being a “good person” requires having properties X, Y, and Z. Well, it turns out that no one, or nearly no one, has properties X&Y&Z, and also couldn’t achieve them quickly even with effort. Therefore, no one is a “good person” by that definition.
Some examples of varying flavour, to see if I’ve understood:
Being a good person means not being racist, *but* being racist involves unconscious components (which Susan has limited control over because they are below conscious awareness) and structural components (which Susan has limited control over because she is not a world dictator). Therefore Susan is racist, therefore not good.
Being a good person means not exploiting other people abusively, *but* large parts of the world economy rely on exploiting people, and Bob, so long as he lives and breathes, cannot help passively exploiting people, so he cannot be good.
Alice likes to think of herself as a good person, but according to Robin Hanson, most of what she is doing turns out to be signalling. Alice is dismayed that she is a much shallower and more egotistical person than she had previously imagined.
But the problem with these criteria isn’t that they’re unsatisfiable! The problem is that they are subverted by malicious actors, who use equivocation (plus cache invalidation lag) as a sort of ‘exploit’ on people’s sense of morality. Consider:
Everyone agrees that being a good person means not being racist… if by that is meant “not knowingly behaving in a racist way”, “treating people equally regardless of race”, etc. But along come the equivocators, who declare that actually, “being racist involves unconscious and structural components”; and because people tend to be bad at keeping track of these sorts of equivocations, and their epistemic consequences, they still believe that being a good person means not being racist; but in combination with this new definition of “racist” (which was not operative when that initial belief was constructed), they are now faced with this “no one is a good person” conclusion, which is the result of an exploit.
Everyone agrees that being a good person means not exploiting people abusively… if by that is meant “not betraying trusts, not personally choosing to abuse anyone, not knowingly participating in abusive dynamics if you can easily avoid it”, etc. But along come the equivocators again, who declare that actually, “large parts of the world economy rely on exploiting people”, and that as a consequence, just existing in the modern world is exploitative! And once again, people still believe that being good means not being exploitative, yet in combination with this new definition (which, again, was not operative when the original moral belief was constructed), they’re faced with the “moral paradox” and are led to Calvinism.
If “racism” had always been understood to have “unconscious and structural components”, its avoidance (which is obviously impossible, under this formulation) could never have been accepted as a component of general virtue; and similarly for “exploitation”—if one can “exploit” merely by existing, and if this had always been understood to be part of the concept of “exploitation”, then “exploitation” wouldn’t be considered unvirtuous. But in fact the “moral exploit” consists precisely of abusing the slowness of conceptual cache invalidation, so to speak, by substituting malicious concepts for ordinary ones.
The Hansonian case is different, of course, and more complicated. It involves deeper questions, and not only moral ones but also questions of free will, etc. I do not think it is a good example of what we’re talking about, but in any case it ought to be discussed separately; it follows a very different pattern from the others.
Certainly many people do the sort of thing you’re describing, but I think you’re fighting the hypothetical. The post as I understand it is talking about people who fail to live up to their own definitions of being a good person.
For example, someone might believe that they are not a racist, because they treat people equally regardless of race, while in fact they are reluctant to shake the hands of black people in circumstances where they would be happy to shake the hands of white people. This hypothetical person has not consciously noticed that this is a pattern of behavior; from their perspective they make the individual decisions based on their feelings at the time, which do not involve any conscious intention to treat black people differently than white, and they haven’t considered the data closely enough to notice that those feelings are reliably more negative with regards to black people than white. If they heard that someone else avoided shaking black people’s hands, they would think that was a racist thing to do.
Our example, if they are heavily invested in an internal narrative of being a good non-racist sort of person, might react very negatively to having this behavior pointed out to them. It is a true fact about their behavior, and not even a very negative one, but in their own internal ontology it is the sort of thing Bad People do, as a Good Person they do not do bad things, and therefore telling them they’re doing it is (when it comes to their emotional experience) the same as telling them they are a Bad Person.
This feels very bad! Fortunately, there is a convenient loophole: if you’re a Good Person, then whoever told you you’re a Bad Person must have been trying to hurt you. How awful they are, to make such a good person as you feel so bad! (To be clear, most of this is usually not consciously reasoned through—if it were it would be easier to notice the faulty logic—but rather directly experienced as though it were true.)
I think the dynamic I describe is the same one jessicata is describing, and it is a very common human failing.
When it comes to the difficulty of being or not being a good person, I think this is a matter of whether or not it’s possible to be or not be a good person by one’s own standards (e.g., one might believe that it’s wrong to consume animal products, but be unable to become a vegan due to health concerns). If you fail to live up to your own moral standards and are invested in your self-image as the sort of person who meets them, it is tempting to revise the moral standards, internally avoid thinking about the fact that your actions lead to consequences you consider negative, treat people who point out your failings as attackers, etc.; jessicata’s proposal is one potential way to avoid falling into that trap (if you already aren’t a Good Person, then it’s not so frightening to have done something a Good Person wouldn’t do).
