It not strictly a p zombie because it’s not a physical duplicate. It’s a functional duplicate. A functional duplicate of a person will answer questions about consciousness in the same way whether it’s conscious of not. If it is conscious that would not violate physicalism about consciousness, because the physics is different.
From the wiki “Physicalists typically deny the possibility of zombies: if a p-zombie is atom-by-atom identical to a human being in our universe, then our speech can be explained by the same mechanisms as the zombie’s — and yet it would seem awfully peculiar that our words and actions would have an entirely materialistic explanation, but also, furthermore, our universe happens to contain exactly the right bridging law such that our utterances about consciousness are true and our consciousness syncs up with what our merely physical bodies do. It’s too much of a stretch: Occam’s razor dictates that we favor a monistic universe with one uniform set of laws.”
The computational simulation you are talking about is not an atom by atom duplicate, so the above does not apply.
Almost everyone I know who thinks p-zombies can’t exist agree that a perfect simulation of a human can’t be a zombie either for identical reasons. I’ve never seen someone claim that p-zombies can’t exist, but functional zombies can.
That would mean that the dependence of consciousness on physics is impossible.
No, it wouldn’t. Consciousness depends on the pattern, which, in turn, depends on physics. “Depending on physics” is a very vague phrase. It’s possible to define it in a way that will make it false for what I said, in which case consciousness doesn’t “depend on physics.” There is no point in using very vague phrases to check if they apply to a particular ontology of consciousness. That’s worthless—it gives us no information.
Instead, let’s concentrate on what’s actually the case. That’s the important thing. Not the semantics used (like “depending on physics”).
The Blockhead experiment (the way Wikipedia describes it) can’t pass the Turing test. The response to every sentence doesn’t depend only on the last sentence, but also on all sentences before that (and on all responses, but those might be deterministic). We can’t build anything that has all possible responses preprogrammed (like a giant lookup table) and only takes as its input the last sentence in the conversation (well, we can, but it wouldn’t pass the Turing test).
If you meant it in the sense that’s not true for what I wrote, then it’s not true. That’s why I recommended not relying on ill-defined phrases, and instead concentrating on the topic itself.
It not strictly a p zombie because it’s not a physical duplicate. It’s a functional duplicate. A functional duplicate of a person will answer questions about consciousness in the same way whether it’s conscious of not. If it is conscious that would not violate physicalism about consciousness, because the physics is different.
That’s not making any sense to me, sorry.
From the wiki “Physicalists typically deny the possibility of zombies: if a p-zombie is atom-by-atom identical to a human being in our universe, then our speech can be explained by the same mechanisms as the zombie’s — and yet it would seem awfully peculiar that our words and actions would have an entirely materialistic explanation, but also, furthermore, our universe happens to contain exactly the right bridging law such that our utterances about consciousness are true and our consciousness syncs up with what our merely physical bodies do. It’s too much of a stretch: Occam’s razor dictates that we favor a monistic universe with one uniform set of laws.”
The computational simulation you are talking about is not an atom by atom duplicate, so the above does not apply.
Almost everyone I know who thinks p-zombies can’t exist agree that a perfect simulation of a human can’t be a zombie either for identical reasons. I’ve never seen someone claim that p-zombies can’t exist, but functional zombies can.
I don’t think it’s an unusual position in mainstream philosophy. Anyway, it’s the arguments that count.
A functional duplicate of a consciousness necessarily has consciousness.
That can be shown by many thought experiments.
That would mean that the dependence of consciousness on physics is impossible.
Thought experiments only demonstrate plausability and implausibility.
There are also thought experiments, such as the Blockhead, showing the implausability of functional realisbility.
No, it wouldn’t. Consciousness depends on the pattern, which, in turn, depends on physics. “Depending on physics” is a very vague phrase. It’s possible to define it in a way that will make it false for what I said, in which case consciousness doesn’t “depend on physics.” There is no point in using very vague phrases to check if they apply to a particular ontology of consciousness. That’s worthless—it gives us no information.
Instead, let’s concentrate on what’s actually the case. That’s the important thing. Not the semantics used (like “depending on physics”).
The Blockhead experiment (the way Wikipedia describes it) can’t pass the Turing test. The response to every sentence doesn’t depend only on the last sentence, but also on all sentences before that (and on all responses, but those might be deterministic). We can’t build anything that has all possible responses preprogrammed (like a giant lookup table) and only takes as its input the last sentence in the conversation (well, we can, but it wouldn’t pass the Turing test).
But obviously not in the sense I meant.if I meant in that sense I wouldn’t be disagreeing with you.
If you meant it in the sense that’s not true for what I wrote, then it’s not true. That’s why I recommended not relying on ill-defined phrases, and instead concentrating on the topic itself.