is always bad, which probably explains our disagreement on this.
Visible, salient inequality can reduce both gross and net happiness in some populations, but that’s not a necessary part of moral reasoning, just an observed situation of current humanity.
I don’t see how you can distinguish the two? For a ethical belief that has direct practical implications (e.g. “eating animals is bad”), you can accuse someone of being hypocritical by pointing out that they don’t actually act that way (e.g. they eat a lot of meat). But the repugnant conclusion isn’t directly applicable to practical decisions—nothing an individual can do will change the world enough to bring it about, and the repugnant conclusion doesn’t directly imply anything about the marginal value of quality vs. quantity of lives.
If you mean you don’t believe I would take practical steps that favored the supposedly repugnant conclusion if I had a choice, then you are mistaken. For example, I am opposed to the use of contraception because it keeps population lower, and I would maintain this opposition even if it were clearly shown that with the increasing population, the standard of living would continue to decline until everyone’s lives were barely worth living. This affects me in practical ways such as what I try to persuade other people to do, what I would vote for, what I would do myself in regard to a family, and so on.
First of all, this is rude, especially if I am woman myself.
Second, I am interested in increasing the population, but I am also interested in other things. (And this does not mean that I want these other things and a low population instead of a high population; I expect a high population to happen whether or not I am involved in bringing it about, so I can achieve both goals by working mainly for the other goals.)
Eh, I concede you have a point there re actively working toward spreading utility as thin as possible. I still have trouble believing that you truly mean what you say. But hey, I’ve been wrong before.
I accept the “repugnant” conclusion, on its own merits, namely because it seems obviously true to me.
I feel the term “repugnant conclusion” is unfair, and biases people against accepting the said “repugnant conclusion”, regardless of whether or not the “repugnant conclusion” is, in fact, something one might want to accept. Maybe you could instead call the “repugnant conclusion” something like “the happiness-sharing principle”, if you wanted more people to accept it.
I feel that the fact that people are presented with the repugnant conclusion only in the context of the mere addition paradox (whereas adding happy people and redistributing utility are often presented on their own) is unfair ^_^
I find it repugnant. It doesn’t come up much for me, though—I reject #2. Redistributing happiness can be net negative.
Yes, I’m pretty skeptical of #2 as well. At least it doesn’t seem obviously true.
I am more inclined to reject the premise about adding very happy lives increasing overall happiness. If inequality is bad, adding very happy lives to a larger population produces more inequality than adding them to a smaller population. If the population is large enough, adding the happy lives can decrease overall utility.
That isn’t one of the premises—it didn’t say very happy, it just said happy—at least minimally happy.
So, your rejection is significantly stronger than needed in order to dodge the repugnant conclusion. It’s also more dubious.
Freaky. Adding very happy lives at no cost to others seems like an unqualified win to me. I do reject the idea that inequality is always bad, which probably explains our disagreement on this.
Visible, salient inequality can reduce both gross and net happiness in some populations, but that’s not a necessary part of moral reasoning, just an observed situation of current humanity.
That’s more my approach. You can get this by, eg, assuming a little bit of average utilitrianism alongside your other values.
I don’t think you do, you are just saying that you do.
I don’t see how you can distinguish the two? For a ethical belief that has direct practical implications (e.g. “eating animals is bad”), you can accuse someone of being hypocritical by pointing out that they don’t actually act that way (e.g. they eat a lot of meat). But the repugnant conclusion isn’t directly applicable to practical decisions—nothing an individual can do will change the world enough to bring it about, and the repugnant conclusion doesn’t directly imply anything about the marginal value of quality vs. quantity of lives.
If you mean you don’t believe I would take practical steps that favored the supposedly repugnant conclusion if I had a choice, then you are mistaken. For example, I am opposed to the use of contraception because it keeps population lower, and I would maintain this opposition even if it were clearly shown that with the increasing population, the standard of living would continue to decline until everyone’s lives were barely worth living. This affects me in practical ways such as what I try to persuade other people to do, what I would vote for, what I would do myself in regard to a family, and so on.
How many women have you impregnated so far?
First of all, this is rude, especially if I am woman myself.
Second, I am interested in increasing the population, but I am also interested in other things. (And this does not mean that I want these other things and a low population instead of a high population; I expect a high population to happen whether or not I am involved in bringing it about, so I can achieve both goals by working mainly for the other goals.)
Eh, I concede you have a point there re actively working toward spreading utility as thin as possible. I still have trouble believing that you truly mean what you say. But hey, I’ve been wrong before.