Easy reader version for consequentialists: I’m like a consequentialist with a cherry on top. I think this cherry on top is very, very important, and like to borrow moralistic terminology to talk about it. Its presence makes me a very bad consequentialist sometimes, but I think that’s fine.
I don’t think cutting out deontology entirely would be a good thing. I do think that the relative weights of deontological and consequentialist rules needs to be considered, and that choosing inaction in a 5 lives:1 life trolley problem strongly suggests misweighting. But that’s just a thought experiment; and I wouldn’t consider it wrong to choose inaction in, say, a 1.2 lives:1 life trolley problem.
I don’t think cutting out deontology entirely would be a good thing. I do think that the relative weights of deontological and consequentialist rules needs to be considered, and that choosing inaction in a 5 lives:1 life trolley problem strongly suggests misweighting. But that’s just a thought experiment; and I wouldn’t consider it wrong to choose inaction in, say, a 1.2 lives:1 life trolley problem.
I agree (if not on 1.2 figure, then still on some 1+epsilon).
It’s analogous to, say, prosecuting homosexuals. If some people feel bad emotions caused by others’ homosexuality, this reason is weaker than disutility caused by the prosecution, and so sufficiently reflective bargaining between these reasons results in not prosecuting it (it’s also much easier to adjust attitude towards homosexuality than one’s sexual orientation, in the long run).
Here, we have moral intuitions that suggest adhering to moral principles and virtues, with disutility of overcoming them (in general, or just in high-stakes situations) bargaining against disutility of following them and thus making suboptimal decisions. Of these two, consequences ought to win out, as they can be much more severe (while the psychological disutility is bounded), and can’t be systematically dissolved (while a culture of consequentialism could eventually make it psychologically easier to suppress non-consequentialist drives).
Unclear. I wanted to refer to legal acceptance as reflective distillation of social attitude as much as social attitude itself. Maybe still incorrect English usage?
Can’t parse.
Easy reader version for consequentialists: I’m like a consequentialist with a cherry on top. I think this cherry on top is very, very important, and like to borrow moralistic terminology to talk about it. Its presence makes me a very bad consequentialist sometimes, but I think that’s fine.
If this cherry on top costs people lives, it’s not “fine”, it’s evil incarnate. You should cut this part of yourself out without mercy.
(Compare to your Luminosity vampires, that are sometimes good, nice people, even if they eat people.)
I don’t think cutting out deontology entirely would be a good thing. I do think that the relative weights of deontological and consequentialist rules needs to be considered, and that choosing inaction in a 5 lives:1 life trolley problem strongly suggests misweighting. But that’s just a thought experiment; and I wouldn’t consider it wrong to choose inaction in, say, a 1.2 lives:1 life trolley problem.
I agree (if not on 1.2 figure, then still on some 1+epsilon).
It’s analogous to, say, prosecuting homosexuals. If some people feel bad emotions caused by others’ homosexuality, this reason is weaker than disutility caused by the prosecution, and so sufficiently reflective bargaining between these reasons results in not prosecuting it (it’s also much easier to adjust attitude towards homosexuality than one’s sexual orientation, in the long run).
Here, we have moral intuitions that suggest adhering to moral principles and virtues, with disutility of overcoming them (in general, or just in high-stakes situations) bargaining against disutility of following them and thus making suboptimal decisions. Of these two, consequences ought to win out, as they can be much more severe (while the psychological disutility is bounded), and can’t be systematically dissolved (while a culture of consequentialism could eventually make it psychologically easier to suppress non-consequentialist drives).
I think you mean “persecuting”, although depending on what exactly you’re talking about I suppose you could mean “prosecuting”.
Unclear. I wanted to refer to legal acceptance as reflective distillation of social attitude as much as social attitude itself. Maybe still incorrect English usage?