No, I don’t want to quantify pain. Honestly, I think it takes optimism to look at the variety and extremes of suffering and decide they might all be worth it in some way. Do you have that optimism? What do you think makes the suffering worth it, if so?
Do people who do not do so become unloving beings?
Some caveats—”less than maximally loving” rather than “unloving”, and the aforementioned restriction on “within the being’s physical and emotional limits”—but basically, yes, if you can reduce someone’s suffering and don’t, you’re not loving them as much as you could.
The axioms that build up to the logical conclusion. I think that what you said there logically follows if the statements that precede it are true.
if you can reduce someone’s suffering and don’t, you’re not loving them as much as you could.
If you are happy doing so I would like to focus on this statement first. My selfish reasons are that it is the easiest for me to discuss and on account of being in the middle of the chain directly influences the statements that come before and after it.
If you will allow our discussion to focus on this statement, I have a question: from whose perspective must suffering be reduced?
If you are happy doing so I would like to focus on this statement first.
I mean, sure, we can focus on that. But I feel like you’re doing a lot of inquiring as to my position without giving me even a rough idea of your own. Which is a little frustrating, fyi.
from whose perspective must suffering be reduced?
Mine? I’m not really clear what you’re asking. The suffering I want reduced is the suffering experienced from the perspective of the person suffering. I’m the one who’s doing the wanting (although the vast majority of sufferers want their suffering reduced as well). I’m not really a moral objectivist, so it’s my subjective moral-things-that-I-care-about that I’m asking a hypothetical God to live up to.
I feel like you’re doing a lot of inquiring as to my position without giving me even a rough idea of your own. Which is a little frustrating, fyi.
I do apologise for the frustration this state of affairs brings. It’s not for nothing though, I don’t want to be in a position to be accused of dictating the conversation. If I just came in with “we will speak about [x] in such a way that we are forced into a paradigm as defined by [y]” it would be unfair to you, and to anyone reading.
I am trying to minimise this by giving you the power to steer and direct the definitions and the direction of the conversation.
The suffering I want reduced is the suffering experienced from the perspective of the person suffering.
This is an excellent perspective.
To be loving is to—within your power—reduce the suffering of a person, as perceived by them, as much as possible.
I am going to write an example, and ask you if the person “A” is loving.
A small child “B” is in the habit of running across the street after their ball.
Their parent “A” has two options:
If A allows B to continue then A has minimised suffering
If A stops B then A has imposed suffering
Is A loving by allowing B to continue running out onto the road unimpeded?
A imposes suffering (not-chase-ball) in order to prevent a greater suffering (hit-by-car); and it is important that A does not have the option to prevent hit-by-car except by imposing not-chase-ball. Because A didn’t create the system in the first place and has outside constraints imposed by reality on A’s options. Thus, within A’s limits, imposing the lesser suffering is the maximally loving option that A has.
within A’s limits, imposing the lesser suffering is the maximally loving option that A has.
This is not so as defined. Suffering is not from the perspective of the one inflicting or reducing it, but from the perspective of the one whom experiences it. A cannot be loving by imposing a lesser suffering from A’s perspective—it has to be from the perspective of B.
And from the perspective of B it is not a case of a little suffering now to avoid a potential greater suffering later but suffering now, or no suffering now.
If you would like to update our definition to more robustly include the ability for an outside observer to choose a lesser suffering, while still inflicting suffering, now would be the time.
Alternatively we can continue with the current definition and state that by imposing suffering on B, A is being unloving.
Both forms of suffering, not-chase-ball and hit-by-car, would be suffering that is endured by B. In that sense, they’re both from B’s perspective, even though B never experiences hit-by-car, which is the whole point. A is choosing an action which results in less suffering from B’s perspective than B will experience if A chooses otherwise, even if B doesn’t happen to know that.
If you’re using perspective in a different sense, then you’re making a different point that I’m not currently following.
Note: Sorry for slow replies. I am working in a different city this week and have limited time and access. The problems of life I’m afraid.
If you’re using perspective in a different sense, then you’re making a different point that I’m not currently following.
I am using the same sense of perspective that you are. I was saying that until actually experienced, the suffering of being hit by a car exists only in the mind of A. It is potential, but not real. B has no concept—or at best no ability to truly imagine—the suffering that would come. From A’s perspective they only know the suffering of being restrained from chasing their ball.
You are correct in that if B gets hit by a car, then the suffering will be experienced by B, but the definition that we have used in the sequence of our problem of pain doesn’t allow for potential suffering—only suffering that is actually experienced.
