I am more inclined to reject the premise about adding very happy lives increasing overall happiness. If inequality is bad, adding very happy lives to a larger population produces more inequality than adding them to a smaller population. If the population is large enough, adding the happy lives can decrease overall utility.
Freaky. Adding very happy lives at no cost to others seems like an unqualified win to me. I do reject the idea that inequality is always bad, which probably explains our disagreement on this.
Visible, salient inequality can reduce both gross and net happiness in some populations, but that’s not a necessary part of moral reasoning, just an observed situation of current humanity.
I am more inclined to reject the premise about adding very happy lives increasing overall happiness. If inequality is bad, adding very happy lives to a larger population produces more inequality than adding them to a smaller population. If the population is large enough, adding the happy lives can decrease overall utility.
That isn’t one of the premises—it didn’t say very happy, it just said happy—at least minimally happy.
So, your rejection is significantly stronger than needed in order to dodge the repugnant conclusion. It’s also more dubious.
Freaky. Adding very happy lives at no cost to others seems like an unqualified win to me. I do reject the idea that inequality is always bad, which probably explains our disagreement on this.
Visible, salient inequality can reduce both gross and net happiness in some populations, but that’s not a necessary part of moral reasoning, just an observed situation of current humanity.
That’s more my approach. You can get this by, eg, assuming a little bit of average utilitrianism alongside your other values.