I don’t see how you can distinguish the two? For a ethical belief that has direct practical implications (e.g. “eating animals is bad”), you can accuse someone of being hypocritical by pointing out that they don’t actually act that way (e.g. they eat a lot of meat). But the repugnant conclusion isn’t directly applicable to practical decisions—nothing an individual can do will change the world enough to bring it about, and the repugnant conclusion doesn’t directly imply anything about the marginal value of quality vs. quantity of lives.
If you mean you don’t believe I would take practical steps that favored the supposedly repugnant conclusion if I had a choice, then you are mistaken. For example, I am opposed to the use of contraception because it keeps population lower, and I would maintain this opposition even if it were clearly shown that with the increasing population, the standard of living would continue to decline until everyone’s lives were barely worth living. This affects me in practical ways such as what I try to persuade other people to do, what I would vote for, what I would do myself in regard to a family, and so on.
First of all, this is rude, especially if I am woman myself.
Second, I am interested in increasing the population, but I am also interested in other things. (And this does not mean that I want these other things and a low population instead of a high population; I expect a high population to happen whether or not I am involved in bringing it about, so I can achieve both goals by working mainly for the other goals.)
Eh, I concede you have a point there re actively working toward spreading utility as thin as possible. I still have trouble believing that you truly mean what you say. But hey, I’ve been wrong before.
I don’t think you do, you are just saying that you do.
I don’t see how you can distinguish the two? For a ethical belief that has direct practical implications (e.g. “eating animals is bad”), you can accuse someone of being hypocritical by pointing out that they don’t actually act that way (e.g. they eat a lot of meat). But the repugnant conclusion isn’t directly applicable to practical decisions—nothing an individual can do will change the world enough to bring it about, and the repugnant conclusion doesn’t directly imply anything about the marginal value of quality vs. quantity of lives.
If you mean you don’t believe I would take practical steps that favored the supposedly repugnant conclusion if I had a choice, then you are mistaken. For example, I am opposed to the use of contraception because it keeps population lower, and I would maintain this opposition even if it were clearly shown that with the increasing population, the standard of living would continue to decline until everyone’s lives were barely worth living. This affects me in practical ways such as what I try to persuade other people to do, what I would vote for, what I would do myself in regard to a family, and so on.
How many women have you impregnated so far?
First of all, this is rude, especially if I am woman myself.
Second, I am interested in increasing the population, but I am also interested in other things. (And this does not mean that I want these other things and a low population instead of a high population; I expect a high population to happen whether or not I am involved in bringing it about, so I can achieve both goals by working mainly for the other goals.)
Eh, I concede you have a point there re actively working toward spreading utility as thin as possible. I still have trouble believing that you truly mean what you say. But hey, I’ve been wrong before.