I’m ok with being proselytized; I don’t think there’s a good solution to the problem that doesn’t depend on either an optimistic interpretation of events or a way-way-higher-than-I-have valuing of free will for its own sake (which may also involve contradictory interpretations of free will.)
I am not convinced the moderators would be okay with you being proselytized.
Thinking about this and about your question though I have considered ways that we could tangentially discuss it. Would you mind offering a definitive statement on the problem of pain that we could discuss from?
I’d say it boils down to the idea that a good God would not allow the kind of suffering that does, in fact, happen.
If you’d feel more comfortable carrying the discussion elsewhere, I’m fine with that. (I haven’t noticed an LW rule against giving out my own email address, but I’m not sure if I’ve looked well enough.)
I am content having the discussion here. I do think this is the appropriate space.
I was hoping that you would be able to posit a specific definition, as opposed to a general boiling down to. One of the difficulties with this is that without a defining example what we are actually discussing may become confused with the examples.
The reason I asked if you would be willing to offer the statement is so that I wouldn’t seem to be railroading you into a discussion in my favour. I have an example of such a statement, but I worry that by proposing it the definitive statement I make will become sticky and then influence yours—and so it would seem that I have railroaded you into a discussion in my favour.
I have put an example below. Hopefully hidden in spoiler tags so you can decide for yourself if you want to see it before thinking of your own. If the spoiler tags don’t work then you’re going to have to choose to not read on.
To be in pain is always worse than to not be in pain. To love someone is to reduce their pain in any way you can. If God loves people He would reduce their pain to zero. Since there is pain, either God is not loving or He is not capable of reducing their pain to zero.
I was mostly looking for a general indication of which category your response falls into, but sure, I’ll formulate my thoughts/version a little more specifically.
There exists emotional pain, much of which does not have enough redeeming side effects to make it preferable over the option of not experiencing it. A loving being would seek to reduce that pain, within their own physical/emotional limits and capability of doing so. If a being is as ultimate as God is described as, especially if it made the whole system in the first place, then reducing that pain is possible and an all-loving God would have done it.
much of which does not have enough redeeming side effects to make it preferable over the option of not experiencing it.
I am not sure this works as a statement of fact. Do you think we could try and come to some kind of agreement on a quantitative amount that does not have redeeming side effects? Or better still, how much of a redeeming side effect makes experiencing pain preferable to not experiencing it?
A loving being would seek to reduce that pain
Why? What is the likelihood that a loving being would do so? Does this become prescriptive? Do people who do not do so become unloving beings?
If a being is as ultimate as God is described as, especially if it made the whole system in the first place, then reducing that pain is possible and an all-loving God would have done it.
This follows logically from your previous statements—supposing that they are true. I don’t think this is the crux of the discussion.
What are your thoughts? Where would you like to start?
No, I don’t want to quantify pain. Honestly, I think it takes optimism to look at the variety and extremes of suffering and decide they might all be worth it in some way. Do you have that optimism? What do you think makes the suffering worth it, if so?
Do people who do not do so become unloving beings?
Some caveats—”less than maximally loving” rather than “unloving”, and the aforementioned restriction on “within the being’s physical and emotional limits”—but basically, yes, if you can reduce someone’s suffering and don’t, you’re not loving them as much as you could.
The axioms that build up to the logical conclusion. I think that what you said there logically follows if the statements that precede it are true.
if you can reduce someone’s suffering and don’t, you’re not loving them as much as you could.
If you are happy doing so I would like to focus on this statement first. My selfish reasons are that it is the easiest for me to discuss and on account of being in the middle of the chain directly influences the statements that come before and after it.
If you will allow our discussion to focus on this statement, I have a question: from whose perspective must suffering be reduced?
If you are happy doing so I would like to focus on this statement first.
I mean, sure, we can focus on that. But I feel like you’re doing a lot of inquiring as to my position without giving me even a rough idea of your own. Which is a little frustrating, fyi.
from whose perspective must suffering be reduced?
Mine? I’m not really clear what you’re asking. The suffering I want reduced is the suffering experienced from the perspective of the person suffering. I’m the one who’s doing the wanting (although the vast majority of sufferers want their suffering reduced as well). I’m not really a moral objectivist, so it’s my subjective moral-things-that-I-care-about that I’m asking a hypothetical God to live up to.
I feel like you’re doing a lot of inquiring as to my position without giving me even a rough idea of your own. Which is a little frustrating, fyi.
I do apologise for the frustration this state of affairs brings. It’s not for nothing though, I don’t want to be in a position to be accused of dictating the conversation. If I just came in with “we will speak about [x] in such a way that we are forced into a paradigm as defined by [y]” it would be unfair to you, and to anyone reading.
I am trying to minimise this by giving you the power to steer and direct the definitions and the direction of the conversation.
The suffering I want reduced is the suffering experienced from the perspective of the person suffering.