Some examples of varying flavour, to see if I’ve understood:
Being a good person means not being racist, *but* being racist involves unconscious components (which Susan has limited control over because they are below conscious awareness) and structural components (which Susan has limited control over because she is not a world dictator). Therefore Susan is racist, therefore not good.
Being a good person means not exploiting other people abusively, *but* large parts of the world economy rely on exploiting people, and Bob, so long as he lives and breathes, cannot help passively exploiting people, so he cannot be good.
Alice likes to think of herself as a good person, but according to Robin Hanson, most of what she is doing turns out to be signalling. Alice is dismayed that she is a much shallower and more egotistical person than she had previously imagined.
But the problem with these criteria isn’t that they’re unsatisfiable! The problem is that they are subverted by malicious actors, who use equivocation (plus cache invalidation lag) as a sort of ‘exploit’ on people’s sense of morality. Consider:
Everyone agrees that being a good person means not being racist… if by that is meant “not knowingly behaving in a racist way”, “treating people equally regardless of race”, etc. But along come the equivocators, who declare that actually, “being racist involves unconscious and structural components”; and because people tend to be bad at keeping track of these sorts of equivocations, and their epistemic consequences, they still believe that being a good person means not being racist; but in combination with this new definition of “racist” (which was not operative when that initial belief was constructed), they are now faced with this “no one is a good person” conclusion, which is the result of an exploit.
Everyone agrees that being a good person means not exploiting people abusively… if by that is meant “not betraying trusts, not personally choosing to abuse anyone, not knowingly participating in abusive dynamics if you can easily avoid it”, etc. But along come the equivocators again, who declare that actually, “large parts of the world economy rely on exploiting people”, and that as a consequence, just existing in the modern world is exploitative! And once again, people still believe that being good means not being exploitative, yet in combination with this new definition (which, again, was not operative when the original moral belief was constructed), they’re faced with the “moral paradox” and are led to Calvinism.
If “racism” had always been understood to have “unconscious and structural components”, its avoidance (which is obviously impossible, under this formulation) could never have been accepted as a component of general virtue; and similarly for “exploitation”—if one can “exploit” merely by existing, and if this had always been understood to be part of the concept of “exploitation”, then “exploitation” wouldn’t be considered unvirtuous. But in fact the “moral exploit” consists precisely of abusing the slowness of conceptual cache invalidation, so to speak, by substituting malicious concepts for ordinary ones.
The Hansonian case is different, of course, and more complicated. It involves deeper questions, and not only moral ones but also questions of free will, etc. I do not think it is a good example of what we’re talking about, but in any case it ought to be discussed separately; it follows a very different pattern from the others.
Certainly many people do the sort of thing you’re describing, but I think you’re fighting the hypothetical. The post as I understand it is talking about people who fail to live up to their own definitions of being a good person.
For example, someone might believe that they are not a racist, because they treat people equally regardless of race, while in fact they are reluctant to shake the hands of black people in circumstances where they would be happy to shake the hands of white people. This hypothetical person has not consciously noticed that this is a pattern of behavior; from their perspective they make the individual decisions based on their feelings at the time, which do not involve any conscious intention to treat black people differently than white, and they haven’t considered the data closely enough to notice that those feelings are reliably more negative with regards to black people than white. If they heard that someone else avoided shaking black people’s hands, they would think that was a racist thing to do.
Our example, if they are heavily invested in an internal narrative of being a good non-racist sort of person, might react very negatively to having this behavior pointed out to them. It is a true fact about their behavior, and not even a very negative one, but in their own internal ontology it is the sort of thing Bad People do, as a Good Person they do not do bad things, and therefore telling them they’re doing it is (when it comes to their emotional experience) the same as telling them they are a Bad Person.
This feels very bad! Fortunately, there is a convenient loophole: if you’re a Good Person, then whoever told you you’re a Bad Person must have been trying to hurt you. How awful they are, to make such a good person as you feel so bad! (To be clear, most of this is usually not consciously reasoned through—if it were it would be easier to notice the faulty logic—but rather directly experienced as though it were true.)
I think the dynamic I describe is the same one jessicata is describing, and it is a very common human failing.
When it comes to the difficulty of being or not being a good person, I think this is a matter of whether or not it’s possible to be or not be a good person by one’s own standards (e.g., one might believe that it’s wrong to consume animal products, but be unable to become a vegan due to health concerns). If you fail to live up to your own moral standards and are invested in your self-image as the sort of person who meets them, it is tempting to revise the moral standards, internally avoid thinking about the fact that your actions lead to consequences you consider negative, treat people who point out your failings as attackers, etc.; jessicata’s proposal is one potential way to avoid falling into that trap (if you already aren’t a Good Person, then it’s not so frightening to have done something a Good Person wouldn’t do).
Yes, this is exactly what I mean.