A imposes suffering (not-chase-ball) in order to prevent a greater suffering (hit-by-car); and it is important that A does not have the option to prevent hit-by-car except by imposing not-chase-ball. Because A didn’t create the system in the first place and has outside constraints imposed by reality on A’s options. Thus, within A’s limits, imposing the lesser suffering is the maximally loving option that A has.
within A’s limits, imposing the lesser suffering is the maximally loving option that A has.
This is not so as defined. Suffering is not from the perspective of the one inflicting or reducing it, but from the perspective of the one whom experiences it. A cannot be loving by imposing a lesser suffering from A’s perspective—it has to be from the perspective of B.
And from the perspective of B it is not a case of a little suffering now to avoid a potential greater suffering later but suffering now, or no suffering now.
If you would like to update our definition to more robustly include the ability for an outside observer to choose a lesser suffering, while still inflicting suffering, now would be the time.
Alternatively we can continue with the current definition and state that by imposing suffering on B, A is being unloving.
Both forms of suffering, not-chase-ball and hit-by-car, would be suffering that is endured by B. In that sense, they’re both from B’s perspective, even though B never experiences hit-by-car, which is the whole point. A is choosing an action which results in less suffering from B’s perspective than B will experience if A chooses otherwise, even if B doesn’t happen to know that.
If you’re using perspective in a different sense, then you’re making a different point that I’m not currently following.
Note: Sorry for slow replies. I am working in a different city this week and have limited time and access. The problems of life I’m afraid.
If you’re using perspective in a different sense, then you’re making a different point that I’m not currently following.
I am using the same sense of perspective that you are. I was saying that until actually experienced, the suffering of being hit by a car exists only in the mind of A. It is potential, but not real. B has no concept—or at best no ability to truly imagine—the suffering that would come. From A’s perspective they only know the suffering of being restrained from chasing their ball.
You are correct in that if B gets hit by a car, then the suffering will be experienced by B, but the definition that we have used in the sequence of our problem of pain doesn’t allow for potential suffering—only suffering that is actually experienced.
I am happy updating our definitive statement to include potential suffering not yet experienced by a person but understood by an outside observer.
the definition that we have used in the sequence of our problem of pain doesn’t allow for potential suffering—only suffering that is actually experienced
Honestly, I feel like you are playing word games, and I think I’ve lost interest in continuing the conversation.
Ah, the parent defense.
A imposes suffering (not-chase-ball) in order to prevent a greater suffering (hit-by-car); and it is important that A does not have the option to prevent hit-by-car except by imposing not-chase-ball. Because A didn’t create the system in the first place and has outside constraints imposed by reality on A’s options. Thus, within A’s limits, imposing the lesser suffering is the maximally loving option that A has.
This is not so as defined. Suffering is not from the perspective of the one inflicting or reducing it, but from the perspective of the one whom experiences it. A cannot be loving by imposing a lesser suffering from A’s perspective—it has to be from the perspective of B.
And from the perspective of B it is not a case of a little suffering now to avoid a potential greater suffering later but suffering now, or no suffering now.
If you would like to update our definition to more robustly include the ability for an outside observer to choose a lesser suffering, while still inflicting suffering, now would be the time.
Alternatively we can continue with the current definition and state that by imposing suffering on B, A is being unloving.
Both forms of suffering, not-chase-ball and hit-by-car, would be suffering that is endured by B. In that sense, they’re both from B’s perspective, even though B never experiences hit-by-car, which is the whole point. A is choosing an action which results in less suffering from B’s perspective than B will experience if A chooses otherwise, even if B doesn’t happen to know that.
If you’re using perspective in a different sense, then you’re making a different point that I’m not currently following.
Note: Sorry for slow replies. I am working in a different city this week and have limited time and access. The problems of life I’m afraid.
I am using the same sense of perspective that you are. I was saying that until actually experienced, the suffering of being hit by a car exists only in the mind of A. It is potential, but not real. B has no concept—or at best no ability to truly imagine—the suffering that would come. From A’s perspective they only know the suffering of being restrained from chasing their ball.
You are correct in that if B gets hit by a car, then the suffering will be experienced by B, but the definition that we have used in the sequence of our problem of pain doesn’t allow for potential suffering—only suffering that is actually experienced.
I am happy updating our definitive statement to include potential suffering not yet experienced by a person but understood by an outside observer.
Honestly, I feel like you are playing word games, and I think I’ve lost interest in continuing the conversation.