Now each of those consciousnesses produce the same output as they would in a classical universe, so even though they exist in superposition, they themselves see only a single possible input. To them it will appear as though when they looked at the input the superposition collapses, leaving only a single random result, but on the outside view we can see that the whole thing exists in a giant superposition.
This strongly mirrors how the MWI says the entire universe is in a giant superposition, but each individual consciousness sees a collapsed state due to decoherence preventing them interfering with other consciousnesses.
In a decoherently superposed multiverse, the decoherence itself ensures that each mind is objectively non interacting with the others , and therefore has no reason to detect itself as in superposition.
But what happens inside a quantum computer is a coherent superposition. And it isn’t a coherent superposition of classical states, because there is no fact of the matter about the basis of a superposed state.
I take it as obvious that a simulation of a conscious human will be conscious, given that it will answer exactly the same to any questions about consciousness as an actual human
So would a zombie. A computational duplicate is a functional duplicate, and a functional duplicate would answer the same questions in the same way, conscious or not.
It not strictly a p zombie because it’s not a physical duplicate. It’s a functional duplicate. A functional duplicate of a person will answer questions about consciousness in the same way whether it’s conscious of not. If it is conscious that would not violate physicalism about consciousness, because the physics is different.
From the wiki “Physicalists typically deny the possibility of zombies: if a p-zombie is atom-by-atom identical to a human being in our universe, then our speech can be explained by the same mechanisms as the zombie’s — and yet it would seem awfully peculiar that our words and actions would have an entirely materialistic explanation, but also, furthermore, our universe happens to contain exactly the right bridging law such that our utterances about consciousness are true and our consciousness syncs up with what our merely physical bodies do. It’s too much of a stretch: Occam’s razor dictates that we favor a monistic universe with one uniform set of laws.”
The computational simulation you are talking about is not an atom by atom duplicate, so the above does not apply.
Almost everyone I know who thinks p-zombies can’t exist agree that a perfect simulation of a human can’t be a zombie either for identical reasons. I’ve never seen someone claim that p-zombies can’t exist, but functional zombies can.
That would mean that the dependence of consciousness on physics is impossible.
No, it wouldn’t. Consciousness depends on the pattern, which, in turn, depends on physics. “Depending on physics” is a very vague phrase. It’s possible to define it in a way that will make it false for what I said, in which case consciousness doesn’t “depend on physics.” There is no point in using very vague phrases to check if they apply to a particular ontology of consciousness. That’s worthless—it gives us no information.
Instead, let’s concentrate on what’s actually the case. That’s the important thing. Not the semantics used (like “depending on physics”).
The Blockhead experiment (the way Wikipedia describes it) can’t pass the Turing test. The response to every sentence doesn’t depend only on the last sentence, but also on all sentences before that (and on all responses, but those might be deterministic). We can’t build anything that has all possible responses preprogrammed (like a giant lookup table) and only takes as its input the last sentence in the conversation (well, we can, but it wouldn’t pass the Turing test).
If you meant it in the sense that’s not true for what I wrote, then it’s not true. That’s why I recommended not relying on ill-defined phrases, and instead concentrating on the topic itself.
But what happens inside a quantum computer is a coherent superposition. And it isn’t a coherent superposition of classical states, because there is no fact of the matter about the basis of a superposed state.
And yet each consciousness will still only see a classical state, or otherwise it would not answer exactly the same as the original consciousness. Hence this is an example of Many Worlds (even though it doesn’t rely on decoherence to work).
You’re starting at the end.
There’s no fact of the matter about how many consciousnesses there are, including whether there are any. The output of the whole system can be explained by computation. It might be “as if” a bunch of classical computations were occurring , but that doesn’t mean they are. A Giant Look Up Table can behave as though it is computing, but isnt.
Talking about the fact that each consciouness will only see a classical state doesn’t make sense, because they are in a quantum superposition state. Just like it does not make sense to say that the photon went either right or left in the double slit experiment.
