see also my eaforum at https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/users/dirk
dirk
Karma: 75
I’m against intuitive terminology [epistemic status: 60%] because it creates the illusion of transparency; opaque terms make it clear you’re missing something, but if you already have an intuitive definition that differs from the author’s it’s easy to substitute yours in without realizing you’ve misunderstood.
I’m not alexithymic; I directly experience my emotions and have, additionally, introspective access to my preferences. However, some things manifest directly as preferences which I have been shocked to realize in my old age, were in fact emotions all along. (In rare cases these are stronger than the ones directly-felt even, despite reliably seeming on initial inspection to be simply neutral metadata).
“Or”, in casual conversation, is typically interpreted and meant as being, implicitly, exclusive (this is whence the ‘and/or’ construction). It’s not how “or” is used in formal logic that they would misunderstand, but rather, whether you meant it in the formal-logic sense.
Meta/object level is one possible mixup but it doesn’t need to be that. Alternative example, is/ought: Cedar objects to thing Y. Dusk explains that it happens because Z. Cedar reiterates that it shouldn’t happen, Dusk clarifies that in fact it is the natural outcome of Z, and we’re off once more.
Classic type of argument-gone-wrong (also IMO a way autistic ‘hyperliteralism’ or ‘over-concreteness’ can look in practice, though I expect that isn’t always what’s behind it): Ashton makes a meta-level point X based on Birch’s meta point Y about object-level subject matter Z. Ashton thinks the topic of conversation is Y and Z is only relevant as the jumping-off point that sparked it, while Birch wanted to discuss Z and sees X as only relevant insofar as it pertains to Z. Birch explains that X is incorrect with respect to Z; Ashton, frustrated, reiterates that Y is incorrect with respect to X. This can proceed for quite some time with each feeling as though the other has dragged a sensible discussion onto their irrelevant pet issue; Ashton sees Birch’s continual returns to Z as a gotcha distracting from the meta-level topic XY, whilst Birch in turn sees Ashton’s focus on the meta-level point as sophistry to avoid addressing the object-level topic YZ. It feels almost exactly the same to be on either side of this, so misunderstandings like this are difficult to detect or resolve while involved in one.
dirk’s Shortform
I apologize for my lack of time to find the sources for this belief, so I could well be wrong, but my recollection of looking up a similar idea is that I found it to be reversible only in the very earliest stages, when the tooth has weakened but not yet developed a cavity proper.
Re: post/comment quality, one thing I do suspect helps which I didn’t see anyone mention (and imo a potential upside of rate-limiting) is that age-old forum standard, lurking moar. I think it can actually be hugely valuable to spend awhile reading the historical and present discussion of a site and absorbing its norms of discourse before attempting to contribute; in particular, it’s useful for picking up illegible subtleties of phrasing and thought that distinguish quality from non-quality contributors, and for getting a sense of the shared context and background knowledge that users expect each other to have.
I can’t vouch for the quality as I don’t speak Russian myself, but https://lyricstranslate.com/en/крылья-krylya-wings.html has a human-authored translation, and I found google translate to line up with it reasonably well should that be your go-to.
I get the idea you’re pointing at but in point of fact, people mostly purchased their clothes in 1974 :P
But what does a user look like who uses the feature when it requires a single click, but doesn’t use the feature if it requires a double click? Clearly the data shows that these people exist, but I couldn’t easily point to a single person for whom that intervention is decisive in determining their behavior.
I use Discord, which recently switched the file-upload feature from requiring one click to requiring two (the first of which, if you single-click as you used to rather than double-clicking to skip, opens a context menu that I never use and did not want). I do still share images most of the time, but every single time I upload an image it’s noticeably higher-friction and more frustrating than it previously was, and if I valued the feature less I can easily imagine ceasing to use it.
Prior to the update, the path from wanting to share a file to actually doing so was sufficiently short to feel effortless. The extra click, even though it’s minor, adds a stumbling block in the middle of what was previously an effectively-atomic action (and moreover, adds latency; there’s not very much more, if I remember to make my click a double, but there’s still some, and as a user I consider latency one of the worst crimes a developer can commit).