I am happy updating our definitive statement to include potential suffering not yet experienced by a person but understood by an outside observer.
the definition that we have used in the sequence of our problem of pain doesn’t allow for potential suffering—only suffering that is actually experienced
Honestly, I feel like you are playing word games, and I think I’ve lost interest in continuing the conversation.
No, I don’t want to quantify pain. Honestly, I think it takes optimism to look at the variety and extremes of suffering and decide they might all be worth it in some way. Do you have that optimism? What do you think makes the suffering worth it, if so?
Some caveats—”less than maximally loving” rather than “unloving”, and the aforementioned restriction on “within the being’s physical and emotional limits”—but basically, yes, if you can reduce someone’s suffering and don’t, you’re not loving them as much as you could.
What do you think IS the crux of the discussion?
The axioms that build up to the logical conclusion. I think that what you said there logically follows if the statements that precede it are true.
If you are happy doing so I would like to focus on this statement first. My selfish reasons are that it is the easiest for me to discuss and on account of being in the middle of the chain directly influences the statements that come before and after it.
If you will allow our discussion to focus on this statement, I have a question: from whose perspective must suffering be reduced?
I mean, sure, we can focus on that. But I feel like you’re doing a lot of inquiring as to my position without giving me even a rough idea of your own. Which is a little frustrating, fyi.
Mine? I’m not really clear what you’re asking. The suffering I want reduced is the suffering experienced from the perspective of the person suffering. I’m the one who’s doing the wanting (although the vast majority of sufferers want their suffering reduced as well). I’m not really a moral objectivist, so it’s my subjective moral-things-that-I-care-about that I’m asking a hypothetical God to live up to.
I do apologise for the frustration this state of affairs brings. It’s not for nothing though, I don’t want to be in a position to be accused of dictating the conversation. If I just came in with “we will speak about [x] in such a way that we are forced into a paradigm as defined by [y]” it would be unfair to you, and to anyone reading.
I am trying to minimise this by giving you the power to steer and direct the definitions and the direction of the conversation.
This is an excellent perspective.
To be loving is to—within your power—reduce the suffering of a person, as perceived by them, as much as possible.
I am going to write an example, and ask you if the person “A” is loving.
A small child “B” is in the habit of running across the street after their ball.
Their parent “A” has two options:
If A allows B to continue then A has minimised suffering
If A stops B then A has imposed suffering
Is A loving by allowing B to continue running out onto the road unimpeded?
Ah, the parent defense.
A imposes suffering (not-chase-ball) in order to prevent a greater suffering (hit-by-car); and it is important that A does not have the option to prevent hit-by-car except by imposing not-chase-ball. Because A didn’t create the system in the first place and has outside constraints imposed by reality on A’s options. Thus, within A’s limits, imposing the lesser suffering is the maximally loving option that A has.
This is not so as defined. Suffering is not from the perspective of the one inflicting or reducing it, but from the perspective of the one whom experiences it. A cannot be loving by imposing a lesser suffering from A’s perspective—it has to be from the perspective of B.
And from the perspective of B it is not a case of a little suffering now to avoid a potential greater suffering later but suffering now, or no suffering now.
If you would like to update our definition to more robustly include the ability for an outside observer to choose a lesser suffering, while still inflicting suffering, now would be the time.
Alternatively we can continue with the current definition and state that by imposing suffering on B, A is being unloving.
Both forms of suffering, not-chase-ball and hit-by-car, would be suffering that is endured by B. In that sense, they’re both from B’s perspective, even though B never experiences hit-by-car, which is the whole point. A is choosing an action which results in less suffering from B’s perspective than B will experience if A chooses otherwise, even if B doesn’t happen to know that.
If you’re using perspective in a different sense, then you’re making a different point that I’m not currently following.
Note: Sorry for slow replies. I am working in a different city this week and have limited time and access. The problems of life I’m afraid.
I am using the same sense of perspective that you are. I was saying that until actually experienced, the suffering of being hit by a car exists only in the mind of A. It is potential, but not real. B has no concept—or at best no ability to truly imagine—the suffering that would come. From A’s perspective they only know the suffering of being restrained from chasing their ball.
You are correct in that if B gets hit by a car, then the suffering will be experienced by B, but the definition that we have used in the sequence of our problem of pain doesn’t allow for potential suffering—only suffering that is actually experienced.
I am happy updating our definitive statement to include potential suffering not yet experienced by a person but understood by an outside observer.
Honestly, I feel like you are playing word games, and I think I’ve lost interest in continuing the conversation.