In a decoherently superposed multiverse, the decoherence itself ensures that each mind is objectively non interacting with the others , and therefore has no reason to detect itself as in superposition.
But what happens inside a quantum computer is a coherent superposition. And it isn’t a coherent superposition of classical states, because there is no fact of the matter about the basis of a superposed state.
So would a zombie. A computational duplicate is a functional duplicate, and a functional duplicate would answer the same questions in the same way, conscious or not.
I’m taking it was obvious was that zombies can’t exist. See https://www.lesswrong.com/tag/zombies for lots of arguments as to why that is indeed obvious.
It not strictly a p zombie because it’s not a physical duplicate. It’s a functional duplicate. A functional duplicate of a person will answer questions about consciousness in the same way whether it’s conscious of not. If it is conscious that would not violate physicalism about consciousness, because the physics is different.
That’s not making any sense to me, sorry.
From the wiki “Physicalists typically deny the possibility of zombies: if a p-zombie is atom-by-atom identical to a human being in our universe, then our speech can be explained by the same mechanisms as the zombie’s — and yet it would seem awfully peculiar that our words and actions would have an entirely materialistic explanation, but also, furthermore, our universe happens to contain exactly the right bridging law such that our utterances about consciousness are true and our consciousness syncs up with what our merely physical bodies do. It’s too much of a stretch: Occam’s razor dictates that we favor a monistic universe with one uniform set of laws.”
The computational simulation you are talking about is not an atom by atom duplicate, so the above does not apply.
Almost everyone I know who thinks p-zombies can’t exist agree that a perfect simulation of a human can’t be a zombie either for identical reasons. I’ve never seen someone claim that p-zombies can’t exist, but functional zombies can.
I don’t think it’s an unusual position in mainstream philosophy. Anyway, it’s the arguments that count.
A functional duplicate of a consciousness necessarily has consciousness.
That can be shown by many thought experiments.
That would mean that the dependence of consciousness on physics is impossible.
Thought experiments only demonstrate plausability and implausibility.
There are also thought experiments, such as the Blockhead, showing the implausability of functional realisbility.
No, it wouldn’t. Consciousness depends on the pattern, which, in turn, depends on physics. “Depending on physics” is a very vague phrase. It’s possible to define it in a way that will make it false for what I said, in which case consciousness doesn’t “depend on physics.” There is no point in using very vague phrases to check if they apply to a particular ontology of consciousness. That’s worthless—it gives us no information.
Instead, let’s concentrate on what’s actually the case. That’s the important thing. Not the semantics used (like “depending on physics”).
The Blockhead experiment (the way Wikipedia describes it) can’t pass the Turing test. The response to every sentence doesn’t depend only on the last sentence, but also on all sentences before that (and on all responses, but those might be deterministic). We can’t build anything that has all possible responses preprogrammed (like a giant lookup table) and only takes as its input the last sentence in the conversation (well, we can, but it wouldn’t pass the Turing test).
But obviously not in the sense I meant.if I meant in that sense I wouldn’t be disagreeing with you.
If you meant it in the sense that’s not true for what I wrote, then it’s not true. That’s why I recommended not relying on ill-defined phrases, and instead concentrating on the topic itself.
And yet each consciousness will still only see a classical state, or otherwise it would not answer exactly the same as the original consciousness. Hence this is an example of Many Worlds (even though it doesn’t rely on decoherence to work).
You’re starting at the end. There’s no fact of the matter about how many consciousnesses there are, including whether there are any. The output of the whole system can be explained by computation. It might be “as if” a bunch of classical computations were occurring , but that doesn’t mean they are. A Giant Look Up Table can behave as though it is computing, but isnt.
Talking about the fact that each consciouness will only see a classical state doesn’t make sense, because they are in a quantum superposition state. Just like it does not make sense to say that the photon went either right or left in the double slit experiment.