Sneers and loaded terms are, IMO, evidence that the summary is unlikely to be true. It’s not impossible to sneer while having an accurate understanding of the situation, but typically sneering goes along with a lack of interest in the details of whatever one sneers at and a lack of concern for the accuracy of one’s characterization; mechanically, a sneer is a status attack on something the sneerer feels contempt for. It can also be a sign of dishonesty: sneering feels good, so people are generally inclined to lower their epistemic standards when presented with a description of something that makes it sound sneerworthy, and this is a convenient impulse for bad actors to exploit.
Due to these same features, I think they are also evidence that the speaker is, if they dox the target of the sneering, likely to be doing so out of a desire to hurt the target and without careful consideration for whether the ostensible justification for the doxxing is true.
Certainly many people do the sort of thing you’re describing, but I think you’re fighting the hypothetical. The post as I understand it is talking about people who fail to live up to their own definitions of being a good person.
For example, someone might believe that they are not a racist, because they treat people equally regardless of race, while in fact they are reluctant to shake the hands of black people in circumstances where they would be happy to shake the hands of white people. This hypothetical person has not consciously noticed that this is a pattern of behavior; from their perspective they make the individual decisions based on their feelings at the time, which do not involve any conscious intention to treat black people differently than white, and they haven’t considered the data closely enough to notice that those feelings are reliably more negative with regards to black people than white. If they heard that someone else avoided shaking black people’s hands, they would think that was a racist thing to do.
Our example, if they are heavily invested in an internal narrative of being a good non-racist sort of person, might react very negatively to having this behavior pointed out to them. It is a true fact about their behavior, and not even a very negative one, but in their own internal ontology it is the sort of thing Bad People do, as a Good Person they do not do bad things, and therefore telling them they’re doing it is (when it comes to their emotional experience) the same as telling them they are a Bad Person.
This feels very bad! Fortunately, there is a convenient loophole: if you’re a Good Person, then whoever told you you’re a Bad Person must have been trying to hurt you. How awful they are, to make such a good person as you feel so bad! (To be clear, most of this is usually not consciously reasoned through—if it were it would be easier to notice the faulty logic—but rather directly experienced as though it were true.)
I think the dynamic I describe is the same one jessicata is describing, and it is a very common human failing.
When it comes to the difficulty of being or not being a good person, I think this is a matter of whether or not it’s possible to be or not be a good person by one’s own standards (e.g., one might believe that it’s wrong to consume animal products, but be unable to become a vegan due to health concerns). If you fail to live up to your own moral standards and are invested in your self-image as the sort of person who meets them, it is tempting to revise the moral standards, internally avoid thinking about the fact that your actions lead to consequences you consider negative, treat people who point out your failings as attackers, etc.; jessicata’s proposal is one potential way to avoid falling into that trap (if you already aren’t a Good Person, then it’s not so frightening to have done something a Good Person wouldn’t do).
https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/bvK44CdpG7mGpQHbw/the-usd100-000-truman-prize-rewarding-anonymous-ea-work possibly? (I’m unclear on whether it’s still ongoing, unfortunately).
AIUI the actual arguments are over on Zack’s blog due to being (in Zack’s judgement) Too Spicy For LessWrong (that is, about trans people). (Short version, Blanchardianism coupled with the opinion that most people who disagree are ignoring obvious truths about sex differences for political reasons; I expect the long version is more carefully-reasoned than is apparent in this perhaps-uncharitable summary.)
Manifold also explicitly encourages insider trading; I think they’re just not trying to emulate real-money markets.
I didn’t remember it as key, but the highlights I’d cached about the whole affair (before rereading the post) were that he’d been astroturfing reviews and that he’d required unpaid ‘volunteer’ work from employees (well, and that employees had been doing some of the astroturfing, possibly on ‘volunteer’ time).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gish_gallop is slightly distinct but very similar, too.
Great question! Here are some ways you could try to find out:
Lurk forums where DMT users hang out; maybe they discuss their reasons for using it!
Ask someone who uses DMT; maybe they have an explanation!
Research the effects of DMT; maybe there are desirable effects you just don’t know about!
Can you think of any more?
Sometimes a vague phrasing is not an inaccurate demarkation of a more precise concept, but an accurate demarkation of an imprecise concept