This is an excellent perspective.
To be loving is to—within your power—reduce the suffering of a person, as perceived by them, as much as possible.
I am going to write an example, and ask you if the person “A” is loving.
A small child “B” is in the habit of running across the street after their ball.
Their parent “A” has two options:
If A allows B to continue then A has minimised suffering
If A stops B then A has imposed suffering
Is A loving by allowing B to continue running out onto the road unimpeded?
A imposes suffering (not-chase-ball) in order to prevent a greater suffering (hit-by-car); and it is important that A does not have the option to prevent hit-by-car except by imposing not-chase-ball. Because A didn’t create the system in the first place and has outside constraints imposed by reality on A’s options. Thus, within A’s limits, imposing the lesser suffering is the maximally loving option that A has.
within A’s limits, imposing the lesser suffering is the maximally loving option that A has.
This is not so as defined. Suffering is not from the perspective of the one inflicting or reducing it, but from the perspective of the one whom experiences it. A cannot be loving by imposing a lesser suffering from A’s perspective—it has to be from the perspective of B.
And from the perspective of B it is not a case of a little suffering now to avoid a potential greater suffering later but suffering now, or no suffering now.
If you would like to update our definition to more robustly include the ability for an outside observer to choose a lesser suffering, while still inflicting suffering, now would be the time.
Alternatively we can continue with the current definition and state that by imposing suffering on B, A is being unloving.
Both forms of suffering, not-chase-ball and hit-by-car, would be suffering that is endured by B. In that sense, they’re both from B’s perspective, even though B never experiences hit-by-car, which is the whole point. A is choosing an action which results in less suffering from B’s perspective than B will experience if A chooses otherwise, even if B doesn’t happen to know that.
If you’re using perspective in a different sense, then you’re making a different point that I’m not currently following.
Note: Sorry for slow replies. I am working in a different city this week and have limited time and access. The problems of life I’m afraid.
If you’re using perspective in a different sense, then you’re making a different point that I’m not currently following.
I am using the same sense of perspective that you are. I was saying that until actually experienced, the suffering of being hit by a car exists only in the mind of A. It is potential, but not real. B has no concept—or at best no ability to truly imagine—the suffering that would come. From A’s perspective they only know the suffering of being restrained from chasing their ball.
You are correct in that if B gets hit by a car, then the suffering will be experienced by B, but the definition that we have used in the sequence of our problem of pain doesn’t allow for potential suffering—only suffering that is actually experienced.
I am happy updating our definitive statement to include potential suffering not yet experienced by a person but understood by an outside observer.
the definition that we have used in the sequence of our problem of pain doesn’t allow for potential suffering—only suffering that is actually experienced
Honestly, I feel like you are playing word games, and I think I’ve lost interest in continuing the conversation.
What’s your resolution to the problem of pain?
I don’t have one that I think is rationally valid that would not come across as proselytizing.
I’m ok with being proselytized; I don’t think there’s a good solution to the problem that doesn’t depend on either an optimistic interpretation of events or a way-way-higher-than-I-have valuing of free will for its own sake (which may also involve contradictory interpretations of free will.)
I am not convinced the moderators would be okay with you being proselytized.
Thinking about this and about your question though I have considered ways that we could tangentially discuss it. Would you mind offering a definitive statement on the problem of pain that we could discuss from?
I would rather not discuss from assumptions.
I’d say it boils down to the idea that a good God would not allow the kind of suffering that does, in fact, happen.
If you’d feel more comfortable carrying the discussion elsewhere, I’m fine with that. (I haven’t noticed an LW rule against giving out my own email address, but I’m not sure if I’ve looked well enough.)
I am content having the discussion here. I do think this is the appropriate space.
I was hoping that you would be able to posit a specific definition, as opposed to a general boiling down to. One of the difficulties with this is that without a defining example what we are actually discussing may become confused with the examples.
The reason I asked if you would be willing to offer the statement is so that I wouldn’t seem to be railroading you into a discussion in my favour. I have an example of such a statement, but I worry that by proposing it the definitive statement I make will become sticky and then influence yours—and so it would seem that I have railroaded you into a discussion in my favour.
I have put an example below. Hopefully hidden in spoiler tags so you can decide for yourself if you want to see it before thinking of your own. If the spoiler tags don’t work then you’re going to have to choose to not read on.
To be in pain is always worse than to not be in pain. To love someone is to reduce their pain in any way you can. If God loves people He would reduce their pain to zero. Since there is pain, either God is not loving or He is not capable of reducing their pain to zero.
I was mostly looking for a general indication of which category your response falls into, but sure, I’ll formulate my thoughts/version a little more specifically.
There exists emotional pain, much of which does not have enough redeeming side effects to make it preferable over the option of not experiencing it. A loving being would seek to reduce that pain, within their own physical/emotional limits and capability of doing so. If a being is as ultimate as God is described as, especially if it made the whole system in the first place, then reducing that pain is possible and an all-loving God would have done it.
Thank you for your definition.
I am content taking this as a given.
I am not sure this works as a statement of fact. Do you think we could try and come to some kind of agreement on a quantitative amount that does not have redeeming side effects? Or better still, how much of a redeeming side effect makes experiencing pain preferable to not experiencing it?
Why? What is the likelihood that a loving being would do so? Does this become prescriptive? Do people who do not do so become unloving beings?
This follows logically from your previous statements—supposing that they are true. I don’t think this is the crux of the discussion.
What are your thoughts? Where would you like to start?
No, I don’t want to quantify pain. Honestly, I think it takes optimism to look at the variety and extremes of suffering and decide they might all be worth it in some way. Do you have that optimism? What do you think makes the suffering worth it, if so?
Some caveats—”less than maximally loving” rather than “unloving”, and the aforementioned restriction on “within the being’s physical and emotional limits”—but basically, yes, if you can reduce someone’s suffering and don’t, you’re not loving them as much as you could.
What do you think IS the crux of the discussion?
The axioms that build up to the logical conclusion. I think that what you said there logically follows if the statements that precede it are true.
If you are happy doing so I would like to focus on this statement first. My selfish reasons are that it is the easiest for me to discuss and on account of being in the middle of the chain directly influences the statements that come before and after it.
If you will allow our discussion to focus on this statement, I have a question: from whose perspective must suffering be reduced?
I mean, sure, we can focus on that. But I feel like you’re doing a lot of inquiring as to my position without giving me even a rough idea of your own. Which is a little frustrating, fyi.
Mine? I’m not really clear what you’re asking. The suffering I want reduced is the suffering experienced from the perspective of the person suffering. I’m the one who’s doing the wanting (although the vast majority of sufferers want their suffering reduced as well). I’m not really a moral objectivist, so it’s my subjective moral-things-that-I-care-about that I’m asking a hypothetical God to live up to.
I do apologise for the frustration this state of affairs brings. It’s not for nothing though, I don’t want to be in a position to be accused of dictating the conversation. If I just came in with “we will speak about [x] in such a way that we are forced into a paradigm as defined by [y]” it would be unfair to you, and to anyone reading.
I am trying to minimise this by giving you the power to steer and direct the definitions and the direction of the conversation.
This is an excellent perspective.
To be loving is to—within your power—reduce the suffering of a person, as perceived by them, as much as possible.
I am going to write an example, and ask you if the person “A” is loving.
A small child “B” is in the habit of running across the street after their ball.
Their parent “A” has two options:
If A allows B to continue then A has minimised suffering
If A stops B then A has imposed suffering
Is A loving by allowing B to continue running out onto the road unimpeded?
Ah, the parent defense.
A imposes suffering (not-chase-ball) in order to prevent a greater suffering (hit-by-car); and it is important that A does not have the option to prevent hit-by-car except by imposing not-chase-ball. Because A didn’t create the system in the first place and has outside constraints imposed by reality on A’s options. Thus, within A’s limits, imposing the lesser suffering is the maximally loving option that A has.
This is not so as defined. Suffering is not from the perspective of the one inflicting or reducing it, but from the perspective of the one whom experiences it. A cannot be loving by imposing a lesser suffering from A’s perspective—it has to be from the perspective of B.
And from the perspective of B it is not a case of a little suffering now to avoid a potential greater suffering later but suffering now, or no suffering now.
If you would like to update our definition to more robustly include the ability for an outside observer to choose a lesser suffering, while still inflicting suffering, now would be the time.
Alternatively we can continue with the current definition and state that by imposing suffering on B, A is being unloving.
Both forms of suffering, not-chase-ball and hit-by-car, would be suffering that is endured by B. In that sense, they’re both from B’s perspective, even though B never experiences hit-by-car, which is the whole point. A is choosing an action which results in less suffering from B’s perspective than B will experience if A chooses otherwise, even if B doesn’t happen to know that.
If you’re using perspective in a different sense, then you’re making a different point that I’m not currently following.
Note: Sorry for slow replies. I am working in a different city this week and have limited time and access. The problems of life I’m afraid.
I am using the same sense of perspective that you are. I was saying that until actually experienced, the suffering of being hit by a car exists only in the mind of A. It is potential, but not real. B has no concept—or at best no ability to truly imagine—the suffering that would come. From A’s perspective they only know the suffering of being restrained from chasing their ball.
You are correct in that if B gets hit by a car, then the suffering will be experienced by B, but the definition that we have used in the sequence of our problem of pain doesn’t allow for potential suffering—only suffering that is actually experienced.
I am happy updating our definitive statement to include potential suffering not yet experienced by a person but understood by an outside observer.
Honestly, I feel like you are playing word games, and I think I’ve lost interest in continuing the conversation.